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Abstract
I argue that party competition in legislative elections is partly a function of presiden-
tial elections. Previous research on spatial competition has assumed that parties are
competing in parliamentary regimes, where the only election of concern for parties
and voters is the legislative election. However, in presidential regimes, presidential
elections lead to relatively centrist positioning of candidates, and coattail e↵ects from
the presidential elections help shape the legislative elections. Through spatial mod-
eling, I demonstrate how presidentialism gives incentives for parties to take centrist
positions in legislative elections. Using cross-national data, I give empirical validation
to the spatial models by showing that presidential elections make parties relatively
more centrist in legislative elections as compared to parties in parliamentary elec-
tions. Further empirical validation is given through case studies on Israel and France,
which have both experienced changes regarding the selection of their executive. The
evidence in these case studies also show that voters’ views of the main parties are
a↵ected by these institutional changes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2008, the Democratic Party in the United States looked nowhere near being sup-
portive of same-sex marriage. While the Democratic Party’s platform that year
backed providing “equal responsibility, benefits, and protections” to same-sex couples
and opposed the Defense of Marriage Act, the platform stopped short of endorsing
same-sex marriage (Peters and Woolley, 2008). In addition, only 19 percent (11 out of
57 Senators) of the Senate Democratic caucus publicly supported same-sex marriage
at the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009.
However, in early 2012, President Barack Obama publicly acknowledged that he
supported same-sex marriage, after previously bring opposed to it (Calmes and Baker,
2012). Later that year, the Democratic Party’s platform in 2012 general election
for the first time included language that endorsed same-sex marriage by a rming
that they “support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal
treatment under law for same-sex couples” (Peters and Woolley, 2012). There was a
markedly-shift change back in the legislature as well. Currently, 94 percent (51 out of
54 Senators) of the Senate Democratic caucus publicly supports same-sex marriage
(Matthews, 2013).
Why would a party have incentives all of the sudden to shift positions on a major
issue? This rapid change in party policy on a major political issue provides for a
1
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puzzle when it comes to understanding the ideological positioning of a party’s legisla-
tive component vis-a`-vis its executive component in presidential regimes. Traditional
accounts of party discipline cannot explain the change in positions, since it occurred
under a presidential regime and not a parliamentary regime (Sartori, 1997; Main-
waring and Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, 1997; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002). Under parliamentary
regimes, parties are traditionally characterized by strong party discipline, due to in-
stitutional incentives that cause legislators to continually support their party leader
on legislation.
Under presidential regimes, however, there are institutional incentives that make
it sometimes beneficial for legislators to not support their party’s leadership on legis-
lation. One manifestation of this is when a legislator represents a district where the
predominant ideology of its constituents runs counter to that of the legislator’s own
party. The legislator will feel pressures to vote in line with their constituents. Given
the separation of branches in presidential regimes, executive election results do not
have any o cial bearing on legislative election results and vice versa. This gives such
legislators more incentive to vote against their party on legislation, in order to ensure
their re-election.
This dynamic is embodied in the vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United
States Congress. In the vote, legislators were highly responsive to constituents’ views
on the bill. As a result, a legislator’s region was a better predictor of how they
voted on the bill than their party a liation. While the leadership of both parties
in Congress supported the legislation, only 61 percent of Democrats in the House
of Representatives voted for the bill, while 80 percent of Republicans voted for it
(Govtrack.us, 2014a). In the Senate, 69 percent of Democrats voted for the bill,
while 82 percent of Senate Republicans voted in favor (Govtrack.us, 2014b).
The di↵erences are starker though when one looks at the regional breakdown of
the vote. In the House, only seven percent of Southerners from either party voted for
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the bill and 90 percent of Northerners from both parties were in favor. In the Senate,
only nine percent of Southerners from both parties were in favor, while 92 percent of
Northerners from either party supported the bill.1
Since legislators’ tenure in o ce is not dependent on the continual support of the
president, there is no immediate incentive for these legislative members to become
more supportive of their de facto party leader on a major policy issue. So, returning
to the original scenario, why was there such a dramatic shift in Senators’ positions
after President Obama’s announcement in so little time, under an institutional ar-
rangement that is not conducive to party discipline? The literature on legislative
party discipline in presidential regimes o↵ers little answers. This literature instead
focuses on endogenous factors facilitating party cohesion (Crook and Hibbing, 1985;
Layman et al., 2006), rather than factors external to the legislative party itself, such
as the presidency.
Previous studies on legislative party positioning have attempted to explain and
model how parties take various positions in elections. Notably, these studies have
argued that parties in two-party systems have incentives to take positions that are
centrist (Downs, 1957). All the while, parties competing in multi-party systems have
incentives to take positions that are non-centrist (Greenberg and Shepsle, 1987; Cox,
1990).
However, these studies all made the same assumption: that the legislative party
system being explained/modeled exists under a parliamentary regime. This assump-
tion is important for two reasons. First, under presidential regimes, voters have to
vote for two di↵erent types of candidates: legislative candidates and presidential can-
didates. Second, presidential elections generally lead to relatively centrist equlibria,
given the majoritarian, winner-take-all nature of presidential elections.
1Southern legislators are defined as members of the House or Senate from any of the 11 states
that were part of the Confederate States of America.
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New research, however, has explained how parties campaign under presidential
regimes. Specifically, presidential regimes lead to the creation of “presidentialized
parties” that have to face tradeo↵s when campaigning in elections (Samuels, 2002).
While in parliamentary regimes parties can focus exclusively on winning seats, par-
ties under presidential regimes must decide how to allocate their resources between
the legislative and presidential elections. Under presidential regimes, winning the
presidency is the bigger prize for parties, since the president is the country’s chief
executive. As a result, parties in these countries are more likely to allocate their
limited resources toward winning the presidential election, as opposed to maximizing
their share of legislative seats.
Furthermore, in presidential regimes, presidents and presidential candidates from
opposing parties have a relative level of autonomy from their counterparts at the
legislative level. This is because of the institutional separation of origin and survival
between the executive and legislative branches in presidential regimes (Samuels and
Shugart, 2010). To the extent that they do not sink or swim together, legislators
in presidential regimes do not have any necessary incentive to follow their executive-
level leaders. This is what makes the same-sex marriage example puzzling for political
scientists. It is not obvious why conservative Democrats would switch positions in
a quick manner, since their own electoral survival is independent of that of their de
facto leader. They can remain in o ce well after President Obama has left o ce due
to term limits.
However, legislators in presidential regimes, while having autonomy from the pres-
ident, will have incentives to make their campaigns appear similar to their executive-
level counterparts’. These incentives come in the form of “coattail e↵ects,” which run
from the executive down to the legislature. These coattail e↵ects are present, since
in presidential regimes, the presidential election generates more attention than the
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legislative election.2
This is why there was a pronounced change in the positions of most Democratic
Senators on same-sex marriage between the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. This
is best evidenced by the fact that the strongest call for including support for same-sex
marriage in the party platform in 2012 came from members of the Senate (Johnson,
2012). While legislators in presidential regimes are not obliged to follow the line of
their presidential candidates to the extent that legislators in parliamentary regimes
have to follow the line of their leader, there still exists incentives for legislators under
presidentialism to follow their leaders as well.
Returning to the previous studies on spatial party competition, we remember
that presidentialism leads to relatively centrist candidates, while parties might have
incentives to take non-centrist positions in legislative elections. However, if we now
assume that the same legislative election is occurring under a presidential regime,
then the parties in the legislative election will instead want to take centrist positions,
similar to their respective presidential candidates.
With that said, in this dissertation, I argue that within presidential regimes,
legislative elections are functions of presidential elections. Specifically, presidential
regimes provide incentives for the legislative parties to adopt positions that are sim-
ilar to their presidential candidates. This means, keeping in mind the centripetal
nature of presidential elections, that legislative parties will have incentives to take
positions that are relatively centrist, just like their counterparts in the presidential
election.
2This, however, is a function of the powers that the president possesses in a given presidential
regime. This dissertation will also look at how variations in presidential powers a↵ect the extent
to which coattail e↵ects from presidential elections are present in legislative elections. In situations
where voters are voting for a weaker president, the e↵ects of presidential elections on legislative
party competition will not be as strong. However, the fact that voters in these countries vote for
a president separate from the legislature is still important, and coattail e↵ects will still be present
(albeit weaker) in these regimes. These distinctions will be explored in the next chapter, when
factors a↵ecting coattail e↵ect strength are discussed.
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This dissertation will show demonstrate things. First, parties will be more centrist
in presidential regimes than parties in parliamentary regimes, other things being
equal. Second, voters have the ability detect ideological shifts made by parties that
result from institutional changes a↵ecting how a country’s chief executive is selected.
This project is important, due to the continued impact that political institutions
have on the actions of parties, politicians, and voters. The original set of theories
explaining party competition was developed during a period where parliamentary
regimes were the predominant form of government throughout the democratic world.
However, the latest wave of democratization has brought about an increase in the
number of democratic presidential regimes. In the mid-1970’s, over 60 percent of the
world’s democracies were parliamentary regimes. In the years since then, the number
of democracies in the world has increased, primarily due to democratization mainly
in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Today, two-thirds of all democracies in the
world elect their presidents directly.
With this in mind, the existing set of theories that explain party competition
is speaking to a smaller and smaller set of the world’s democracies. This limits
our ability to understand party competition across the full spectrum of democracies.
This dissertation therefore has normative implications as well, which concern the
consequences of di↵erent types of democratic institutions. When countries modify
their political institutions, voters are a↵ected by these changes. Research has shown
that di↵ering electoral rules have varying e↵ects on how voters perceive electoral
fairness. Namely, proportional elections lead voters to perceive the democratic process
as being fairer than in countries with less proportional elections (Anderson et al., 2005;
Birch, 2008).
Changes in institutions a↵ect voters’ views toward the democratic process. If pres-
identialism modifies some of the e↵ects that proportional elections have on legislative
party systems, then there are implications with regards to how fair these elections
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are in the minds of voters. These evaluations of the electoral process are critical in
countries that are seeking to consolidate democracy (Elklit, 1999).
Presidentialism’s e↵ect on party systems has implications in other areas as well.
For example, researchers have explored how various electoral systems create di↵erent
policy outcomes (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Golder and Stramski, 2010). This can be
attributed in part to how parties position themselves in response to certain electoral
systems. If presidentialism modifies legislative party systems in a way that is di↵erent
from legislative electoral systems, then we can expect policy outcomes to be di↵erent
in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes.
By presidentialism, I am referring to regimes in which the voters directly elect
their head of state. This would thus include countries that fall into what is called the
“semi-presidential” category, in which there is an elected president alongside a prime
minister who acts as the head of government (Duverger, 1980). This category would
include some countries that are considered to be de facto parliamentary regimes, such
as Ireland, Finland and Portugal. Empirical evidence in this dissertation will show
that even when presidentialism is defined as including semi-presidential regimes, the
incentives will still be strong for parties to behave in more centrist manner.
Furthermore, one of the later chapters is a case study on Israel, where there was
a brief period from 1996 through 2001 in which voters directly elected the Prime
Minister. I will treat this period in Israel as a quasi-presidential regime, due to the
electoral separation created between the executive and the legislature during this
time.
Organization of Dissertation
An overview of the rest of this dissertation now follows. Chapter 2 provides the
theoretical explanation as to why legislative elections become functions of presidential
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elections under presidential regimes. This is done through presenting a series of
spatial models that capture the relationship between presidential candidates and their
legislative parties. The chapter starts o↵ by presenting standard models of spatial
competition, where presidential and legislative elections are modeled separately.
Next, I present a series of new spatial models where the assumption of a world
of presidentialism is added. In these models, the equilibria that were present in the
standard legislative spatial models change. The new models will show that while
non-centrist equilibria are likely in legislative elections under a parliamentary regime,
centrist equilibria can be present if the same elections are held under a presidential
regime.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the empirical evidence that supports the theoretical ar-
guments from Chapter 2. This chapter utilizes evidence from over 400 legislative
elections in over 50 countries over the past several decades. Using data from the
Comparative Manifestos Project and the Median Voter Dataset, several findings are
made.
First, under presidential regimes, countries’ main parties will be ideologically
closer to each other than the main parties in parliamentary regimes, all things being
equal. In addition, the main parties in the legislative election under presidentialism
will be ideologically closer to the position of the median voter than the main par-
ties under parliamentary regimes, all things being equal. The results also show that
within presidential regimes, the main parties are ideologically closer to each other and
the median voter during concurrent elections than similar parties in non-concurrent
elections.
The next two chapters are case studies on two countries that have experienced
institutional changes a↵ecting the selection of their executive: Israel and France.
Chapter 4 provides for a case study on Israel. Israel works as a good case for this
project due to the changes in the selection of their Prime Minister in recent years.
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Between 1996 and 2002, Israel had direct elections for their Prime Minister. This is
in contrast to the selection of prime ministers in other parliamentary regimes, where
they are chosen by the legislature.
The direct election of the Israeli Prime Minister had the e↵ect of turning Israel
into a quasi-presidential regime, where there was a separation of origin between the
executive and the legislature. This reform was put in place in an attempt to reduce the
fragmentation of the highly proportional Israeli party system and to create a stronger
bi-polar party system. However, the reform had the opposite consequences, in that it
increased party system fragmentation during this period. It also had another e↵ect
as well. That is, the switch to direct elections for Prime Minister had the e↵ect of
making the two main parties focus mainly on winning the Prime Ministerial election,
and less so on maximizing their share of legislative seats.
The evidence in this chapter will show that the increased focus on the Prime
Ministerial election by the main parties had several e↵ects. First, the direct elec-
tions for Prime Minister made the main parties downplay party branding during the
campaigns, and instead put an increased emphasis on the parties’ leaders. Second,
it led voters to perceive the main parties as being more centrist during the period
of direct elections for Prime Minister than during the period of pure parliamentary
elections. Third, it caused voters’ feelings toward the two main parties to become
more similar to their feelings to each respective party’s leader during the period of
direct Prime Ministerial elections. In e↵ect, parliamentary elections became a func-
tion of the Prime Ministerial election during the period of direct elections for Prime
Minister.
Chapter 5 is a case study on institutional reform in France. While the previous
Chapter on Israel examines changes in how the executive is selected, Chapter 5 ex-
plores changes to the electoral cycle. Specifically, the chapter looks at the e↵ect of
the constitutional reforms put in place in 2000 which ensured that the legislative elec-
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tion would always occur a month after the Presidential election. Before the change,
Presidential terms were set at seven years, while legislative terms were set at five
years. This meant that most legislative elections occurred in di↵erent years from the
Presidential election.
The new closeness of each legislative election to the Presidential election means
that the coattail e↵ects of the Presidential election have been felt on the legislative
election more since 2000 than before. This is analyzed by looking at the 1997 legisla-
tive election (the last legislative election before the reform) and the 2002 legislative
election (the first legislative election after the reform).
Evidence in this chapter will show that the now-relative concurrence between the
Presidential and legislative elections in France has led to a few changes. First, the
main parties in France campaigned more on substantial policy issues during the 1997
legislative campaign, while the 2002 legislative campaign was devoid of policy issues,
and instead served as a “third round” of the Presidential election. Second, voters
who voted for one of the main candidates in the Presidential election were more
likely to feel ideologically closest to that Presidential candidate’s party in 2002 than
comparable voters did in 1997. Third, voters who identified as centrist were more
likely to feel ideologically closest to either of the two main parties in 2002 than in
1997.
Chapter 6 is the final chapter and gives a summary of the dissertation’s findings.
It will also talk about limitations in this project, as well as give ideas for future
research.
This project takes a multi-methods approach, utilizing a variety of methodological
approaches. This includes using formal modeling for the theoretical argument, various
forms of empirical data analysis, and evidence from primary and secondary qualitative
sources.
In addition, this dissertation involves examining political actors across di↵erent
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levels. First, political parties in the aggregate will be the subject of focus in Chapters
1 and 2. However, in Chapters 3 and 4, in-depth examinations of individual politicians
within parties are presented. This is in addition to analyses of voters in these two
chapters. Thus, I will be looking at the actions and behaviors of parties in the
aggregate, politicians within parties, and voters in this project. Analyzing all three
of these actors will lend more empirical support toward my argument.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Explanation of
Presidentialism’s E↵ect on Party
Competition
An institution does not have an impact only on the behaviors of o ceholders asso-
ciated with that institution or voters. Institutions can also have an impact on other
institutions. This is the case of elected heads of state in democratic regimes, with
regards to how parties ideologically position themselves in legislative elections.
Standard models of party competition in legislative elections make the restric-
tive assumption that the only election occurring in a given country is the legislative
election. In other words, the models assume that the country has a parliamentary
regime.
However, in presidential regimes, most of the attention is focused on the presiden-
tial election, not the legislative election. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the
theoretical explanation as to how parties ideologically position themselves in countries
that directly elect their presidents.
The first portion of the chapter will provide a review of existing research on
spatial modeling and party/candidate positioning. This is followed with providing
the rationale for bringing in assumptions of presidentialism into existing models.
After that, a formal explanation of party/candidate positioning in legislative and
12
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presidential elections separately will be given.
After the models of these two types of elections are presented, the formal process
of modeling legislative elections in presidential regimes will be described. Once it is
explained how legislative elections are modeled within the context of presidentialism,
a survey of the most relevant combinations of presidential and legislative elections
will be shown. This will set up the final portion of the chapter, which will model
these specific combinations.
Literature Review
Models of party competition are concerned with two primary classes of actors: voters
and parties (or candidates). In the models, both classes of actors are assumed to
be acting out of self-interest. This means that voters have an established stake or
interest in the outcome of an election, which lead them to vote in the manner they do.
These models simply assume that voters understand their own self-interests, weigh
alternative choices based on which of them will further their self-interest, and vote
for the candidate or party that was most favorably evaluated. Voters are therefore
acting in a rational manner.
Parties and candidates act rationally as well. Each party or candidate sees a link
between the platform of issues they o↵er, their past records, and personal character-
istics with the number of votes they receive. The parties’ or candidates’ goals are
simply to win the election; whether that entails winning enough votes or seats to do
so, or by maximizing their vote or seat share. In addition, parties and candidates will
have the assumption that voters are self-interested.
Using spatial terms, the voter will vote for the candidate or party that is the
“closest” to them in space, which delineates all of the factors that are of interest
to the voter. The factors might be policy issues, such as taxation, defense, and
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immigration. Factors can also be candidate traits, such as likability and previous
political experience.
In each election modeled, voters decide whom they will vote for through utility
models, denoted as Ui for any given alternative a voter has to choose from. For each
voter, every party or candidate has a utility that is derived from a function. The
closer that a party or candidate is located to a voter, the greater the utility a voter
will receive if that party or candidate is elected. Conversely, the further away a party
or candidate is from a voter; the voter will receive less utility from from that party
or candidate getting elected. The voter votes for the party or candidate that yields
the largest utility. If more than one party or candidate yield the same utility for a
voter, the voter randomizes their vote choice, and each of the parties/candidates has
the same chance of being selected.
It should be kept in mind that the term “self-interest” in this context does not
solely refer to economic self-interest. Self-interest can encompass a broad range of
issues. For example, the issue of whether or not to go to war might be of self-interest
to a voter, since that voter derives self-interest in the form of security (Enelow and
Hinich, 1984).
Downs (1957) took the basic Hotelling-Smithies model of location games involving
two firms (Hotelling, 1929; Smithies, 1941) and applied it to plurality elections with
two candidates. The equilibrium Downs found was similar to Hotelling and Smithies’
in that the model was in equilibrium whenever both candidates took the same posi-
tion, being the location of the median voter. Both candidates move to this location
because either of them would be worse o↵ if they deviated even slightly from that
position.
One of the earliest attempts at spatially modeling party competition in propor-
tional and multiparty elections was done by Greenberg and Shepsle (1987). In their
model, they showed there could be equilibria in which parties took positions away
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from the median voter. Cox (1990) combined an analysis of both plurality and pro-
portional elections to show situations in which both of these elections could have
centrist and non-centrist equilibria. These equilibria are conditional on the district
magnitude, number of candidates (or parties), and the number of votes per voter in
each election.
Work since then has incorporated probabilistic voting into spatial competition
models. These are models where a degree of uncertainty is added into people’s vote
decision. Essentially, voters will not always vote for the candidate that is closest to
them. These models also have a tendency to bring in non-policy factors (Enelow and
Hinich, 1989) and party identification (Adams et al., 2005). Some of the outcomes in
probabilistic spatial models have confirmed Cox’s propositions on centrist and non-
centrist outcomes (Dow, 2001; Schofield, 2004), while others have run counter to them
(Lin et al., 1999; Ezrow, 2005).
Problems With Existing Literature
All of the previous research on spatial models has made an implicit assumption. That
is, parties or candidates position themselves in elections where voters only have to
concern themselves with voting for one branch of government. This assumption is,
I suggest, problematic when we try to apply spatial models to explain party compe-
tition in legislative elections not held under parliamentary regimes. This is because
voters must cast ballots both for a legislative party and a presidential candidate in
presidential regimes and because of the potential impact of presidential elections on
legislative elections.
Because of this electoral separation of the executive and the legislature, a party’s
main goal is to win the executive election, not to maximize their share of legisla-
tive seats. As a result, parties are more likely to organize around that purpose in
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presidential regimes (Samuels, 2002; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). In addition, presi-
dential elections a↵ect legislative elections through “coattail e↵ects,” where a party’s
prospects at the legislative level are a↵ected by their party’s prospects in the presi-
dential election (Jones, 1994; Shugart, 1995).
The coattail e↵ect operates by running down from the more important institution
(the presidency in this case) to the less important institution (the legislature). In
presidential regimes, the presidency is considered the bigger prize for parties. As
a result, presidential elections garner most of the media attention, along with re-
ceiving more campaign donations and having better campaign organizations. These
reasons are why legislative parties are incentivized to run their campaigns around
their party’s presidential candidate, in the hopes of benefitting from the advantages
that presidential candidates possess (Samuels, 2002).
These coattail e↵ects have e↵ects on a regime’s party system as a result. Prior
research has shown that presidentialism can a↵ect the size and fragmentation of the
party system at the legislative level (Jones, 1994; Neto and Cox, 1997; Mainwaring and
Shugart, 1997; Samuels, 2002; Moza↵ar et al., 2003; Golder, 2006; Hicken and Stoll,
2011). In addition, some of this research has shown that presidential coattails can help
a president’s party achieve success in legislative elections (Born, 1984; Mondak, 1993;
Flemming, 1995; Shugart, 1995). Also, voters will also use presidential elections as an
informational shortcut to help guide their choice in the legislative election (Golder,
2006).
A key aspect of a party running their legislative campaign around their party’s
presidential candidate would involve modifying their ideological positions to be more
in tune with their party’s presidential candidate’s. Presidential elections thus work as
an external factor in explaining how parties position themselves ideologically within
the context of presidential regimes. However, previous research on presidentialism
has not specifically analyzed how presidentialism can a↵ect how parties decide to
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ideologically place themselves in legislative elections.
Formally Modeling Legislative and Presidential Elec-
tions Separately
This portion of the chapter will provide separate examples of party competition in
legislative and presidential regimes. First, the positioning of parties in legislative
elections will be presented. This will be followed by a demonstration of the positioning
of candidates in presidential elections.
For both legislative and presidential elections, di↵erent variations of each will
be shown, according to di↵erent balloting rules. For legislative elections, models
will be shown for those that use a majoritarian electoral system and those that use
proportional representation. For presidential elections, models will be presented for
elections that are conducted with a plurality ballot and those that utilize a runo↵
ballot. After the models for both legislative and presidential elections are given, I
will show what happens when legislative elections are modeled within the context of
a presidential regime.
In the following models, there are two classes of actors: parties (or candidates)
and voters. For the models demonstrating spatial competition in legislative elections,
parties will be used, and in the models showing competition in presidential elections,
candidates will be used.
Next, I describe the action space in which the actors take part. The action space
is a policy space which will be defined as X. X is a closed compact set on a one-
dimensional real line, with X = [0, 1]. 0 is the most extreme party position a party
can take on the left, and 1 is the most extreme position a party can take on the right.
However, one-dimension lines are not the only way in which ideology can be mea-
sured. Two-dimensional lines can be used, where issues are grouped into two broad
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categories. This was first devised by Davis et al. (1970). In many cases, this takes the
form of one category representing economic issues, while the other category represents
social issues (Miller and Schofield, 2003).
For this chapter, I will utilize a one-dimensional line instead of a multi-dimensional
policy space. This is because the models I am creating are foundational in nature. I
intend to build them o↵ of the fundamental models which have shaped the discourse
on party competition.
I also assume that there is a uniform distribution of voters on the line. Each party
and candidate will take a position x on X. The positions that parties in legislative
elections take on line X will be denoted by xpi, with i denoting the party that takes
the given position. The positions that presidential candidates take will be denoted
by xci. Furthermore, the position of the median voter on the line will be denoted by
xm. Also, any slight movement by a party or candidate away from a given position
on X will be denoted by  .
First, the parties and candidates place themselves on X simultaneously. After
that, the voters choose the party or candidate that is closest to them on X. Parties
and candidates attain utility through gaining votes. At the same time, voters have
their own utilities in the form of voting for the party or candidate that is most
similar to them. Therefore, parties and candidates therefore maximize their utility
by winning as many votes as possible, while voters maximize their utility by voting
for the party or candidate that is closest to them on X. The utility for voters is in the
form of the perceived benefit, based on their ideology, that a voter expects to receive
if a particular party or candidate is elected into o ce. The utility function for each
alternative a voter faces is:
Upi = 1  |xv   xpi|
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0 xp1 = xp2 = xm 1
Figure 2.1: Two-Party Plurality Legislative Elections
Consequently, the voter will vote for party i if Upi if greater than all other alter-
natives.
Based on the amount of votes they receive, parties and candidates receive a vote
share s. The proportion of the vote a party receives in a legislative election is denoted
by spi. For candidates in a presidential election, sci denotes the proportion of the vote
the candidate received.
Furthermore, I will assume that voters are engaging in sincere voting. That is, the
voters are policy-oriented, and will vote for the candidate or party that is the closest
to their own position. This is the situation for all of the examples in this section.
However, the assumption of proximity voting will be relaxed when I turn to modeling
legislative elections held under presidential regimes.
Also, the utility models will be deterministic. This is in contrast to random util-
ity models, which are probabilistic. In these models, voters do not always vote for
the party or candidate that gives them the greatest utility (Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987; Dixit and Londregan, 2000). While most of the recent developments in spatial
modeling have focused on probabilistic models, it is important to go to the founda-
tional method of spatial modeling. The following models will be the building blocks
of understanding presidentialism’s e↵ect on legislative party competition. This is so
that later on, more advanced modeling practices can better be able to incorporate
presidential assumptions into them. The equilibria described in the models are Nash
equilibria in pure strategies.
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0 xp1 = xp2 = .25 xp3 = xp4 = .75 1
Figure 2.2: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Elections
Legislative Elections
The first scenario among legislative elections that will be described are single-member
district plurality/majoritarian elections. The assumptions that guide the coordination
and exit of candidates for the plurality ballot will be in place here. Therefore, there
will be only two e↵ective parties in this election, being parties 1 and 2 (Duverger,
1964). In this type of election, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be xp1⇤ =
xp2⇤ = xm. The vote shares of each party will be sp1 = sp2. Figure 2.1 shows this
election in pure strategy equilibrium.
The next scenario among legislative elections is one that employs a form of pro-
portional representation (PR). Given that PR elections set a lower threshold for
parties attaining seats than majoritarian elections do, there are always more than
two parties competing in a PR legislative election (Cox, 1997). This means that the
potential number of parties competing in a PR election could be infinite. However,
for this chapter, only two scenarios will be examined: PR elections with four parties
competing, and PR elections where there are three parties competing.
In a four-party PR election, assume that there are four parties competing named
parties 1, 2, 3, and 4. Given the expectations of party positioning when there are four
parties competing in an election, the parties are at a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
when xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25 and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75. This is presented in Figure 2.2.
This leads to vote shares of each party of sp1 = sp2 = sp3 = sp4. This creates a
situation with a non-centrist equilibrium, where all of the parties find it beneficial to
take positions away from the median voter.
Next, assume that there are three parties competing in a PR legislative election
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Figure 2.3: Plurality Presidential Elections
named parties 1, 2, and 3. Unlike the previous scenario, the three-party PR election
will not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this situation, one party will
always have an incentive to leapfrog the other two parties, allowing them to attain
higher share of the vote. This will cause the one of the other two parties to leapfrog
the first party as well, leading to an infinite state of leapfrogging.
The lack of equilibrium in three-party legislative elections only holds when it is as-
sumed the election is occurring under a parliamentary regime. As will be shown later,
when the same three-party legislative election occurs under a presidential regime, a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium can occur under some scenarios.
Presidential Elections
Two types of of presidential elections will be modeled. These elections are those that
are held under a plurality ballot, and those that are held under a runo↵ ballot. For
each presidential election, a voter’s utility function for voting for a specific candidate
is:
Uci = 1  |xv   xci|
Consequently, the voter will vote for candidate i if Uci if greater than all other
alternatives.
First, the pure strategy equilibrium conditions for presidential elections under the
plurality rule will be presented. As shown in Figure 2.3, under this scenario, the
candidate who attains the most votes wins the election. This is regardless of whether
or not they won a majority of votes. Given this rule, there will be incentives for the
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Figure 2.4: Three-Candidate Runo↵ Presidential Elections
coordination and the exit of unviable candidates, save for two candidates (Duverger,
1964). Therefore, there will be only two e↵ective candidates in this election, named
candidates 1 and 2. In this election, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be
xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, where both candidates where end up in the center of the ideological
spectrum. Figure 2.3 shows the equilibrium for this model.
The di↵erence between plurality and runo↵ presidential elections is that in runo↵
elections, presidential candidates have to take into account not only their position in
the first round, but their position in the second round as well. The assumption being
made in this chapter for runo↵ elections is that once a presidential candidate takes
their position in the first round, they will maintain that same position in the second
round. Therefore, the position the candidate takes in the first round will determine
their vote share of sci1 in the first round, and sci2 in the second round.
Two specific types of runo↵ elections will be modeled. These are three-candidate
elections and four-candidate elections. Three-candidate presidential elections are be-
ing shown, because, according to Cox (1997), the fewest number of candidates in
a runo↵ election are always three. Four-candidate presidential elections are being
looked at because in many runo↵ elections, the left’s main presidential candidate
might face a serious competitor to their left, while simultaneously, the right’s main
presidential candidate might face a serious competitor to their right. The distinction
between the two are important, because three-candidate runo↵ elections will lead to a
centrist pure strategy Nash equilibrium. All the while, four-candidate runo↵ elections
can lead to not just a centrist Nash equilibrium, but a range of non-centrist Nash
equilibria as well.
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xc1 = xc2 = [xm   e, xm]
xc3 = xc4 = [xm, xm + e]
Figure 2.5: Four-Candidate Runo↵ Presidential Elections
Figure 2.4 models competition in a three-candidate presidential election. In this
type of election, there will be three candidates named candidates 1, 2, and 3. While
the case of three-party legislative elections did not lead to any pure strategy Nash
equilibria, this will not be the case for three-candidate runo↵ presidential elections.
In this type of election, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ =
xc3⇤ = xm, such that the vote shares of the parties will be sc11 = sc21 = sc31 = .33
and sc12 = sc22 = sc32 = .50 for all possible combinations of match-ups in the second
round. Therefore, the three candidates will end up in a centrist position on the
ideological spectrum.
For four-candidate runo↵ presidential elections, the candidates are candidates 1,
2, 3, and 4. Figure 2.5 shows this type of election. In the case of this election,
there is pure strategy Nash equilibria for any positioning of the candidates where
xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = [xm   e, xm] and xc3⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25).
There is also Nash equilibria in the situation when xc1⇤ = xc3⇤ = [xm   e, xm] and
xc2⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25); and xc1⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm   e, xm] and
xc2⇤ = xc3⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25). These pure strategy Nash equilibria
would lead to vote shares of sc11 = sc21 = sc31 = sc41 = .25 and sc12 = sc22 = sc32 =
sc42 = .50 (for any of the two candidates that advance to the second round).
The equilibria in four-candidate runo↵ elections can fall anywhere within almost
the middle half of the ideological spectrum, allowing for both centrist and non-centrist
equilibria. However, the most non-centrist pure strategy equilibrium is not as non-
centrist as the pure strategy equilibrium in four-party legislative elections. This shows
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that even when the pure strategy equilibrium is non-centrist for a runo↵ presidential
election, it will always give incentives for parties in four-party legislative elections to
move closer to the median voter.
Modeling Legislative Elections in a World of Presi-
dentialism
The final portion of this chapter will show what happens when legislative elections are
assumed to be occurring under a presidential regime. Given the varieties of presiden-
tial elections (pure presidentialism vs. semi-presidentialism and plurality vs. runo↵
ballots) and legislative elections (plurality vs. PR ballots), it has to be determined
which combination of electoral rules will be modeled. Combinations that will be mod-
eled will be ones which reflect the realities of the universe of presidentialism. As seen
in Table 2.1, among presidential regimes, the most common type of electoral system
combination is one where the president is elected through a runo↵ ballot, and the
legislature is elected through PR.
Plurality Runo↵
Majoritarian 5 5
Proportional 8 36
Table 2.1: Combinations of Electoral Systems Used in Presidential and Legislative
Elections in Presidential Regimes
Before the models are presented, I will explain how how parties in legislative
elections earn votes. In the models where I assume a legislative election is occurring
under a presidential regime, I will modify the utilities derived from voting for parties
that have candidates in the presidential election. There are two modifications I will
make to the models. First, instead of simply taking into stock the position of a voter
from a given party, I will now also take into stock the position of the voter from
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Figure 2.6: Majoritarian Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plu-
rality Vote
that party’s presidential candidate, in addition to the position of the party from their
party’s presidential candidate. This is because voters are figuring in the positions of
presidential candidates when coming to vote decision in legislative elections now. If
a voter is at the same position of a presidential candidate, then the utility of voting
for that candidate’s party in the legislative election will increase the closer the party
moves to the location of their presidential candidate. Therefore, the utility function
for a legislative party with a candidate in the presidential election is:
Upi = 1  |xv   xpi| + |xv   xpi|⇥ |xv   xci|
While the utility function for a legislative party without a presidential candidate
is:
Upi = 1  |xv   xpi|
I will model five types of legislative elections under presidential regimes. Three of
the elections will be under presidential regimes where the president is elected through
a plurality ballot, while the other two will be elections under presidential regimes
where the president is elected through a runo↵ ballot. In each election, I assume
that the presidential candidates position themselves on the scale first, followed by the
legislative parties.
Figure 2.6 shows a majoritarian legislative election held under a presidential
regime where the president is elected by plurality vote. If the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, then the pure
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xp3 = [0, 1]
1
Figure 2.7: Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is
Elected by Plurality Vote
0 xc1 = xc2 = xp1 = xp2 = xm
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Figure 2.8: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is
Elected by Plurality Vote
strategy Nash equilibrium for a majoritarian legislative election is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm.
Both of the parties in the legislative election will be at a centrist location.
The next two examples model proportional legislative elections under a regime
where the president is elected by plurality vote. The first model describes competition
in a three-party legislative election, while the second model describes competition in
a four-party legislative election. Figure 2.7 shows party competition in a three-party
legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential
election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium condition for
a three-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm, and any
location on X for party 3 in the legislative election.
Figure 2.8 shows party competition in a four-party legislative election under a
plurality presidential regime. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality
presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium
condition for a four-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ =
xm, and any locations on X for parties 3 and 4 in the legislative election.
Next is the three-party legislative election under a presidential regime where the
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xc1 = xc2 = [xm   e, xm] xc3 = xc4 = [xm, xm + e]
xp1 = xp2 = .25 xp3 = xp4 = .75
Figure 2.9: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is
Elected by Runo↵ Vote
president is elected by runo↵ vote. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a three-
candidate runo↵ presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xc3⇤ = xm, then there is no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the legislative election. However, all three parties
will have incentives to take positions away from xm so that they can maximize their
vote shares as much as possible.
Figure 2.9 shows a four-party PR legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for a four-candidate runo↵ presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = [xm  
e, xm] and xc3⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25), then the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for a four-party proportional or mixed-member legislative election
is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25 and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75.
Adding Coattails
Next, I will further modify the utility functions by taking into account the strength
of the coattail e↵ect in each legislative election. This strength of a coattail e↵ect is
measured with c. When c is greater, it will cause a voter’s utility function for a party
with a presidential candidate to weight the position of themselves from the position
of themselves from the party’s presidential candidate/position of the party from their
presidential candidate more than the position of themselves from the party. When
c is smaller, it will cause a voter’s utility function for a party with a presidential
candidate to weight the position of the party from themselves more than the position
of themselves from the party’s presidential candidate/position of the party from their
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presidential candidate. This will present a problem for parties without presidential
candidates when the coattail e↵ects are stronger. This is because these parties will
yield lower utilities for voters, since they do not have presidential candidates that
increase the utility of voting for them. Therefore, the new utility function for a
legislative party with a candidate in the presidential election is:
Upi = 1  ((1  c)|xv   xpi|) + c⇥ |xv   xpi|⇥ |xv   xci| | c 2 (0, 1)
While the new utility function for a legislative party without a presidential can-
didate is:
Upi = (1  c)(1  |xv   xpi|) | c 2 (0, 1)
There are two ways in which coattail e↵ects can vary in presidential regimes:
timing between the presidential and legislative elections, and the powers that the
president possesses. The timing between the presidential and legislative elections
refers to how close in proximity the legislative elections are to the presidential election.
The closer the two elections are to each other, the stronger the coattail e↵ects on the
legislative election will be. The further apart the two elections are, the weaker the
coattail e↵ects will be on a legislative election. This is because both media attention
and popular attention are more focused on the presidential election the closer a day
is to the presidential election. This increased media attention on the presidential
election will have the e↵ect of drowning out attention on the legislative election.
Predictably, the situation in which the coattail e↵ects will be the strongest is when
the presidential and legislative elections are held on the same day. Conversely, the
coattail e↵ects will be the weakest when the legislative election is held at the midpoint
of a presidential term.
When the president has more institutional powers, the more emphasis that par-
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ties place on winning the presidential election over that of maximizing their share
of legislative seats. As a result, the presidential election’s coattail e↵ects on the
legislative election will be stronger. This means that pure presidential regimes will
have the strongest coattail e↵ects, while semi-presidential regimes will have weaker
coattail e↵ects on the legislative election. However, semi-presidential regimes vary
in the amount of powers that are given to the president. Criticisms of Duverger’s
(1980) definition of semi-presidentialism has led to the creation of a greater distinc-
tion among semi-presidential regimes that take into account the variance in powers.
Shugart and Carey (1992) identified two sub-groups of semi-presidential regimes. The
first sub-group consists of premier-presidential regimes and the second sub-group is
president-parliamentary regimes. The key di↵erence between the two sub-groups is
that the president’s powers are greater under president-parliamentary regimes than
under premier-presidential regimes.
The extent to which c is higher or lower will depend on the combination of these
two factors. For example, when a legislative election is occurring the same day as
a presidential election under a pure presidential regime, the c will equal 1. How-
ever, when a legislative election is occurring under a parliamentary regime, then c
would equal 0 (since there would be no coattail e↵ects from another election onto
the legislative election. This indicates that even under situations where there are
non-concurrent legislative and presidential elections under semi-presidential regimes,
there will be some coattail e↵ects present on the legislative election, albeit not as
strong as in the previous scenario. The advantage of the c measurement is that it
allows one to model the e↵ects of presidentialism on party competition for an infinite
range of combinations of presidential powers and election proximities in each voter’s
utility function.
Again, I will model the same five types of legislative elections under presidential
regimes. However, for some of the scenarios, there will be equilibrium situations
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Figure 2.10: Majoritarian Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by
Plurality Vote
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xp3 = [0, 1]
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Figure 2.11: Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is
Elected by Plurality Vote if c   .4
under all conditions of coattail strength. Under the other elections, there will only
be equilibrium conditions when the coattail strength is relatively strong.
Figure 2.10 shows a majoritarian legislative election held under a presidential
regime where the president is elected by plurality vote. If the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, then the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium for a majoritarian legislative election is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm
for any value of c. Both of the parties in the legislative election will be at a centrist
location.
The next two examples model proportional legislative elections under a regime
where the president is elected by plurality vote. The first model will describe com-
petition in a three-party legislative election, while the second model will describe
competition in a four-party legislative election. Figure 2.11 shows party competi-
tion in a three-party legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
a plurality presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, then the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium condition for a three-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is
xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm, and any location on X for party 3 in the legislative election if
c   .4. There is no pure strategy equilibrium condition for the election if c < .4.
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Figure 2.12: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is
Elected by Plurality Vote if c   .4
Instead, when c < .4, parties 1 and 2 will have incentives to take positions away from
xm in order to maximize their vote shares as much as possible. However, the parties
will still not end up in an pure strategy equilibrium position.
Figure 2.12 shows party competition in a four-party legislative election. If the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm,
then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium condition for a four-party PR or mixed-
member legislative election is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm, and any locations on X for parties
3 and 4 in the legislative election if c   .4. There is no pure strategy equilibrium
condition for the election if c < .4. Instead, when c < .4, parties 1 and 2 will have
incentives to take positions away from xm in order to maximize their vote shares
as much as possible. However, the parties will still not end up in a pure strategy
equilibrium position.
Next is the model for the three-party legislative election under a regime where the
president is elected by a runo↵ ballot. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a
three-candidate runo↵ presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xc3⇤ = xm, then there is
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for any value of c. However, all three parties will
have incentives to take positions away from xm so that they can maximize their vote
shares as much as possible.
Figure 2.13 shows a four-party PR legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for a four-candidate runo↵ presidential election is xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = [xm  
e, xm] and xc3⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25), then the pure strategy
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Figure 2.13: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is
Elected by Runo↵ Vote if c   .4
Nash equilibrium for a four-party proportional or mixed-member legislative election
is xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25 and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75, for all values of c.
Table 2.2: Positioning of Legislative Parties with Presidential Candidates When Coat-
tails are Strong
Presidential Ballot Type
No Presidential
Election
Plurality Runo↵
Two-Party
Majoritarian
Centrist Centrist -
Three-Party
Proportional
No Equilibrium Centrist No Equilibrium
Four-Party
Proportional
Non-Centrist Centrist Non-Centrist
To summarize, all of the di↵erent scenarios are presented in the following two
tables. Table 2.3 shows the positioning of parties when the coattail e↵ects are strong
(when c   4), and Table 2.4 shows the positioning of parties when the coattail e↵ects
are weak (when c < .4). In each table, the first column shows the pure strategy
equilibrium conditions under parliamentarism. Table 2.3 shows that under strong
coattail e↵ects, all legislative elections in a regime where the president is elected
under a plurality ballot, the parties with presidential candidates will end up in a
centrist position. When there is a runo↵ ballot for president, however, there will
be non-centrist positioning of legislative parties in four-party elections, and there
will be no equilibria in three-party elections. Instead, the parties will generally take
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non-centrist positions, but will not settle in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Table 2.3: Positioning of Legislative Parties with Presidential Candidates When Coat-
tails are Weak
Presidential Ballot Type
No Presidential
Election
Plurality Runo↵
Two-Party
Majoritarian
Centrist Centrist -
Three-Party
Proportional
No Equilibrium No Equilibrium No Equilibrium
Four-Party
Proportional
Non-Centrist No Equilibrium Non-Centrist
In Table 2.4, There is no centrist position of legislative parties in elections, except
when there is a two-party majoritarian legislative elections with a plurality presi-
dential ballot. There will be non-centrist positioning in four-party elections under a
runo↵ presidential ballot, but in all other elections, there are no equilibria. Instead,
for these elections, parties with presidential candidates will have to negotiate between
taking a centrist position and taking a non-centrist position, due to legislative parties
without presidential candidates taking votes from the ends of the ideological spec-
trum. Overall, we are more likely to see non-centrist positioning of parties when the
coattail e↵ects are weaker in a legislative election, than when they are stronger.
Conclusions
This chapter has provided the theoretical explanation for how presidentialism a↵ects
party competition in legislative elections. The review of literature showed that pre-
vious research has failed to provide an explanation to competition in these settings.
This is because previous models have assumed legislative party competition is oc-
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curring under a parliamentary regime. However, in presidential regimes, legislative
elections partly become functions of presidential elections. This is due to the coattail
e↵ects produced by presidential elections. When the same legislative election is oc-
curring under a presidential regime, equilibria can potentially be di↵erent than they
would be under a parliamentary regime.
The extent to how strong the coattail e↵ects are dependent on two factors. The
first is the institutional powers of the president, and the second being the timing
between the presidential and legislative elections. When the coattail e↵ects are strong,
there will be a centrist positioning of parties when the president is elected by plurality
vote. However, when the president is elected by runo↵ vote, we will see a greater non-
centrist positioning of legislative parties. When the coattail e↵ects are weak, we will
not see the centrist positioning of parties, except in a two-party legislative election
where the president is elected by plurality vote.
The next chapter will test the theoretical claims made in this chapter, by using
empirical data on the positions of political parties throughout numerous democracies
across time. The results in the next chapter will be in line with these theoretical
expectations. That is, the main parties in presidential regimes will be significantly
closer to each other and the median voter than the main parties in parliamentary
regimes.
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Appendix
Legislative Plurality Election
Theorem: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm, leading to
vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5.
Proof: If party 1 moved to xm+   then the vote share of party 1 would be sp1 < sp2.
This is because Up2 > Up1, 8xv = [.5 +  2 , 1].
Legislative Proportional Four-Party Election
Theorem: The parties are at pure strategy Nash equilibrium when xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25
and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75. This leads to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = sp3 = sp4.
Proof: If the parties are located at xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25 and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75,
and party 2 decides to move to xp2 = .25 +  , then party 2 would have a vote
share that is sp2 < sp1, sp2 < sp3, and sp2 < sp4. This is because Up1 > Up2,
Up1 > Up3, and Up1 > Up4 8xv = [0, .25+  2 ]; and Up2 > Up1, Up2 > Up3, and Up2 > Up4
8xv = [.25 +  2 ,  +.752 ].
Legislative Proportional Three-Party Election
If the parties are at xp1 = xp2 = xp3 = xm, the vote shares of the parties would be
sp1 = sp2 = sp3. While the vote shares are equal In this situation, party 1 could move
to xm +  , and then take all of the votes to the right of that location. This would
then make the parties’ vote shares sp1 > sp2 = sp3. This is because Up1 > Up2 and
Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1], and Up2 = Up3, 8xv = [0, .5   2 ]. Party 2 would move to
a position slightly right of xm+  , such that xp2 = xm+2 . This would take away the
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vote share party 1 attained, giving the parties vote shares of sp3 > sp2 > sp1. This is
because Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ], and Up2 > Up1 and Up2 > Up3,
8xv = [.5 +  , 1]. This would now induce either parties 1 or 2 to leapfrog party 3 to
the left, resulting in a cycle where all three parties keep leapfrogging each other. The
parties would therefore not settle into a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Presidential Plurality Election
Theorem: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm, leading to
vote shares that are sc1 = sc2 = .5.
Proof: If candidate 1 moved to xm     then the vote share of candidate 1 would be
sc1 < sc2. This is because Uc2 > Uc1, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1].
Three-Candidate Presidential Runo↵ Election
Theorem: The Nash equilibrium will be xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xc3⇤ = xm, such that the vote
shares of the candidates will be sc11 = sc21 = sc31 = .33 and sc12 = sc22 = sc32 = .5
for all possible combinations of match-ups in the second round.
Proof: For example, if candidate 1 decided to move to xc1 = xm +   the new vote
shares would be sc11 > sc21 = sc31. This is because Uc11 > Uc21 and Uc11 > Uc31,
8xv = [.5    2 , 1], and Uc21 = Uc31, 8xv = [0, .5    2 ]. This would guarantee that
candidate 1 will advance to the second round. However, this would mean that if
candidate 1 faced either candidate 2 or candidate 3 in the second round, candidate
1’s vote share would be sc12 < sc22 or sc12 < sc32. This is because Uc22 > Uc12, 8xv =
[0, .5 +  2 ] and Uc12 > Uc22, 8xv = [5 +  2 , 1] (or, Uc32 > Uc12, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ] and
Uc12 > Uc32, 8xv = [.5 +  2 , 1]). This would mean that candidate 1 would lose in the
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second round, despite getting the most votes in the first round.
Four-Candidate Presidential Runo↵ Election
Theorem: There is pure strategy Nash equilibria for any positioning of the can-
didates where xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = [xm   e, xm] and xc3⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where
e = [0, .25). There is also pure strategy Nash equilibria in the situation when
xc1⇤ = xc3⇤ = [xm   e, xm] and xc2⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25);
and xc1⇤ = xc4⇤ = [xm   e, xm] and xc2⇤ = xc3⇤ = [xm, xm + e], where e = [0, .25).
These pure strategy Nash equilibria would lead to vote shares of sc11 = sc21 = sc31 =
sc41 = .25 for the first round and sc12 = sc22 = sc32 = sc42 = .50 (for any of the two
candidates that advance to the second round).
Proof: If xc1 = xc2 = xc3 = xc4 = xm , then the vote shares for round 1 would
be sc11 = sc21 = sc31 = sc41 = .25 and sc12 = sc22 = sc32 = sc42 = .50 (for any
of the two candidates that advance to the second round). However, if candidate
1 decided to move to xc1 = xm +  , then their vote share for round 1 would be
sc11 > sc21 = sc31 = sc41, guaranteeing candidate 1 a place in the second round against
either candidate 2, 3, or 4. This is because Uc11 > Uc21, Uc11 > Uc31, Uc11 > Uc41,
8xv = [.5 +  2 , 1]; and Uc21 = Uc31 = Uc41, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ]. However, since candidate
1 is at xc1 = xm +  , while candidates 2, 3, and 4 are still at xc2 = xc3 = xc4 = xm,
candidate 1 would lose in the second round of the election with a vote share of
sc12 < sc22 = sc32 = sc42. This is because Uc22 > Uc12, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ] and Uc12 >
Uc22, 8xv = [.5+  2 , 1] (or Uc32 > Uc12, 8xv = [0, .5+  2 ] and Uc12 > Uc32, 8xv = [.5+  2 , 1];
or Uc42 > Uc12, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ] and Uc12 > Uc42, 8xv = [.5 +  2 , 1]).
In addition, xc1 = xc2 = .333 and xc3 = xc4 = .667, with vote shares of sc11 =
sc21 = sc31 = sc41 = .25 for the first round and sc12 = sc22 = sc32 = sc42 = .50 (for
any of the two candidates that advance to the second round), is a Nash equilibrium
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as well. If candidate 1 moved to xc1 = .666, they would receive vote shares that are
sc11 < sc31 = sc41 < sc21. This is because Uc21 > Uc11, Uc21 > Uc31, and Uc21 > Uc41,
8xv = [0, .4995]; Uc11 > Uc21, Uc11 > Uc31, and Uc11 > Uc41, 8xv = [.4995, .6665]; and
Uc31 = Uc41 > Uc11, and Uc31 = Uc41 > Uc21, 8xv = [.6665, 1]. In this scenario though,
candidate 1 would fail to receive enough votes to advance to the second round. At the
same time, candidate 2 and either candidates 3 and 4 would advance to the second
round, and would tie in the second round of the election with vote shares of sc22 =
sc32 = sc42. This is because Uc22 > Uc32, 8xv = [0, .5] and Uc32 > Uc22, 8xv = [.5, 1] (or
Uc22 > Uc42, 8xv = [0, .5] and Uc42 > Uc22, 8xv = [.5, 1]; or Uc32 = Uc42, 8xvonX).
Adding in the Assumption of Presidentialism
Legislative Plurality Election Under a Presidential Regime
Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote
Theorem: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm, leading to
vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5.
Proof: If party 1 moved to xm+   then the vote share of party 1 would be sp1 < sp2.
This is because Up2 > Up1, 8xv = [.5 +  2 , 1].
Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Pres-
idential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality
Vote
Theorem: If xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm for the presidential election, then xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm
and any position on X for party 3 for the legislative election. This will lead to vote
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shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5 and sp3 = 0.
Proof: For example, if party 1 moved to xm    , then the vote shares of the parties
would be sp1 = .5    , sp2 = .5 +  2 , and sp3 = 0. This is because Up2 > Up1 and
Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1].
Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presi-
dential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality
Vote
Theorem: If xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm for the presidential election, then xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm
and any position on X for parties 3 and 4 for the legislative election. This will lead
to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5 and sp3 = sp4 = 0.
Proof: For example, if party 1 moved to xm    , then the vote shares of the parties
would be sp1 = .5  , sp2 = .5+  2 , and sp3 = 0. This is because Up2 > Up1, Up2 > Up3,
and Up2 > Up4, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1].
Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Pres-
idential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runo↵
Vote
If the parties are at xp1 = xp2 = xp3 = xm, the vote shares of the parties would be
sp1 = sp2 = sp3. While the vote shares are equal In this situation, party 1 could move
to xm +  , and then take all of the votes to the right of that location. This would
then make the parties’ vote shares sp1 > sp2 = sp3. This is because Up1 > Up2 and
Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1], and Up2 = Up3, 8xv = [0, .5   2 ]. Party 2 would move to
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a position slightly right of xm+  , such that xp2 = xm+2 . This would take away the
vote share party 1 attained, giving the parties vote shares of sp3 > sp2 > sp1. This is
because Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ], and Up2 > Up1 and Up2 > Up3,
8xv = [.5 +  , 1]. This would now induce either parties 1 or 2 to leapfrog party 3 to
the left, resulting in a cycle where all three parties keep leapfrogging each other. The
parties would therefore not settle into a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Pres-
idential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runo↵
Vote
Theorem: The parties are at pure strategy Nash equilibrium when xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25
and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75. This leads to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = sp3 = sp4.
Proof: If the parties are located at xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25 and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75,
and party 2 decides to move to xp2 = .25 +  , then party 2 would have a vote
share that is sp2 < sp1, sp2 < sp3, and sp2 < sp4. This is because Up1 > Up2,
Up1 > Up3, and Up1 > Up4 8xv = [0, .25+  2 ]; and Up2 > Up1, Up2 > Up3, and Up2 > Up4
8xv = [.25 +  2 ,  +.752 ].
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Elections with Varied Coattail E↵ects
Legislative Plurality Election Under a Presidential Regime
Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote
Theorem: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm, 8c. This
will lead to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5.
Proof: For any value of c, if c = .75 and party 1 moved to xm +  , then the vote
share of party 1 would be sp1 < sp2. This is because Up2 > Up1, 8xv = [.5 +  2 , 1].
Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Pres-
idential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality
Vote
Theorem: If c = [.4, 1] and xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm for the presidential election, then
xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm and any position on X for party 3 for the legislative election. This
will lead to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5 and sp3 = 0. If c = [0, .4), then there
is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the election.
Proof: For example, if c = [.4, 1], and party 1 moved to xm   , then the vote shares
of the parties would be sp1 = .5    , sp2 = .5 +  2 , and sp3 = 0. This is because
Up2 > Up1 and Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1].
Furthermore, assume c = .39 and xp1 = xp2 = xm and xp3 = .01. In this situation,
the vote shares of the parties are sp1 = sp2 = .49 and sp3 = .02. This is because
Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .02]; and Up1 = Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.02, 1]. If
party 2 moved to xp2 = .51, then the vote shares of the parties would be sp1 = .485,
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sp2 = .495 and sp3 = .02. This is because Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .02];
Up1 > Up2 > and Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [.02, .505]; and Up3 > Up1 > and Up3 > Up2,
8xv = [.505, 1]. This would then cause party 1 to move to xp1 = .49, which would
lead to vote shares of sp1 = sp2 = .5 and sp3 = 0. This is because Up1 > Up2 and
Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [0, .5]; and Up2 > Up1 > and Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.5, 1]. However,
party 2 could then move to xm, leading to vote shares of sp1 = .495, sp2 = .505 and
sp3 = 0. This is because Up1 > Up2 and Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [0, .495]; and Up2 > Up1 >
and Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.495, 1]. This would then cause party 1 to move back to xm as
well, leading us back to the beginning of the cycle at xp1 = xp2 = xm and xp3 = .01.
Furthermore, assume c = .25 and xp1 = xp2 = xm and xp3 = .01. In this situation,
the vote shares of the parties are sp1 = sp2 = .445 and sp3 = .11. This is because
Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .11]; and Up1 = Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.11, 1]. If
party 2 moved to xp2 = .51, then the vote shares of the parties would be sp1 = .395,
sp2 = .495 and sp3 = .11. This is because Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .11];
Up1 > Up2 > and Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [.11, .505]; and Up3 > Up1 > and Up3 > Up2,
8xv = [.505, 1]. This would then cause party 1 to move to xp1 = .29, which would
lead to vote shares of sp1 = .4, sp2 = .6 and sp3 = 0. This is because Up1 > Up2 and
Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [0, .4]; and Up2 > Up1 > and Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.4, 1]. However,
party 2 could then move back to xm to attain a higher vote share, bringing us back
to a previous arrangement of parties, leading to cycling.
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Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presi-
dential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality
Vote
Theorem: If c = [.4, 1] and xc1⇤ = xc2⇤ = xm for the presidential election, then
xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = xm and any position on X for party 3 for the legislative election. This
will lead to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = .5 and sp3 = sp4 = 0. If c = [0, .4), then
there is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the election.
Proof: For example, if c = [.4, 1], and party 1 moved to xm   , then the vote shares
of the parties would be sp1 = .5   , sp2 = .5 +  2 , and sp3 = sp4 = 0. This is because
Up2 > Up1 and Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1].
Furthermore, assume c = .39 and xp1 = xp2 = xm, xp3 = 0, and xp4 = 1. In this
situation, the vote shares of the parties are sp1 = sp2 = .48 and sp3 = sp4 = .02. This
is because Up3 > Up1, Up3 > Up2, and Up3 > Up4, 8xv = [0, .02]; Up1 = Up2 > Up3
and Up1 = Up2 > Up4, 8xv = [.02, .98]; and Up4 > Up1, Up4 > Up2, and Up4 > Up3,
8xv = [.98, 1]. If party 1 moved to xp2 = .48 and party 2 moved to xp2 = .52, then the
vote shares of the parties would be sp1 = sp2 = .5 and sp3 = sp4 = 0. This is because
Up1 > Up2, Up1 > Up3, and Up1 > Up4, 8xv = [0, .5]; and Up2 > Up1, Up2 > Up3, and
Up2 > Up4, 8xv = [.5, 1]. This would then cause party 1 to move to xp1 = .52    ,
which would lead to vote shares such that sp1 > sp2 > sp3 > sp4.
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Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Pres-
idential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runo↵
Vote
For any value of c, if the parties are at xp1 = xp2 = xp3 = xm, the vote shares of the
parties would be sp1 = sp2 = sp3. While the vote shares are equal In this situation,
party 1 could move to xm +  , and then take all of the votes to the right of that
location. This would then make the parties’ vote shares sp1 > sp2 = sp3. This is
because Up1 > Up2 and Up1 > Up3, 8xv = [.5   2 , 1], and Up2 = Up3, 8xv = [0, .5   2 ].
Party 2 would move to a position slightly right of xm +  , such that xp2 = xm + 2 .
This would take away the vote share party 1 attained, giving the parties vote shares
of sp3 > sp2 > sp1. This is because Up3 > Up1 and Up3 > Up2, 8xv = [0, .5 +  2 ], and
Up2 > Up1 and Up2 > Up3, 8xv = [.5 +  , 1]. This would now induce either parties 1
or 2 to leapfrog party 3 to the left, resulting in a cycle where all three parties keep
leapfrogging each other. The parties would therefore not settle into a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Pres-
idential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runo↵
Vote
Theorem: The parties are at pure strategy Nash equilibrium when xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25
and xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75. This leads to vote shares that are sp1 = sp2 = sp3 = sp4.
Proof: For any value of c, if the parties are located at xp1⇤ = xp2⇤ = .25 and
xp3⇤ = xp4⇤ = .75, and party 2 decides to move to xp2 = .25 +  , then party 2
would have a vote share that is sp2 < sp1, sp2 < sp3, and sp2 < sp4. This is because
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Up1 > Up2, Up1 > Up3, and Up1 > Up4 8xv = [0, .25 +  2 ]; and Up2 > Up1, Up2 > Up3,
and Up2 > Up4 8xv = [.25 +  2 ,  +.752 ].
Chapter 3
Empirically Testing the Theoretical
Explanation of Presidentialism’s
E↵ect on Party Competition
The previous chapter exhibited that when party competition is modeled with the as-
sumption that the said competition is taking place against the backdrop of presiden-
tialism, legislative parties with presidential candidates have vote-gaining incentives to
move toward the location of their presidential candidate. Simultaneously, this means
that legislative parties are moving toward the center of the party system. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to empirically prove that parties in presidential regimes exhibit
centrist tendencies more than parties in parliamentary regimes.
Using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the Median Voter
Dataset, I will show that major parties on the left and the right in presidential
regimes are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in legislative elec-
tions than similar parties in parliamentary regimes. In addition, I demonstrate that
the timing between legislative and presidential elections a↵ects the placement of par-
ties in legislative elections. Specifically, major parties on the left and the right will
be ideologically closer to each other and to the median voter when the legislative
election is concurrent with the presidential election. Conversely, major parties on the
left and the right will be ideologically further apart from each other and the median
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voter when the legislative election is not concurrent with the presidential election.
These findings are important, because standard accounts of spatial competition
show that parties in legislative elections that use PR (or are otherwise multi-party
systems) position themselves in a non-centrist fashion. I show that this result holds
only when the election in question occurs under a parliamentary regime. However, in
presidential regimes, parties will place themselves in a centrist fashion regardless of
the electoral system.
First, I will show how bringing in presidentialism has already contributed to a
clearer understanding of legislative party systems. Building o↵ of this literature, I
will explain that presidentialism can also help us better understand party competition
in legislative elections. Next, the data used in this chapter will be discussed; along
with the methodology used to test the theory. This will be followed with the pre-
sentation of the results, which will also include selected real-world examples. These
examples will provide an up-close perspective to presidentialism’s e↵ects on party
competition, which complements the cross-national analysis that is the focus of this
chapter. Finally, conclusions and limitations with the analysis in this chapter (along
with avenues for potential future research) will be discussed.
Background
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, a party’s electoral success in a legislative
election can be determined by their ideological position relative to that of their pres-
idential candidate. This is because of the coattail e↵ects that presidential elections
have over legislative elections in a presidential regime.
The coattail e↵ects cause the presidential election to be judged more important by
both the parties and voters. As a result, most of the attention is drawn toward these
elections, at the expense of the legislative election. In order to garner attention and
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resources, legislative parties will modify their own campaigns to be more in line with
that of their presidential candidate. This includes making their ideological position
resemble that of their presidential candidates’. Since the presidential election is the
most important election in a country, voters will gauge legislative parties’ positions
based on the positions of presidential candidates.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, prior research has shown that presidential
elections a↵ect the size and fragmentation of a country’s legislative party system
(Jones, 1994; Neto and Cox, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Samuels, 2002;
Moza↵ar et al., 2003; Golder, 2006; Hicken and Stoll, 2011). This research has focused
on how variations within presidentialism a↵ect these outcomes. More specifically, in
regard to how both the ballot method of presidential elections and the timing between
presidential and legislative elections a↵ect the party system. Presidential regimes
with plurality presidential elections and concurrent elections are more likely to have
a smaller number of parties in legislative elections. This is compared to presidential
regimes with runo↵ presidential elections and non-concurrent elections (Golder, 2006).
It can be expected that these two factors will also have an e↵ect on where par-
ties decide to ideologically place themselves in legislative elections. Specifically, when
a legislative election is concurrent with a presidential election, parties will be more
centripetal in the legislative election. Conversely, when the same legislative election
is non-concurrent with the presidential election, the parties will be more centrifu-
gal. Also, when a country elects its president with a plurality ballot, the parties will
be more centripetal in the legislative election. However, when a country elects is
president with a runo↵ ballot, the parties will be more centrifugal in the legislative
election. The expected hypotheses based on the theory can be given as follows:
H1: In countries where the head of state is directly elected, the main parties will
be ideologically closer to each other and the median voter than the main parties in
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regimes where the head of state is not elected.
H2: Among regimes in which the head of state is directly elected, the main par-
ties will be ideologically closer to each other and the median voter during years in
which the legislative election is concurrent with the presidential election.
H3: Among regimes in which the head of state is directly elected, the main par-
ties will be ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in regimes in
which the head of state is elected through a plurality election than in regimes where
the head of state is elected in a runo↵ election.
Data and Methods
The empirical evidence comes from two di↵erent, but related, datasets. The data on
the positions of the parties comes from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)
(Budge, 2001), which provides the ideological positions of every political party in each
legislative election since the end of the Second World War for select countries.1
This dataset alone however cannot provide the evidence necessary to demonstrate
how presidentialism impacts party competition. The main problem facing the CMP
is that it does not provide the positions of presidential candidates for each party in
those countries with presidential elections. Neither the CMP nor any other dataset
1The initial dataset only had 20 countries included. However, in the latest version that number
has grown to 52 countries, including virtually almost every democratic election in the postwar era.
The CMP has 2,347 positions of 632 di↵erent political parties in its latest edition. The positions
of parties in the CMP are derived from codifying the sentences of every election manifesto in its
dataset as a way of placing the parties on the left-right scale. Then, the party’s actual ideological
value is computed by subtracting the sum of the percentage of left-wing codified statements from
the sum of the percentage of right-wing codified statements. Therefore, a positive value represents
a party with a right-leaning ideological position, while a negative value represents a party with a
left-leaning position. The ideological values of parties can range on an infinite scale from -100 (the
most left-wing position a party can take) to 100 (the most right-wing position a party can take).
The timeframe for the CMP ranges from 1945 till the mid-2000’s decade.
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has any record of presidential candidate positioning for the entire postwar era.
This still leaves the problem of finding an alternative measurement that can cap-
ture how parties position themselves in presidential regimes. Such an alternative
measurement is found by using the statistic of the median voter in each election.
The median voter statistic can be useful for measuring the e↵ects of presidentialism
on a party system for a couple of reasons. First, as stated earlier, the location of the
median voter gives a measure of where the center of the party system is located in
any given election. This provides a starting point for any kind of analysis of party
system behavior. Second, presidential elections induce presidential candidates to
move toward the center of the political spectrum. This causes presidential elections to
have a centripetal nature. If parties desire to have positions similar to their respective
presidential candidates, they would therefore have to move toward the location of the
median voter as well.
This method of estimating the e↵ect of presidentialism on party competition is
akin to how astrophysicists discuss star clusters that are invisible in the sky. These
clusters cannot be seen, but can still be detected. The conclusions that these as-
trophysicists make are widely accepted, even though there is no direct evidence of
these stars existing. The methods I am using to test party positioning are similar to
this. This is because the positions of presidential candidates are like invisible stars.
However, unlike invisible stars, we can still observe presidential candidates.
The median voter statistic is taken from a dataset by De Neve (2011), which is
essentially an expanded version of an already-existing dataset created by Kim and
Fording (1998).2 To calculate the statistic of the median voter in each election,
2The Kim and Fording version of the median voter dataset includes the location of the median
voter in 364 elections in 25 countries. However, De Neve’s more recent version includes not only the
25 countries from Kim and Fording’s initial dataset, but 28 more countries that were not included
by Kim and Fording. Along with including more countries than Kim and Fording, De Neve also
slightly revised the methodology by which the median voter statistic was calculated, by basing his
values o↵ a version of the CMP that corrects for random error (Benoit et al., 2009). Along with
the 53 countries included in De Neve’s median voter dataset, I took the methods used by Kim and
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Table 3.1: Breakdown of Elections in Dataset by Regime and Concurrence
Concurrent Non-Concurrent Total
Parliamentary - - 310
Pure Presidential 24 8 32
Semi-Presidential 7 91 98
Total 31 99 440
they first took the values of the positions of each party from the CMP for a given
election. Next, they calculated the midpoint in-between each party for that election.
Finally, they found the percentage of the vote received by each party in that election,
and weighted each party’s position by that vote share to come up with an accurate
representation of what the distribution of voters looked like in that election.3
The advantage of using the median voter dataset is that it provides for a way
in which the median voter can be assessed in each election. This assessment can be
done regardless of country or time of election. The only other method as to which the
median voter can be assessed is through using survey data. However, such information
is nonexistent for most elections. This is due to electoral surveys having only been
conducted for a select few countries, and select elections within those countries. With
this said, the median voter dataset has been validated by comparing it to preexisting
measures of voter ideology. Two such surveys that it has been compared to are the
Eurobarometer survey (European Commision, 2011) and Stimson’s (1999) “policy
mood” model of Americans’ collective ideology since the 1950’s.
As described in Table 3.1, counting only democratic cases, there are 32 elec-
tions in the dataset that occurred under a pure presidential regime. Meanwhile,
there are 98 elections that occurred under a semi-presidential regime. Broken down
Fording/De Neve, and calculated the median voter for all of South Korea’s legislative elections from
1992 to 2008. This gives me a total of 54 countries for analysis.
3It should be noted that the statistic of the median voter in each election is based on the same
scale used by the CMP, therefore a median voter value that is negative indicates that the median
voter in that given election was on the left side of the spectrum, and a positive median voter value
means that the median voter was right-leaning in that election.
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further, 24 elections in pure presidential regimes were concurrent, while eight were
non-concurrent. Furthermore, only seven elections in semi-presidential regimes were
concurrent, while the other 91 were non-concurrent. The numbers become smaller
when broken down further according to the electoral system used in the presidential
election.
These small numbers are the result of two factors. First, most of the dataset’s
democratic regimes are located in Western Europe. This region of the world is known
for primarily featuring countries with parliamentary regimes. Second, the dataset
does not include any countries from Latin America (with the exception of Mexico).
Most of the world’s pure presidential regimes are located in this region.
In an ideal world, I would prefer to have a dataset that included a wider range of
countries. Specifically, I would add in those countries in Latin America that employ
pure presidential regimes. This would also give me a larger number of elections
that were held concurrently with presidential elections. Having a smaller sample size
means that it will be harder to make inferences from the results of the analyses. The
more cases that are available, the more confidence can be placed in the results.
Despite these limitations, the positive aspect of the current dataset is that there
is a large enough sample size to allow me to make inferences about the e↵ects pres-
identialism has on party competition in general. As a result, I will combine both
pure presidential and semi-presidential regimes into one category measuring presi-
dentialism, containing 130 cases. This will give me 31 concurrent elections and 99
non-concurrent elections in all presidential regimes. While I will only be able to give
results of the e↵ects that presidential elections have on party placement, this serves as
a useful starting point to demonstrate how presidentialism a↵ects party behavior in
ways that have not been explained by political scientists who study party competition.
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of interest in this chapter are the distance between the two
major parties from each other and the distance of the two major parties from the
median voter. The distance between the major parties is important to the theory
of centripetal incentives in presidentialism. This is because if the two major parties
are trying to mimic their presidential counterparts, they should be converging toward
each other. The variable of the distance of the major parties from each other is simply
taken by getting the absolute value of the di↵erence in CMP scores of the two major
parties in each election. Therefore, the smaller the value of the dependent variable,
the closer in distance the two major parties are from each other in the given election.
The larger the value, the further away the parties are from each other.
The same logic of convergence should manifest itself also when we look at the
distance of the major parties from the median voter. This variable is the sum of
the squared distances of each major party from the median voter. The dependent
variable of the distance of the major parties from each other will exclusively use data
from the CMP. The dependent variable of the distances of the major parties from the
median voter will use data from both the CMP and the median voter dataset.4
Before going any further, it is necessary to explain what I mean by a major party.
For the purposes of this chapter, a major party is the largest party in terms of vote
share on each side of the ideological spectrum. This is irrespective of the extremeness
of the ideology of that party.5 Furthermore, in many countries, there have been
4Further detail on the two dependent variables is available in this chapter’s appendix.
5For example, in some countries, the major party of the left is the country’s social-liberal party
(i.e., the Democratic Party in the United States), while in other countries, the major party of the
left is the country’s social-democratic party (i.e., the Labour Party in the United Kingdom). In
some countries, the major party of the left is the country’s communist party (i.e., the Progressive
Party of Working People in Cyprus). On the right side of the ideological spectrum, the major party
of the right is the country’s Christian democratic party (i.e., the Christian Democratic Union in
Germany), and in other countries the major party of the right is the country’s economically-liberal
party (i.e., the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan).
Chapter 3. Empirically Testing the Theoretical Explanation 54
changes as to which party becomes the major party on the right or left, based on the
vote shares in each election.6 Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the parties used for
each election in the dataset.
As expected, the smaller the value of the dependent variable, the closer in distance
the two major parties are from the median voter in the given election. The larger the
value, the further away the parties are from the median voter. While it is plausible
that one of the major parties could be relatively far away from the median voter while
the other major party is closer to the median voter, my theory states that both of
the parties will move closer toward the median voter as the result of the presence of
a presidential election. One major party cannot be close to the median voter while
the other major party is not. Both parties have to be close to the median voter under
regimes of presidentialism.
Independent Variables
Both of the dependent variables will be tested on several independent variables, all
of which are dummy variables. The e↵ects of presidentialism will be tested at three
levels.7 At each level, parliamentary regimes will be used as the reference category.
Therefore, all results on the independent variables should be put in comparison to
parliamentarism.
The first test is the simplest: between the e↵ect of elections held in separation of
powers regimes (presidential and semi-presidential) versus parliamentary regimes.
6An example of this would be in Switzerland, where the Christian Democratic People’s Party had
long been for decades the major party on the right. However, since the 1999 Swiss parliamentary
election, the national conservative Swiss People’s Party has been attaining the most votes on the
political right in Switzerland.
7The independent variables are being created in the above stated manner, as opposed to running
interaction models for the independent variables. The reason for doing so is because creating in-
teraction models proved to be problematic. This is because running interaction models using these
variables leads to several of the interaction terms being dropped, due to multicollinearity present
among some of the interaction terms in the model. Instead, each institutional category, save for the
reference group, is placed in each level’s model.
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The second test explores the impact of concurrence. I create two dummies here to
explore against the reference category (parliamentary elections): legislative elections
in presidential regimes in which the legislative election occurs the same day as the
presidential election, and legislative elections in presidential regimes where the presi-
dential election is not held on that same day. These variables explore the impact of
concurrence and non-concurrence on parties’ positions.
The third test explores the impact of presidential election rules on legislative party
positioning. Here, I create a dummy for concurrent and non-concurrent elections held
under plurality rule for the presidential elections, and then a dummy for concurrent
and non-concurrent elections held under a two-round runo↵ election. The reference
category for each dummy includes elections held under parliamentary regimes.
The di↵erences in these two types of presidential ballots are important to consider.
This is because plurality elections have the e↵ect of reducing the e↵ective number of
candidates down to two in an election. On the other hand, runo↵ elections reduce
the e↵ective number of candidates down to three (Cox, 1997; Golder, 2006). Thus,
I expect the presidential elections held under the plurality rule to have a stronger
reductive e↵ect on the distance between the two major parties than elections held
under a two-round system.
Table 3.2 in the appendix of this chapter gives a breakdown of all of the countries
included in the dataset, categorized by the type of institutional regime, along with
the years in which their legislative elections are included in the dataset used for this
analysis.
In each model that follows I also included a control for the electoral system imple-
mented in the legislative election. This is important, because the literature has shown
that the type of electoral system used in a legislative election a↵ects the number of
parties competing in an election. This in turn a↵ects where the parties decide to
position themselves (Downs, 1957; Cox, 1990; Kollman et al., 1992). As a result, PR
Chapter 3. Empirically Testing the Theoretical Explanation 56
electoral systems cause parties to move away from the median voter, while majoritar-
ian electoral systems cause parties to move toward the median voter. Such an e↵ect
on the placement of parties must be accounted for then in the models.
I created two dummy variables, for majoritarian and PR legislative systems, with
mixed systems as the reference category. The first dummy variable includes all legisla-
tive elections that were held in single-member districts, where the winner was decided
either through a plurality vote, two-round runo↵ system, or instant runo↵ voting.
The second includes all legislative elections that were held under a PR system, either
through a party list, single non-transferrable vote, or multi-member district single
transferrable vote. Elections that were held under a mixed-member electoral system
are used as the reference category. These include all legislative elections that were
conducted under a system of mixed-member PR or parallel voting.8
Results
Testing the Parties’ Distances From Each Other
Figure 3.1 looks at the e↵ect presidential regimes have on the distance between the
major parties in each election. All of the models are run using Prais-Winsten FGLS
panel regressions, to account for serial autocorrelation, with semirobust standard er-
rors in order to account for heteroskedasticity. The models in Figure 3.1 progressively
test the hypotheses using the distance of the major parties from each other as the
dependent variable. Each of the cells reports the coe cients and semirobust standard
errors for how much each of the categorical independent variables a↵ects the distance
8Testing the models using a dichotomous distinction between majoritarian systems and systems
that are either PR or mixed-member did not change the relationship between presidentialism and
the placement of parties. Also, using a more-detailed distinction within majoritarian (plurality,
instant-runo↵ voting, two-round runo↵) electoral systems did not change the relationship between
presidentialism and the placement of parties.
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Figure 3.1: Presidentialism’s E↵ects on the Distance of the Major Parties from Each
Other
of the major parties from each other. This figure is essentially a backwards results
tree, where the coe cients are reported only for cases which meet all of the criteria for
a specific branch of the tree. The procedure is repeated for the tests on the distances
of the major parties from the median voter in Figure 3.4. The full models that are
used to create the coe cients and standard errors, along with the impact of control
variables, are located in Appendix A.
Model 1a tests whether or not the distance of the major parties from each other
varies between regimes of direct presidential elections and parliamentarism, thus test-
ing Hypothesis 1. The results confirm that, all things being equal, the distance be-
tween the major parties in countries that elect presidents is smaller than in countries
that have parliamentary regimes.
Examples from real cases illuminates presidentialism’s e↵ect on party competition.
The first example compares Sweden and Finland. Sweden and Finland are good
for comparison, since they are two culturally- and economically-similar countries in
Scandinavia that both employ PR for their legislative elections. The key di↵erence
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Distances Between Major Parties in Sweden and Finland
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between these two countries is that, as a semi-presidential regime, Finland directly
elects its head of state, while Sweden does not (being a parliamentary constitutional
monarchy).
Figure 3.2 compares the distances of the major parties from each other in both
of the countries. For Sweden, the two major parties that are used are the Swedish
Social Democratic Workers’ Party on the left, and the Moderate Party9 on the right.
For Finland, the two major parties that are used are the Social Democratic Party of
Finland on the left,10 and the National Coalition Party on the right.
According to the results in Model 1a, Figure 3.2 should show that the major
parties in Finland are closer to each other. In each of the examples, the same scale
that is used for the CMP is used for the examples. The larger the number on the
scale, the further the ideological distance, while the smaller the number, the smaller
the ideological distance. Looking at Figure 3.2, it shows that the two major parties
9Previously known as the National Organization of the Right and the Rightist Party.
10It should be noted that for the 1962 and 1966 Finnish legislative elections, the communist
Finnish People’s Democratic League was used as the left-wing party, since they finished ahead of
the Social Democratic Party in vote totals.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Distances Between Major Parties in the Czech Republic
and Poland
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in Finland have generally been closer to each other than the two major parties in
Sweden (save for an outlier case in the 1975 Finnish election).
Another example uses two countries that have recently made the transition to
democratic rule: the Czech Republic and Poland. As with Sweden and Finland, the
Czech Republic and Poland are culturally-similar bordering countries, which employ
PR for legislative elections. The two countries also transitioned to democracy at the
same time during the late 1980’s-early 1990’s.
The key di↵erence is that Poland, as with Finland, is a semi-presidential regime,
while the Czech Republic is a pure parliamentary regime, with an appointed head
of state.11 Given these characteristics, the expectation is that the major parties in
Poland should be closer to each other and the median voter than the major parties
in the Czech Republic.
For the Czech Republic, the major left-wing party used is the Czech Social Demo-
11In 2013, the Czech Republic started having direct elections for its president.
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cratic Party,12 and the major right-wing party used is the Civic Democratic Party.13
In Poland, the major left-wing party used is the Democratic Left Alliance, while there
is a di↵erent right-wing party used in each election (listed in Table A.1.).14 The re-
sults described in Model 1a are once again shown in this example, as Figure 3.3 shows
that the major parties in Poland are closer to each other than in the Czech Republic.
Model 1a however is a starting point for the comparisons. Model 1b assesses
the impact concurrent and non-concurrent elections have within presidential regimes,
while comparing them to elections held in pure parliamentary regimes. Within pres-
identialism, we see a greater e↵ect on the distance between the major parties among
concurrent elections compared to that of non-concurrent elections. This gives support
to my second hypothesis.
In Model 1b, the estimate for concurrent elections is smaller than the estimate
for non-concurrent elections, indicating that concurrent elections have major parties
that are closer to each other than in non-concurrent elections. Furthermore, the
estimates for both concurrent and non-concurrent elections remain negative. This
gives additional support for my first hypothesis.
Model 1c brings in information regarding the type of presidential ballot used
in a given regime, allowing for a testing of my third hypothesis. Here, the results
are only partly in line with my basic expectations: Among concurrent elections, the
estimate for elections in a country with a plurality presidential ballot is larger than the
estimate for elections in a country with a runo↵ presidential ballot. However, among
non-concurrent elections, the estimate for elections in a country with a plurality
presidential ballot is smaller than the estimate for elections in a country with a runo↵
presidential ballot. As a result, my third hypothesis cannot be fully confirmed, since
12The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is used for the 1990 and 1992 elections.
13Its predecessor organization, the Civic Forum, is used for the 1990 election.
14This is because a di↵erent right-wing party earned the most votes in the first four Polish leg-
islative elections.
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concurrent elections in countries with runo↵ presidential ballots have major parties
closer to each other than concurrent elections in countries with plurality presidential
ballots.
The results in Figure 3.1 provide strong support for my first two hypotheses, but
only partial support for the third one. The analyses show that regimes which provide
for direct presidential elections have major parties that are ideologically closer to
each other. Also, this e↵ect is pronounced more among concurrent elections than in
non-concurrent elections. While non-concurrent elections in countries with plurality
presidential ballots have major parties that are closer to each other than major parties
in non-concurrent elections in countries with runo↵ presidential ballots, the evidence
shows that this is not so for concurrent elections.
Testing the Parties’ Distances From The Median Voter
Next, I turn to assessing the impact presidentialism has on the distances of the major
parties from the median voter. Once again, this assessment is important, because
it will show that regardless of other incentives that might make parties exhibit cen-
tripetal and centrifugal tendencies, the major parties in presidential regimes will move
toward the ideological center. This is similar to what presidential candidates do in
those regimes. Figure 3.4 shows the results.
As with Model 1a, Model 2a provides for a comparison between regimes of direct
presidential election and parliamentary regimes. However, each institution is now
being tested on the extent to which they a↵ect the distance of major parties from
the median voter, thus testing Hypothesis 1. The results confirm that, all things
being equal, the distance of the major parties from the median voter in regimes that
directly elect presidents is smaller than the distance of similar parties in parliamentary
regimes. Thus, the first hypothesis is fully confirmed.
The same real-world cases used for Model 1a are used to provide up-close evidence
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Figure 3.4: Presidentialism’s E↵ects on the Distance of the Major Parties from the
Median Voter
Figure 3.5: Distance of Major Parties from the Median Voter in Sweden and Finland
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Figure 3.6: Distance of Major Parties from the Median Voter in the Czech Republic
and Poland
0
5
10
15
20
Su
m
 o
f t
he
 S
qu
ar
ed
 D
ist
an
ce
s
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
2
Year
Czech Republic Poland
for Model 2a. Figure 3.5 compares the distances of the major parties from the median
voter in Sweden and Finland. Figure 3.5 conforms to the general results seen in Model
2a. It shows that for most of the post-war history, the major parties in Finland have
been ideologically closer to the median voter than have the major parties in Sweden.
Figure 3.6 shows the di↵erences in the distances of the major parties from the median
voter in the Czech Republic and Poland. The graph again provides evidence for Model
2a, as the major parties in Poland are closer to the median voter than in the Czech
Republic.
Once again, Model 2a is only the starting point for the rest of the analysis. Model
2b investigates the within-di↵erence among presidentialism, between concurrent and
non-concurrent elections. In concurrent elections, there is a greater e↵ect on the dis-
tance of the major parties from the median voter compared to that of non-concurrent
elections. This gives full confirmation to Hypothesis 2. However, only the estimates
for concurrent elections are significant. While this is so, both the estimates for con-
current and non-concurrent elections are negative. This indicates that both types of
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Figure 3.7: Distance of the Major Parties from the Median Voter in France
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elections still move major parties closer to the median voter, providing more confir-
mation of Hypothesis 1.
The e↵ect of concurrent elections making the major parties move closer to the
median voter can clearly be seen when looking at the case of France. France in general
makes for a unique observation, given the variations in their institutions used during
the post-war era. From the end of World War II till 1958, France was a parliamentary
regime, under the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Since 1958, it has been a semi-
presidential regime under the constitution of the Fifth Republic.15 In addition, from
1962-2002, legislative elections have been held non-concurrent alongside presidential
elections. From 2002 onward, presidential elections have occurred within a month of
legislative elections. This change in 2002 has created relative concurrence between
the presidential and legislative elections.
Figure 3.7 shows the distance of the major parties from each other during this
timeframe.16 Looking at Figure 3.7, it is seen that the distance between the major
15Direct presidential elections have been held in France since 1962.
16The major left-wing party used until 1962 is the French Communist Party. Since then, the
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parties has generally taken a downward path in the Fifth Republic. This again gives
another example of the results in Model 2a being shown at a national level. The
smallest distance between the parties is present in 2002, the first year of concurrent
elections. This provides evidence that supports the results in Model 2b. In the figure,
however, there is a small reversal of the downward trend in 1986. This can potentially
be attributed to the change in electing members of the French National Assembly
from a two-round majoritarian ballot to PR, causing more centrifugal parties. France
returned to a majoritarian ballot for the next legislative election.
Model 2c looks at the presidential ballot type for each election. This allows for a
testing of the third hypothesis. In line with Model 1c, the results show that among
concurrent elections, the estimate for elections in a country with a runo↵ presidential
ballot is smaller than the estimate for elections in a country with a plurality presiden-
tial ballot. Also as with Model 1c, among non-concurrent elections, the estimate for
elections in a country with a plurality presidential ballot is smaller than the estimate
for elections in a country with a runo↵ presidential ballot. These results in Model 2c
only provide partial confirmation for the hypothesis, as the runo↵ elections do not
exhibit a significant relationship with the dependent variable.
The results in Figure 3.4 provide strong evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 2, and par-
tial evidence for Hypothesis 3. Despite results that show major parties being further
away from the median voter in concurrent plurality elections than concurrent runo↵
elections, the analyses show that regimes with direct presidential elections have ma-
jor parties that are closer to the median voter. Furthermore, within presidentialism,
there is reason to believe that concurrent elections cause major parties to be closer
to the median voter than in non-concurrent elections.
Socialist Party is used. On the right, various right-wing parties are used until 1956. Since then, each
era’s main Gaullist party is used (with the current one being the Union for a Popular Movement).
However, elections in-between 1956 and 1973 are not included in this graph, since France had a
Polity score of less than six during this period, and are therefore not part of the analysis.
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Conclusions
As stated earlier, previous scholarship has overlooked how presidentialism a↵ects
spatial party competition. Namely, major parties are given incentives to move toward
the position of their presidential candidate (and equally toward the center of the party
system) in a legislative election. This happens in every presidential regime, regardless
of other incentives (such as the electoral system that is in place for the legislative
election, or the number of parties competing in that election).
The analyses in this chapter tested the general tendencies of these expectations.
This was achieved through indirect inference by comparing the locations of parties
relative to that of the center of the party system in each election. The tests on how
presidentialism a↵ects party competition showed several things. First, presidential-
ism induces major parties in each country to move closer to each other (and to the
location of the median voter), all things being equal. Second, presidentialism induces
major parties in each country to move closer to each other (and to the location of the
median voter) when elections are concurrent, as compared to non-concurrent elec-
tions. Finally, there is preliminary evidence that major parties move closer to each
other (and the location of the median voter) in non-concurrent elections in presiden-
tial regimes that implement a plurality ballot in presidential elections over that of
presidential regimes where the president is elected through a two-round runo↵ vote.
Despite these findings, there are a couple of limitations to the study that needs
to be addressed. First, as stated earlier, the dataset used in the analyses did not
include a variable for the positions of presidential candidates in countries that have
presidential elections. Second, and more important, the selection of cases in the
dataset did not include the whole coverage of presidential regimes in the world. This
is due to the fact that the highest concentration of pure presidential regimes is located
in Latin America. This left an incomplete perspective of the presidential universe,
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and required me to combine pure presidential and semi-presidential regimes into one
broad category of presidentialism.
In the situation of an ideal world, an appropriate analysis would appear as follows.
To start, my dataset would have these key features. First, my new dataset would in-
clude the positions of not only parties in each legislative election, but the positions
of presidential candidates in each presidential election. This would allow for a more
e↵ective analysis of the movement of parties toward their presidential candidates.
This is opposed to using the value of the median voter to indirectly infer that parties
are moving closer to their presidential candidates. Presently, the CMP only gives the
positions of the parties at the time of each legislative election for each country. How-
ever, my theory holds that parties are close to their respective presidential candidates
in presidential elections.
Second, the new dataset would have a more inclusive set of countries from which
I could analyze the positions of parties. This is a result of the CMP having focused
mainly on European countries, and not having any cases in Latin America outside of
Mexico. Having these cases would simultaneously increase the number of cases of pure
presidential regimes and concurrent elections. Latin America provides an excellent
resource to those studying presidential regimes, since the majority of the world’s
pure presidential regimes are located in that region. In addition, there are several
omitted countries in Asia that have presidential regimes. An increase in the number
of cases around the world in later editions of the CMP and median voter datasets
would give more opportunities to test the theories of presidentialism’s impact on party
competition.
After the appropriate dataset is in place, I could go forward with the ideal analysis.
First, I would examine three di↵erent dependent variables. The first variable would
compare the distances of major parties from their respective presidential candidates in
legislative elections. The second variable would once again compare the distances of
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major parties from each other. The final variable would again compare the distances
of major parties from the median voter in each election.
Second, I would run models using the following independent variables. The first of
these variables would compare the e↵ects of these three dependent variables on pure
presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Pure presidentialism should have major
parties that are closer to the presidential candidates, each other, and the median
voter versus that of parties in semi-presidential regimes.
The second of these variables would show how the timing of elections a↵ects these
dependent variables as well. Concurrent legislative elections will have major parties
that are closer to their respective presidential candidates, each other, and the median
voter as compared to that of non-concurrent legislative elections.
The final independent variable would show how the presidential ballot would a↵ect
these dependent variables. Presidential regimes with plurality ballots would have
major parties closer to their presidential candidates, each other, and the median
voter, versus that of presidential regimes with runo↵ ballots.
These independent variables would also be interacted with each other in a co-
herent manner. However, given the limitations I discussed earlier on interacting the
dummy variables in the analysis, I would instead have to make each combination
of institutional classifications as a di↵erent dummy variable. All the while, making
parliamentarism as a reference category.
Setting up my analysis as I have just described would allow me to accurately test
my theoretical assumptions regarding the e↵ects of presidentialism on party competi-
tion. However, being constrained with the data limitations that have been presented
to me, I instead tested the theoretical assumptions in this chapter as close as I could.
Despite not being able to exactly replicate the theory, there are promising results
from the analysis in this study. The first is that it can be concluded that presiden-
tialism plays an important role in making major political parties more ideologically
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moderate. Second, concurrent elections appear to make major parties move closer to
each other, as compared to major parties in non-concurrent elections. And finally,
there is reason to believe that countries with plurality presidential elections have ma-
jor parties that are more ideologically moderate than major parties in countries that
have runo↵ presidential elections.
The next couple of chapters move to the national level, by showing up-close the
dynamics uncovered in this chapter at the cross-national level. The evidence in those
chapters will provide even more evidence that presidentialism impacts party compe-
tition in ways that are not seen in parliamentary regimes.
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Appendix
Table 3.2: Countries by Type and Year in Dataset
Country Type Years Country Type Years
Australia PARL 1946-2001 Macedonia PRES 1994-1998
Austria PRES 1949-2002 Mexico PRES 1997-2000
Belgium PARL 1946-1999 Moldova PRES 1994
Bulgaria PARL 1990-2001 Netherlands PARL 1946-2003
Canada PARL 1945-2000 New Zealand PARL 1946-2002
Cyprus PRES 1996-2001 Northern Ireland PARL 1921-1969
Czech Republic PARL 1990-2002 Norway PARL 1945-2001
Denmark PARL 1945-2001 Poland PRES 1991-2001
Estonia PARL 1992-2003 Portugal PRES 1975-1999
Finland PRES 1945-2003 Romania PRES 1996-2000
France PARL 1946-1956 Russia PRES 2003
France PRES 1973-2002 Serbia PRES 2000
Georgia PRES 2004 Slovakia PARL 1990-1998
Germany PARL 1949-2002 Slovenia PRES 1996-2000
Greece PARL 1974-2002 South Korea PRES 1992-2008
Hungary PARL 1990-2002 Spain PARL 1977-2000
Ireland PRES 1948-2002 Sri Lanka PARL 1952-1977
Israel PARL 1951-1996 Sweden PARL 1944-2002
Israel* PRES 1996-1999 Switzerland PARL 1947-2003
Italy PARL 1946-2001 Turkey PARL 1950-1999
Japan PARL 1960-2000 Ukraine PRES 1994-2002
Latvia PARL 1993-2002 United Kingdom PARL 1945-2001
Lithuania PRES 1992-2000 United States PRES 1920-2008
*Israel conducted direct prime ministerial elections from 1996-2001.
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Dependent Variables
Distance of the Major Parties from Each Other
To calculate the dependent variable of the distance of the major parties from each
other, I subtracted the CMP value of the right-wing major party in each election from
the CMP value of the left-wing major party in the same election. Then, I calculated
the absolute value of this di↵erence, in order to allow for a meaningful comparison
across elections. This is because most of the left-leaning parties in my dataset have
an ideological position that is a negative number, given that the most left position a
party can take, according to the CMP, is -100. This means most of the left-leaning
parties have a raw value that is usually lower than the raw value of the respective
right-leaning party.
For example, let us assume in one hypothetical election the left-wing major party
has an ideological value of -10, the right-wing major party has an ideological posi-
tion of 10. When the value of the right-wing major party is subtracted from the
value of the left-wing major party, the di↵erence is -20. Now us assume that in a
second hypothetical election, the left-wing major party has an ideological value of -5,
the right-wing major party has an ideological position of 5. When the value of the
right-wing major party is subtracted from the value of the left-wing major party, the
di↵erence is -10. While the value of -20 from the first election is technically a smaller
number than the value of -10 from the second election, it is obvious the distance
between the major parties is smaller in the second election than the distance between
the major parties in the first election. Therefore, the absolute values of the di↵erences
are taken from each election, giving us a distance value of 20 in the first election, and
a distance value of 10 in the second election.
Distance of the Major Parties from the Median Voter
Chapter 3. Empirically Testing the Theoretical Explanation 72
To calculate the dependent variable of the distance of the major parties from the
median voter, I used a multi-step process. First, I took the two major parties in
each election, and squared the di↵erence between the major party’s position and the
position of the median voter for each of the parties. Second, I added these squared
numbers together to get a sum of the squared distances. Finally, for simplicity pur-
poses, I divided each of the summed squared distances by 100.
Independent Variables
Presidentialism
The type of institution is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = presidential regimes,
0 = parliamentary regimes
Concurrent Elections
The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = concurrent elections
in presidential regimes, 0 = all other elections
Non-Concurrent Elections
The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = non-concurrent elections
in presidential regimes, 0 = all other elections
Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot
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The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = concurrent elections
in presidential regimes with a plurality ballot in the regime’s presidential election, 0
= all other elections
Concurrent Elections with Runo↵ Ballot
The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = concurrent elections
in presidential regimes with a runo↵ ballot in the regime’s presidential election, 0 =
all other elections
Non-Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot
The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = non-concurrent elections
in presidential regimes with a plurality ballot in the regime’s presidential election, 0
= all other elections
Non-Concurrent Elections with Runo↵ Ballot
The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = non-concurrent elections
in presidential regimes with a runo↵ ballot in the regime’s presidential election, 0 =
all other elections
Control Variables
Majoritarian
The type of institution is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = regime with a plural-
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ity vote, two-round runo↵ system, or instant runo↵ voting for its legislative election,
0 = all other regimes
Proportional
The type of institution is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = regime with a party-
list vote or single non-transferrable vote for its legislative election, 0 = all other
regimes
Chapter 4
The E↵ects of the Direct Elections
for Prime Minister on Party
Campaigning and Perception in
Israel
The goal of the next two chapters is to show at the national level how party com-
petition has been a↵ected by reforming procedures regarding the selection of the
executive. By observing the e↵ects of institutional reform within a country over time,
we can witness a natural experiment that cannot be achieved through a basic cross-
national study. The findings in these chapters will provide us with stronger evidence
of presidentialism’s impact on party competition at the legislative level.
The country that will be examined in this chapter is Israel. Israel makes for a
prime case for investigation, since it has witnessed change related to the selection
of its executive in the recent past. Israel was established in 1948, originally as a
parliamentary republic. However, in 1992, a constitutional change was put in place,
which stated that the Prime Minister would be elected separately from the legislature,
by way of direct popular vote. In 2001, this reform was repealed, and Israel reverted
back to its original system of parliamentary government.
The switch to direct elections for Prime Minister e↵ectively turned Israel into a
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quasi-presidential republic, in which the country’s party system was presidentialized.
As a result, campaigning by the major parties focused more on winning the election
for Prime Minister and less on winning as many legislative seats as possible. In
addition, given the dynamics of candidate competition in presidential elections, the
candidates took a centrist approach in their campaign strategy (Samuels, 2002).
In this chapter, I will show this temporary institutional change led to two e↵ects.
The first e↵ect is that voters perceived the two main parties during this period to
be more centrist during the era of direct Prime Ministerial elections than during the
period of pure parliamentary elections. The second is that the gap in voters’ feelings
between a given major party and that party’s leader grew significantly smaller during
the period of direct elections for Prime Minister. This is because the campaigns of
the parties during this period deemphasized their party brands and policy positions
in favor of promoting their candidates for Prime Minister. In essence, the candidates
became the party during this time.
I will start by giving background on the Israeli electoral system, and the political
dynamics that ultimately led to the constitutional reform in 1992. This will be
followed with a look at the campaign strategies used by both of the major parties
during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections and after the repeal of the
reform. Also, a look at select television advertisements by the parties from this
period will be done, to show how these campaign strategies were at work when the
parties were communicating directly to the voting public. This will be followed with
the empirical testing of the changes in the perception of the ideological gap between
the parties, along with the changes in the feeling gap between the parties and their
leaders.
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Background
Factors Leading to Reform
Since its first election in 1949, Israel has used PR to elect members of the Knesset,
the unicameral legislature of Israel. Every election up until 1992 took place under
the framework of a parliamentary regime. A nationwide closed party list was used to
elect Members of the Knesset (MKs) to the 120-member legislature, since the country
was not divided into electoral districts.
This institutional arrangement led to Israel becoming a multiparty system. This
is because the larger the district magnitude, the more parties will be elected from a
district (Taagepera and Shugart, 1993; Cox, 1997). This is compounded with a low
electoral threshold that parties have to reach in order to attain representation in the
Knesset.1 Thus, no single party has ever held a majority of the seats in the Knesset.
Instead, the formation of governments throughout the history of Israeli politics has
centered around coalition building.
The highly proportional nature of the Israeli electoral system is a result of the
political system that served the Yishuv (the pre-independence Jewish community in
Palestine). State-building in what would later become Israel had challenges, given the
diasporic nature of the Jewish population. Consequently, the political institutions in
the Yishuv were pluralistic in nature and allowed for the representation of di↵erent
segments within the Jewish population in Palestine. This would also have the e↵ect
of allowing the Zionist movement to appear to have a large amount of supporters
(Sandler, 1997; Doron, 2000; Harris and Doron, 1999).
Also compounding the social cleavages in Israel was the 1950 Law of Return, which
1From the 1949-1988 elections, the threshold for parties was one percent. Starting in the 1992
election, the threshold was raised 1.5 percent. In 2006, the threshold was once again raised, this
time to two percent.
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allows any Jewish person in the world the right to immigrate to Israel.2 These factors
have fostered a multitude of minor parties that have been formed on ideological,
ethnic, or religious lines.3 As a result of the extremely proportional nature of the
Israeli electoral system, combined with the strong societal divisions, the sustainment
of governing coalitions in the Knesset has proven to be a challenge.
From the beginning of Israel until 1977, the party system was dominated by
the left-wing party Mapai and its successor, the Labor Party.4 While Mapai was
nominally on the political left, they were more located toward the center (Mendilow,
1983). Even though they formed coalitions with smaller parties to its left and right,
the relatively centrist location of Mapai made it hard for more ideologically extreme
parties on the left and right to come together to topple Mapai governments.
After 1977, the party system was split between two primary poles consisting of
Labor, and the relatively new right-wing party Likud. The shift from a dominant
party system to a bipolar system exacerbated the problems that were evident in the
hyper-proportional system with regard to coalition formation.
The post-1977 bipolar party system led to two scenarios in coalition formation.
The first was that it allowed the smaller parties, primarily the ultra-Orthodox parties,
to become the kingmaker in elections.5 They used this kingmaker position to sponsor
religious legislation and grow the budgets for their constituencies. As a result, the
process of coalition formation was delayed, and the minor parties put demands on
the major parties that were in most cases unworkable.
This second scenario was that Labor and Likud ended up in grand coalition gov-
ernments with each other, sharing most of the ministerial posts. The problems of
2With exceptions for security and health reasons.
3Or combinations of the two, as with the case of Shas (whose support comes from the ultra-
Orthodox Sephardic community) and United Torah Judaism (whose support comes from the ultra-
Orthodox Ashkenazi community).
4From 1965 till 1988, Mapai and Labor were part of the Alignment, which was an electoral
alliance with other left-wing parties in Israel.
5Occurred after the 1981 election.
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coalition formation led to this scenario occurring twice.6 This arrangement made
lawmaking very di cult. These noted problems drove the main impetus for electoral
reform in Israel (Rahat, 2008).
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s there was more demand for reform. The
reformers recommended changing the way both Knesset members and the Prime
Minister were elected. Under the proposal, elections for the Knesset would be through
a mixed-member electoral system consisting of members from regional multi-member
districts and members from a PR national party list. The other part of the proposal
was having the Prime Minister elected by direct popular vote. Ultimately, only this
latter portion of the proposal succeeded in passage.
There were several arguments for this second part of the proposal. First, having
direct elections for Prime Minister would decrease the reliance of the Prime Minister
on the Knesset. Before 1992, the person designated by the President to attempt to
form a government needed to have the support and agreement of minor parties in
order to become Prime Minister. Therefore, the smaller parties could swing the o ce
of the Prime Minister to either Labor or Likud, based on which of the major parties
would provide their party the greatest benefit. Furthermore, once in o ce, the minor
parties could extract concessions (with the threat of bringing down the government)
for their constituencies from the Prime Minister. It was thought that having the
Prime Minister elected by popular vote instead of by the Knesset would bring an end
to this type of politics.
In addition, it was also believed that this would strengthen the Prime Minister-
elect’s hand during the coalition formation process. Now, the Prime Minister-elect
could appoint more cabinet members based on professional capabilities, and less of
them based on political reasons (Doron, 2000). In addition, proponents of the direct
election reform hoped that the change would give the Prime Minister a stronger
6Occurred after the 1984 and 1988 elections.
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mandate to govern, guarantee that changes in the government would come from
popular voting, and see the size and influence of minor parties reduced (Ottolenghi,
2001).
It was also argued that there would be a reduction in the number of parties in
the Knesset due to direct Prime Ministerial elections. This was because it was hoped
that the requirement of an absolute majority in a separate election for Prime Minister
would reduce the number of candidates in that election to the two main parties,
leading to straight-ticket voting for the Prime Minister and the Knesset. Finally,
having direct elections for Prime Minister, while simultaneously preserving extreme
proportionality in the Knesset elections, would mean there would be no trade-o↵
between governability and representation (Hazan and Rahat, 2000).
While a reduction in the number of parties would lead to a centripetal e↵ect on
the party system as well, arguments made by proponents of separate elections did
not include statements about the ideological location of parties in Israel. Instead, the
arguments focused only on the problems of the fragmentation of the party system and
government formation (Diskin and Diskin, 1995; Hazan, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita,
2000). However, we will see that the reform did have implications for the locations
of the main parties.
The Reform
The reform came to ahead when the Basic Law: The Government of 1968 was replaced
with a new Basic Law: The Government in 1992.7 Under the provisions of the 1992
Basic Law, the Prime Minister would now be elected by the voters (not the Knesset)
in direct, national elections. Furthermore, the election of the Prime Minister would
7Israel has no single constitutional document. Instead, the development of constitutional law has
taken a gradual, step-by-step approach. This has been in the form of a series of “Basic Laws,” which
have been passed by the Knesset over the course of decades. These laws detail di↵erent aspects of
the institutional framework that comprises the Israeli political system (Arian, 2005).
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take course in the form of a two-round runo↵ ballot. If a candidate received over 50
percent of the vote in the first round, then they would be elected Prime Minister. If
no candidate received over 50 percent of the vote in the first round, then a runo↵
election would take place between the top-two vote getters two weeks later. Also,
the terms of the Prime Minister and the Knesset would be concurrent in the form of
four-year terms.
Once elected, the Prime Minister would have the right to appoint all members
of the cabinet. However, half of the cabinet members, including the Prime Minister,
would have to be MKs. Plus, the entire cabinet must have the confirmation of Knesset
before taking o ce.8 Members of the cabinet could also be removed from their o ce
by a super-majority of 70 votes in the Knesset.
In addition, the Knesset could remove the Prime Minister from o ce with a simple
majority of 61 votes.9 The removal of the Prime Minister from o ce would also lead
to the dissolution of the Knesset, which would trigger new elections for both the
Knesset and Prime Minister. All the while, the Knesset would continue to be elected
by a closed party list version of PR in a single, nationwide district with an electoral
threshold of 1.5 percent for all parties (Hazan, 1996).
The direct elections for Prime Minister had the most obvious e↵ect of increasing
the fragmentation of the party system. This increased fragmentation was the opposite
expectation of supporters of the reform, since it was expected the coattail e↵ects
from the Prime Ministerial election would increase the size of Labor and Likud in the
Knesset.
Increased fragmentation occurred, however, because having separate elections for
Prime Minister and the Knesset encouraged voters to split their ballots between
8In earlier versions of the 1992 Basic Law, the cabinet would not be subject to the approval of
the Knesset.
9In earlier versions of the 1992 Basic Law, it would take a super-majority of 70 Knesset members
to remove the Prime Minister from o ce.
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di↵erent parties. In the 1999 election (the second election held under the rules of the
1992 Basic Law), the combined seat share of the two largest parties in the Knesset
reached an all-time low of 45 seats. In addition, the e↵ective number of parliamentary
parties reached an all-time high as well in the 1999 election, with a factor of 8.69.
This is above the previous high of six in the 1955 Knesset election (Kenig et al., 2005).
Table 4.1: Parties and Seats in Knesset Elections, 1981-2003
Election Labor Likud Others Parties in Government
1981 47 48 25 5
1984 44 41 35 6
1988 39 40 41 6
1992 44 32 44 3
1996 34 32 54 6
1999 26 19 75 7
2003 19 38 63 3
Furthermore, Table 4.1 shows the number of seats obtained by Labor and Likud
from the 1981 to 2003 elections, along with the number of parties in each governing
coalition. The table shows once again that during the 1996 and 1999 elections, Labor
and Likud had their lowest seat shares combined. This is compounded with the fact
that the 1999 election led to a record high of seven parties in government.
As can be expected, this fragmentation had the e↵ect of making coalition for-
mation even more di cult than during the pre-1992 system. The fragmentation
made coalitions unstable as well. After winning the Prime Ministerial election in
1996, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led coalition su↵ered several resignations of cabi-
net ministers, most notably the Deputy Prime Minister from the Gesher party. This,
combined with the defeat of several no-confidence motions, helped contribute to the
early dissolution of the Knesset in 1999 (Hazan and Diskin, 2000). After left-leaning
Ehud Barak’s 12-point victory over Netanyahu in the 1999 election, right-wing and
ultra-Orthodox parties still made up a numerical majority in the Knesset. As a result,
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Barak put together an unwieldy coalition of seven parties, flanked by the left-wing
Meretz on the left, and the ultra-Orthodox Shas on the right.
Already existing tensions between the coalition partners were exacerbated by the
failure of the Camp David Summit and the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000.
Ultimately, less than two years after taking o ce, Barak was forced to resign from
o ce and call an early election for Prime Minister. After defeating Barak in a land-
slide, Ariel Sharon and his government passed the Basic Law: The Government of
2001. This repealed the 1992 Basic Law, and returned Israel to the pre-1992 system
of parliamentary government (Ottolenghi, 2001).
Much has been discussed about how the direct election of the Prime Minister
caused increased fragmentation of the Israeli party system. However, there has been
no empirical analysis on how the direct elections impacted perceptions of the ideolog-
ical placement of the parties. This chapter will show how the changes to the selection
of the Prime Minister in Israel impacted how voters perceived the locations of the
major parties in elections.
The Direct Elections’ E↵ects on Voters’ Views of
the Parties
Not only did the 1992 Basic Law a↵ect the fragmentation of the party system, it
also shaped how the voters perceived both of the major parties. Two key things will
be shown. First, the change to direct Prime Ministerial elections caused voters to
perceive both of the main parties to be more centrist than during the era of pure
parliamentary elections. The second is that this change in perception was caused by
perceptions about the parties’ leaders.
This is because the 1992 institutional reform e↵ectively created an electoral sep-
aration of origin between each party’s candidate for Prime Minister and the rest of
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their party. This is compounded with the importance the Prime Ministerial elections
received over the legislative elections during this period. As a result, the ideology
of the major parties became associated with the positions of their Prime Ministerial
candidates, even when there was divergence between the legislative parties and the
Prime Ministerial candidates.
This also brings us back to Chapter 2, where legislative party competition under
presidentialism was modeled. Remember, in these models, the stronger the coattail
e↵ect from a party’s presidential candidate to their respective legislative party, the
more the utility of voting for a legislative party is based on that party’s presidential
candidate’s position. This also means that the stronger the coattail e↵ect in an
election, the more the voters identify a party with that party’s presidential candidate.
This is the scenario that occurred in Israel during the 1996 and 1999 general elections.
Voters judged Labor and Likud more based on their leaders than they did the parties’
actual positions.
This means three things about the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections.
First, voters perceived Labor and Likud to be ideologically closer to each other during
the era of direct Prime Ministerial elections than during times of pure parliamentary
elections. Second, because of the separation of origin during the period of direct
Prime Ministerial elections, Labor and Likud’s Prime Ministerial candidates would
have some ideological divergence from their parties’ positions. Finally, because of
the coattail e↵ects present in the 1996 and 1999 general elections, the voters’ atti-
tudes about the Labor and Likud leaders shaped the perceptions they had about the
ideology of Labor and Likud in general.
Furthermore, these findings will support the findings from Chapter 3, which
showed in cross-national perspective that major parties on the left and the right
are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in presidential regimes
than in parliamentary regimes. In essence, the previous chapter proved that parties
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do make ideological changes, based on the institutional environment. However, this
chapter will prove that voters see these shifts that the parties are making.
To test these expectations, I utilize data from both the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems (CSES) (Sapiro and Shively, 2001, 2006) and the Israel National
Election Studies (INES) (Arian and Shamir, 1992, 1996, 1999b, 2003). Using the
data, I will show that voters perceived Labor and Likud to be ideologically closer to
each other during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections than the period of
pure parliamentary elections. Next, I will show that voters’ feelings about the Labor
Party and its leaders converged during the era of direct Prime Ministerial elections,
but were more separate during the period of pure parliamentary elections. I do the
same thing for Likud and its leaders as well.
More specifically, the results here will show that the change to direct elections for
Prime Minister led to a convergence of voters’ feelings between the parties and their
leaders. Once the change was made back to the pre-1992 system of elections, a shift
back to a divergence in feelings between the parties and leaders occurred.
Before I present the empirical findings, I will give overviews of Labor and Likud’s
campaign strategies during the 1996, 1999, and 2003 elections. This will be followed
with descriptions of selected television advertisements aired by the two parties during
the 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2003 elections.
The purpose of giving these overviews and discussing these ads during this period
is to demonstrate that both Labor and Likud took major e↵orts to deemphasize
the issues and bases of support that defined each of the parties. This was done
in exchange for the goal of winning the o ce of Prime Minister. As a result, the
candidates for Prime Minister became stand-ins for their respective parties in the
minds of voters. Therefore, they were more likely to associate their feelings of the
Prime Ministerial candidates with that of the candidates’ respective parties than they
would have before the 1992 Basic Law was implemented and after it was repealed.
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More importantly, this, along with the non-ideological nature of these elections, led
voters in those elections to perceive Labor and Likud as being ideologically closer to
each other during the period of direct elections for Prime Minister than during the
period of pure parliamentary elections.
Election Campaigns
The 1996 Campaign
To understand the campaigning styles of the major parties during the period of direct
Prime Ministerial elections, one must remember one key aspect of the 1992 reforms.
This was that the winning candidate in the Prime Ministerial election would auto-
matically form the next government, regardless of whether or not their party won
the most seats in the Knesset election. As a result, both Labor and Likud made
the decision not to run separate campaigns for Prime Minister and the Knesset, but
to combine the two campaigns, and give priority to the Prime Ministerial election
(Lehman-Wilzig, 1998).
Both of the parties took actions they hoped would win over centrist voters in the
campaign. On the Labor side, their platform called for a referendum on any perma-
nent status agreement reached with the Palestinians. The idea behind this proposal
was to allow the voters to vote for Labor leader Shimon Peres, while simultaneously
limiting his authority during peace negotiations. Emphasizing the importance of the
Prime Ministerial election, Avraham Burg, the writer of the 1992 platform and a
former Labor MK, said that the 1996 platform did not represent the views of La-
bor Party members, but was written principally for the election for Prime Minister
(Hazan, 1999).
In addition, during the televised debated between Peres and Likud leader Ben-
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jamin Netanyahu, Peres declined to mention several key parts of Labor’s platform,
including the establishment of a Palestinian state, a full withdrawal from the Golan
Heights, and an ultimate agreement with Palestinians on the status of Jerusalem (In-
bar, 1998). Labor’s shift to the center during the campaign drew the anger of the
Arab parties to its left, who threatened not to vote for Peres on the Prime Ministerial
vote (Rekhess, 1996).
Labor also sought to court the support of religious voters as well. One way they
tried to achieve this was by diminishing the anti-religious campaign that its favored
coalition partner to the left, Meretz, ran, so that religious voters would not run away
from voting for Peres. Labor even sought votes from the ultra-Orthodox community as
well. One way of achieving this was by taking several sections from their 1992 election
platform,10 that upset religious leaders, out of the 1996 platform. This prompted
Meretz leader Yossi Sarid to say that Labor had surrendered to the religious parties’
demands (The Jerusalem Post, 1996b). Peres (along with Netanyahu) also spoke at
the Agudat Yisrael (the original party created for the ultra-Orthodox community)
conference during the campaign (Keinon, 1996a). In addition, Labor added sections
in their platform that would appeal to religious voters (Hazan, 1999). Also, then-
Housing Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer suggested that a deputy ministership would
be given to a member of Agudat Yisrael (Keinon, 1996b). Finally, in the last few
weeks before the election, Peres wrote open letters to Orthodox newspapers asking
their readers to their vote for him the Prime Ministerial election, while at the same
time telling them to vote for an ultra-Orthodox party on their Knesset vote (Hazan,
1999).
Likud’s campaign took place in the aftermath of the assassination of Labor Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by a far-right Israeli citizen (Hazan, 1999). However,
10These sections included statements on the separation of religion and state and the easing of
abortion laws.
Chapter 4. The Effects of Direct Elections in Israel 88
when o cial campaigning for the general election began, the gap in support between
the Labor and Likud candidates in opinion polls was exactly the same as it was pre-
assassination. This was due in part to a wave of Hamas-led suicide bombings around
that time which killed almost 60 people. This is also combined with the decision
of Labor deciding to downplay the Rabin assassination throughout their campaign,
since Peres wanted to win the election on his own merits (Arian and Shamir, 1999a).
Probably the most important step Likud took was to deemphasize the hawkish
ideology that defined Likud for years, and replace it with messages of security. This
was epitomized in the campaign slogan for Likud during the election, “Netanyahu -
Peace Through Security,” which was an attempt to challenge Labor’s monopoly on
the peace issue (Inbar, 1998). This included Netanyahu not ruling out the situation
of a Likud-led government talking with then-Palestine Liberation Organization leader
Yasser Arafat, which led to criticism from the right (The Jerusalem Post, 1996c).
In addition, during the 1996 campaign, both Labor and Likud took tremendous
steps to obscure policy di↵erences between them, in order to win votes in the center.
For instance, Labor countered Likud’s slogan with one saying “A Strong Israel with
Peres,” touting Peres’ hawkish credentials (Kollek and Kollek, 1996). Furthermore,
when Netanyahu gave his seven policy guidelines, Labor accused Likud of stealing
three of the guidelines from them, and stated that the others were devoid of content
(Hazan, 1999). Labor also accused Netanyahu and Likud of implementing a “weather
vane policy” during the campaign in an attempt to deceive voters (Yudelman, 1996b),
and accused them of duping voters by adopting Labor’s policies (Yudelman, 1996a).
Furthermore, Yehuda Harel, leader of the centrist Third Way party, said that the
unclear nature of the positions of Labor and Likud were taking votes away from his
own party (The Jerusalem Post, 1996a).
Also, both Labor and Likud took steps to remove their staunchest supporters from
public view. For example, Netanyahu did not use Israeli settlers in the Palestinian
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territories, Likud’s most steadfast activists, in the final weeks of the campaign. On
the other side, Labor did not use the services of Histadrut, the national trade union
in Israel, which had historically been linked to Labor and its predecessor, Mapai.
Finally, in a joint decision a week before the election, both of the major parties
cancelled their mass rallies traditionally held on the eve of the election. It was ex-
plained by Likud campaign leader Michael Eitan that the reason for cancelling the
rallies was because only loyal voters attended the rallies, and that the election was
going to be decided by undecided voters (Hazan, 1999). Critics in Likud said the ad-
vertisement campaign ignored its traditional supporters. A former Likud spokesman
even resigned from campaign headquarters because he felt the campaign “did not
reflect the traditional Likud positions” (Inbar, 1998).
The 1999 Campaign
In the 1997 primaries for the Labor Party, party members decided to elect Ehud
Barak, a political outsider who was most notably the former Chief of Sta↵ (supreme
commander) of the Israel Defense Forces, as party leader. Understanding the implica-
tions of the new electoral system, and the hesitation of voters on the right to vote for
Labor, Barak decided to create a new brand for the party in the election. As a result,
the Labor Party brand e↵ectively disappeared from sight during the whole election,
and in its place was the electoral banner of One Israel (Doron, 2002). One Israel
was essentially a political grouping of Labor, Meimad (to its left), and Gesher (to its
right). It was hoped the military record of Barak, combined with the replacement
of the Labor brand with One Israel, would lead the party to victory in the election.
Some in the media called the re-branding a “triumph of avoidance,” in turning Labor
into an invisible party (Steinberg, 1999).
The usage of the One Israel name also allowed Barak to have the space needed
to conduct a campaign independent from Labor. He and his advisers solely set his
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campaign’s policies, and these policies automatically also became those of One Israel
(Medding, 2000). E↵ectively, the platforms for Barak and One Israel were the same,
helping to make the connection between party and leader as strong as it could ever
be in the eyes of the voter. Candidates who were on the party list for One Israel
were not mentioned in campaign advertisements, and even Peres was left out of the
party’s campaign. This was capped o↵ even by Barak only mentioning the name of
the party once in his victory speech, and instead using the word “I” every other time
(Lochery, 1999).
The o cial platform for One Israel in the campaign was non-ideological in almost
every aspect. The platform was essentially devoid of specific policy proposals by a
One Israel-led government.11 On the issue of security, they proclaimed they would
“Endow the citizens of Israel with maximal security based on a strong army and true
peace with our neighbors. We will keep Jerusalem united forever. We will never agree
to return to the 1967 borders.” However, this statement could have been made by
numerous parties (including Likud) during the campaign (Goldberg, 2001).
In an attempt to distance itself from its leftist stance on economic issues, One
Israel talked about these issues in terms of the interests of the individual citizen,
not the interests of a certain social class. Daniel Bloch (1999) of The Jerusalem Post
even commented that Barak’s economic platform, as well as the entourage of business
people around him, were similar to Netanyahu’s. Observers also noted that Barak
was trying to emulate the successes of other leaders on the left, such as Bill Clinton,
Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schro¨der, by embracing free-market principles. Barak even
hired Clinton adviser James Carville to run One Israel’s economic campaign (Amotz,
1999). Barak also played up his past career in the military in television advertising.
This also included a television advertisement showing him during his younger years in
11The only exception to this was a proposal to end the exemption of ultra-Orthodox citizens from
conscription into the military. However, other issues related to religion and state were left out of
the platform.
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the IDF, standing over the dead body of an Arab terrorist that he killed (Goldberg,
2001).
The fact that the party aired an advertisement like this is a testament to how the
presence of a two-candidate Prime Ministerial election changed the way campaigns
were conducted. In the period before the 1992 reforms, airing such an ad would
be unthinkable, given the historical reliance of the Labor Party on the Arab vote.
However, with the reforms in place, One Israel had decided to place its e↵orts into
winning the Prime Minister’s race in exchange for maximizing their Knesset seat
share. This meant that in order to win over 50 percent of the vote share, they
would need to expand beyond their traditional base of support and attract voters on
the right. At the same time, Arabs’ only other option would have been to vote for
Netanyahu, which was a non-starter.12 With this in mind, and no alternative to vote
for on the left, Arabs had no choice but to vote for Barak on the ballot for Prime
Minister.13
As in 1996, the focus of Likud’s campaign was to get Netanyahu re-elected as
Prime Minister. However, they had to do so on a tighter budget, due to Likud’s
parliamentary group losing 13 MKs during the 14th Knesset.14 As a result, very little
of Likud’s campaign funds went to the Knesset election or party activists. Not giving
money to the latter, however, was not a big concern for campaign headquarters since
they preferred to keep the party’s activists out of public view for the Prime Ministerial
election. Also, not funding activists adequately meant that there was less potential for
12In 1996, about 87 percent of Israeli Arabs had a negative view of Netanyahu and 84 percent of
them had a negative view of Likud. This is compared with about 76 percent of Israeli Arabs having
a positive view of Labor that same year (Arian and Shamir, 1996).
13Azmi Bishara ran as a candidate for Prime Minister in 1999 for Balad, a left-wing party with
support predominately from Israeli Arab community. However, he dropped out of the election two
days before election day.
14Likud su↵ered seven defections from within its own party to two newly created political parties
(Herut-The National Union and the Centre Party), and the other six MKs were Gesher and Tzomet
members who left the parliamentary group when the Likud-Gesher-Tzomet group formally split
apart during the Knesset term.
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squabbles with ideologically-neighboring parties, whose supporters Netanyahu would
need if he wanted to win re-election (Mendilow, 2002).
Likud’s problems during the campaign can be seen as a result of the presence of
a direct election for Prime Minister. As the first Prime Minister to be not elected by
the Knesset, Netanyahu had di culties related to keeping his coalition and even his
own party together. These governing problems were likely to occur, given the new
institutional arrangement. Since Netanyahu did not earn the o ce of Prime Minister
due to his party’s standing in the Knesset (but instead due to the voters), he did not
need to be accountable to his own party (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). However, with
the Prime Ministerial election getting almost all of the media attention, Netanyahu’s
leadership issues became a focus of the campaign. This only enhanced the image of
Likud not being fully in sync with its traditional base of supporters, since Netanyahu
(like Barak was with One Israel) was the sole face of Likud’s campaign.
The 2003 Campaign
The 2003 election was the first election after the repeal of the 1992 Basic Law, meaning
there was a return to the pre-1992 electoral system. The leader for Labor was now
Amram Mitzna and the Likud leader was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The shift
back to pure parliamentary elections had a clear impact on how the parties decided
to campaign. In the 1996 and 1999 elections, the parties avoided competing with
parties that were ideologically adjacent to each other, in order to win those parties’
supporters’ votes for the Prime Ministerial ballot. However, now that control of the
Prime Minister’s o ce once again depended on the number of seats a party attained,
Labor and Likud now had to make appeals to neighboring parties.
Labor attempted to do this by declaring they would not join a “National Unity
Government” with Likud and a relatively new centrist party called Shinui. This was
a tactic of appearing less moderate, in order to win voters who might be tempted to
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vote for Meretz. At the same time, this was also an attempt at making an argument
to voters in the middle that Shinui was simply a satellite of Likud. In fact, Labor
attacked Shinui by saying that a vote for Shinui was a vote for Sharon and Likud,
and that a Likud-Shinui government would lead to a right-wing government instead
of a centrist secular government (Goldberg, 2005).
Obviously in the 1996 and 1999 elections, there were not going to be any national
unity governments with Labor/One Israel and Likud (which the 1992 reforms tried
to prevent from occurring). However, making a clear statement that Labor would
not join Likud in a coalition government sent a clear signal that they would not work
across the other side. This is a di↵erent tone than would have been used during
elections that featured a separate ballot for Prime Minister.
In addition, right before the campaign began, Labor approved a platform which
called for Israel to only keep control of Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, relin-
quishing the Temple Mount (the holiest site in Judaism), and a unilateral withdrawal
of the IDF from the then-occupied Gaza Strip (Ho↵man, 2002). This was in contrast
to the more hawkish stances taken by Labor/One Israel in the two prior campaigns.
On the right, Likud notably refrained from attacking ultra-Orthodox parties dur-
ing the 1996 and 1999 campaigns, so that they could win their supporters in the vote
for Prime Minister. However, during the 2003 election, Likud decided to challenge
these parties. A prime example of this was Likud’s assertion that a vote for Shas
would hurt Sharon’s chances of remaining Prime Minister (Bick, 2005). In other
words, they were declaring that a vote for Likud was vote for Sharon, e↵ectively try-
ing to remind people that the rules of the game had changed back to they way they
were before the 1996 election.
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Television Advertising During the Campaigns
1992 Election
We can also look at the advertising campaigns from before, during, and after the 1992
reforms to see how the presence (or absence) of direct elections for Prime Minister
influenced the messages the parties wanted to send to the voters. Looking first at the
1992 election, in a positive advertisement by Labor, a song is played about how Israel
needs Rabin in o ce. Even though Labor emphasized Rabin in the advertisement, the
usage of Rabin can be characterized as a supplement to Labor. This is best exemplified
at the end of the advertisement where the Labor Party logo is prominently shown
on the screen, but with “Under Rabin” added underneath of the logo. Plus, Rabin
himself is only seen on screen for barely a second in the advertisement (Israeli Labor
Party, 1992b).
Another advertisement in 1992 by Labor attacked Likud’s handling of terrorism.
In the advertisement, most of the criticism is leveled toward the party itself, and
not toward Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir (except for a short clip played of Shamir
speaking) (Israeli Labor Party, 1992a). Finally, in a positive advertisement made
by Likud, a song was played which said that Likud was the correct choice, and
that the party resonates in the hearts and minds of Israeli citizens. Throughout the
advertisement, constant references are made to Likud, and not a single reference is
made to Shamir in it (Likud, 1992).
1996 Election
As described earlier, in the 1996 election, both of the parties gave a tremendous focus
on the candidates and not the parties during the campaign. This holds true for the
television advertisements as well. In a positive ad made by Likud, the focus on the
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ad was wholly on Netanyahu. This is exemplified by then-MK Benny Begin (son of
former Prime Minister Menachem Begin) being shown in the advertisement at a rally,
repeatedly telling the audience to “vote Machal and Netanyahu.” Machal, being the
symbol used for Likud on the ballot in Knesset elections. Using the Machal symbol
was a way for the party to distance itself from the Likud name in the advertisement.
In fact, the word “Likud” is not spoken or visible anywhere in the advertisement
(Likud, 1996).
1999 Election
In 1999, there was also a focus on the candidates in advertising as well, at the expense
of the parties. In a One Israel advertisement during the campaign, the alleged failings
of the previous government are mentioned, namely the recession, unemployment, and
the potential violation of the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan. However, these failings
are not described in terms of being Likud’s failings, but as Netanyahu’s failings.
The end of the advertisement tells the viewer to “imagine another four years with
Netanyahu,” but not another four years with Likud (One Israel, 1999).
Likud’s advertisements also had a candidate-centric focus in 1999. In an attack
ad targeted toward One Israel, a clip of Barak played where he said that if he were
Palestinian, he would have joined a terrorist organization as well. The advertisement
concludes with saying “If Barak wins, Israel will lose.” Again, just as with the
advertisement above by One Israel, the ad does not say “if One Israel wins,” but
instead mentions only Barak (Likud, 1999b).
In another Likud attack advertisement, they say that one person has been waiting
for the election for three years, and it is very important to that person that Barak
is elected. The advertisement then ends by saying if Barak (not One Israel) wins, he
will get everything he wants, and that the person is Yasser Arafat (Likud, 1999a).
In yet another attack advertisement by Likud, Barak and Peres are accused of
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doing nothing to stop terrorism. The ad then describes Netanyahu’s achievements in
maintaining security in the country, and says that he is the only one who can bring
security and peace to Israel. Again, the advertisement makes use of the party leader,
but not the party itself. This is best embodied by the claim that Netanyahu, not
Likud, can bring peace and security. Another thing that should be noticed about
the advertisement too is that when talking about the last Labor government, they
mention Peres, and not Labor Likud (1999c).
These advertisements mark a stronger entrenchment of the direct elections for
Prime Minister than the election prior. For example, while Likud only referred to the
party brand by the Machal symbol in 1996, we see that by the second election held
under the rules of the 1992 reform, the parties completely disappeared from campaign
advertising in the 1999 elections.
2003 Election
The 2003 election was the first election that returned to the rules of the pre-1992
system. In Labor’s ad campaign, while there was a focus on leader Amram Mitzna
(including a song in all of the ads called “We Believe in you Mitzna”), one can see
a shift back to the direction of incorporating the party back into advertising. In one
advertisement, Mitzna talks about his days in the military, and says “you don’t drink
from your canteen until the last soldier has drank from it,” and “you don’t eat before
you make sure all of the other soldiers eat too” (Israeli Labor Party, 2003b). Messages
like these, which allude to income redistribution, would appeal to the traditional
voting base of Labor and less so to centrists. Another Labor advertisement has
Mitzna alluding to traditional Labor policy as well, by saying he will change the
budget for the purposes of helping Israeli society (Israeli Labor Party, 2003a).
Another ad shows Mitzna at a press conference with other senior Labor Party
figures, including Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Matan Vilnai, Dalia Itzik, and Haim Ramon
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stating how they will not join Likud in a national unity government. All the while, the
conference is occurring in a room that has Labor Party logos displayed prominently
in the background. Also, the senior figures make repeated references to Labor in
the advertisement. Vilnai says that Labor (not Mitzna) is the real alternative, and
Ramon says that if you want change, vote Labor (Israeli Labor Party, 2003c).
One final Labor advertisement shows Mitzna in a meeting with senior party mem-
bers that is reminiscent of a cabinet meeting. Notably, among the people present
at the meeting is Peres, who, as described earlier, was intentionally left out of One
Israel’s 1999 campaign. The usage of other party leaders in Labor’s ads shows the
shift away from the leader being the sole focus of the campaign, making it less likely
that voters will conflate the leader and the party in their minds. Finally, there is
a large portrait of Yitzhak Rabin in the background of the room, which would also
arouse enthusiasm among traditional Labor supporters (Israeli Labor Party, 2003d).
The pattern in advertisements during the period of Prime Ministerial elections and
during the period of pure parliamentary elections shows how the party is treated in the
di↵erent scenarios. During the 1996 and 1999 elections, there is obviously a higher
focus on the candidates for Prime Minister, and the parties were virtually hidden
away (party logos did not even appear in advertisements). However, in the 1992 and
2003 elections, even though the leaders were present in some of the advertisements,
their role in the ads did not supplant that of the party. Plus, attacks by the parties
were couched in terms as failings of the other party’s leader, and not the party itself.
However, attacks by the parties in 1992 and 2003 were couched in terms of the other
party’s failings. These strategies ultimately made voters more likely to associate their
feelings about the parties with that of their feelings of the parties’ respective leaders
during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections.
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Figure 4.1: Voters’ Perception of the Ideological Distance Between Labor and Likud
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Empirical Evidence
The tactics in campaigning by Labor and Likud during the 1996 and 1999 elections
will manifest itself in public opinion when we look at a couple of key empirical tests.
The first test is where voters ideologically place the two parties in relation to each
other. The second test is the degree of closeness regarding each of the parties in rela-
tion to their respective leaders during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections
versus the period of pure parliamentary elections.
Shift in Ideological Distance Between the Parties
Using CSES data, I compared voters’ perceived ideological distance of Labor from
Likud in 1996 and 2003.15 I created the measurement of ideological distance by
simply taking the absolute value of the di↵erence in the ideological placements of
Labor and Likud in each election for each voter. Ideology in the CSES is measured
15I only used the 1996 and 2003 elections, since data from the CSES is not available for the 1992
and 1999 elections.
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on an 11-point scale from 0-10, with 0 being the most right position and 10 being
the most left position. We would expect that in 1996 (the first election to feature
direct elections for Prime Minister), the gap between the parties would be closer to
each other than in 2003 (the first election after the repeal of the 1992 Basic Law)
because of the e↵ects of the Prime Ministerial election. Looking at Figure 4.1, we see
that these results hold up when we look at the average di↵erences in the placement
of Labor from Likud in the two elections.16 This is in line with our expectations from
looking at the campaign styles of the parties during the period of direct elections.
Change in Feeling Thermometer Gap Between Party and Leader
However, this evidence alone does not provide full evidence of presidentialism’s e↵ect
on public opinion toward the parties’ positions. We also need to know that the voters’
perception of the relationship between the parties and their leaders was altered as
a result of the reforms. The way this can be achieved is through comparing the
di↵erences between each party and their leader on a feeling thermometer that is
asked about several parties and political leaders in the INES.17 This method has
already been used by Arian and Shamir (2002). They show that there is a significant
di↵erence in feelings with regards to each major party and their respective candidate
for Prime Minister in the 1992 and 1996 elections, but not a significant di↵erence in
those feelings for the 1999 election.
However, there is a problem with how Arian and Shamir measure feeling ther-
mometer distances from the party and its leader. They first find the mean placement
across all voters on the feeling thermometer for each party and leader, and then com-
16The ideological distances between the parties for each election were compared by ordinary least
squares regression with robust standard errors. The regression model o↵ of which this test is based
is located in Appendix A.
17The INES’ feeling thermometer asks respondents on a scale of 10 their level of attraction or
rejection of a certain party or political leader, with 1 being a “strong rejection” and 10 being
“strong support.”
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Figure 4.2: Voters’ Feeling Gap Between the Party and Its Leader
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pare the di↵erence in those two means. Arian and Shamir explain their finding in the
1996 election by arguing that there would be a significant di↵erence still in people’s
feelings about each party and their candidates that year, since it was the first time
there were direct elections for Prime Minister. As a result, the distinctions between
the parties and their Prime Ministerial candidates would need another electoral cycle
to be fully blurred.
Nonetheless, given the immediate change in campaigning styles by both parties
that I demonstrated did occur in the 1996 election, we should still expect to see a
significant closing in the feeling gap between parties and their leaders. If we analyze
the gap between feelings toward Labor (or Likud) and their Prime Ministerial candi-
date for each voter, we will see that the gap between each party and their candidate
was significantly smaller during the 1996 and 1999 elections, as compared to the gap
in the 1992 and 2003 elections. In addition, Arian and Shamir’s test was done before
the 2003 Knesset election, which was the first election after the switch back to the
pre-1992 system.
I, instead, modify Arian and Shamir’s method of assessing change in the feeling
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Figure 4.3: Voters’ Feeling Toward the Parties
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thermometer gap by taking the absolute value di↵erence between the rating for each
party and their leader in each election for each voter.18 When we change the analysis
to look at the mean of every voter’s feeling thermometer gap between party and
leader, we now see that for both the 1996 and 1999 elections, there is a significant
decline in the gap between feelings of each party and their leader.19 As opposed to
Arian and Shamir’s analysis, the narrowing of the gap occurs immediately after the
1992 reform in the 1996 election. The shrinkage in the gap is more pronounced for
the 1999 election, and the gap increases during the 2003 election.
This parallel shift in the feeling gap for both parties is more impressive when
looking at the feeling patterns for both parties and their leaders over the same period
of time. In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we look at the average feeling thermometer rating for
each party and leader over the same time period. Labor (and their leaders) and Likud
18For example, in 1996, I find the absolute value of the di↵erence between a voter’s feeling ther-
mometer rating for the Labor Party and Peres, and also find the absolute value of the di↵erence
between their rating of Likud and Netanyahu.
19The gaps for each election were compared by ordinary least squares regression with robust
standard errors. Results are shown in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.4: Voters’ Feeling Toward the Party Leaders
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(and their leaders) follow their own unique paths in average feelings among the public.
However, when comparing the changes in gaps between parties and their leader, the
changes are parallel to each other. This indicates that there were systematic changes
occurring during the 1996 and 1999 Knesset elections which caused the gap between
each party and their leader to shrink. That systemic factor is the direct election for
Prime Minister.
As I indicated in the backgrounds on the 1996 and 1999 elections, Both Labor and
Likud took extreme steps in submerging their parties’ brands (and even most loyal
supporters) in order to win the o ce of Prime Minister. The outcome of those e↵orts
was an alteration in people’s minds about the distance of a leader from their party.
In the 1996 and 1999 elections, the campaigns projected an image of the leaders and
the party being indistinguishable. As a result, the voters reacted by being more likely
to have their feelings about each party and their leader being identical to each other.
This meant that the voters were more likely to see the party and its positions through
the lens of the leader than through that of the party in general.
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Conclusions
The implementation of the Basic Law: The Government in 1992 called for the direct
election of the Prime Minister of Israel. This was put in place in the hopes of creating
changes in the party system that would benefit the two largest parties in the country.
However, there were e↵ects that were not foreseen by the reformers. Along with the
oft-discussed e↵ect the reform had on the fragmentation of the party system, the
direct elections caused the parties’ identities to be submerged during campaigning in
the hopes of winning the Prime Minister’s o ce. As a result, voters associated the
leaders as being synonymous with the parties in these campaigns. Given that the
candidates for Prime Minister were downplaying ideological di↵erences between each
other during campaigning, voters also perceived Labor and Likud to be ideologically
similar to each other in these elections.
Using survey data, I indicated two key findings. The first is that voters perceived
Labor and Likud to be closer to each other during the period of direct Prime Minis-
terial elections than during the period of pure parliamentary elections. The second is
voters’ attitudes toward each of the two parties and their respective leaders became
more similar during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections. This indicates
that ideological perceptions of the parties during the reform period were more driven
by the election for Prime Minister than the Knesset election.
The next chapter will turn to the case of France. While this chapter focused on
the e↵ect of changes from direct versus indirect executive elections and back within
the same country, the next chapter looks at how changes to the electoral calendar has
a↵ected party competition in legislative elections. The findings in the next chapter
will be in line with those in this chapter.
Chapter 5
The E↵ects of the Change to
Concurrent Presidential and
Legislative Elections on Party
Campaigning and Perception in
France
The 2002 Presidential and National Assembly elections were the first in a now-
permanent feature of French politics that came as a result of constitutional changes
to the French electoral calendar. The changes ensured that the Presidential election
would always occur a month before the legislative election every five years. This was
done to reduce the likelihood of the President and the Prime Minister coming from
opposing parties. So far, these expectations have borne out, as the 2002, 2007, and
2012 elections have all led to Presidents and Prime Ministers coming from the same
party each time.
Along with ensuring that success for a party in the Presidential election will
translate to success in the legislative election, the institutional reforms had another
impact as well. That is, competition between the parties in the legislative election has
now become a function of the preceding Presidential election. This chapter examines
the e↵ects these constitutional changes had on party competition between the two
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main parties in France. Samuels and Shugart (2010) showed how the change in the
timing of the elections in France caused the presence of stronger coattail e↵ects onto
the legislative campaign in 2002, creating the e↵ect of presidentialized parties in the
legislative election that year. This chapter expands on this analysis to show how
competition between the parties was a↵ected, along with how voters were a↵ected by
the change.
Using evidence from both political leaders and survey data, I will show that be-
fore the institutional reforms, debates in legislative elections had three characteristics:
they focused more on substantive policy issues, they framed cohabitation as a shift
in which party controlled the power to set the policy agenda, and featured fewer
incursions into the legislative election by the President. However, after the changes,
debates in legislative elections were largely devoid of policy issues, framed cohabi-
tation as a weakening of the incumbent President’s power to set the policy agenda,
and featured more incursions by the President into the legislative campaign. This, as
a result, caused voters to identify the parties more in terms of those parties’ Presi-
dential candidates. Simultaneously, this caused the parties to be perceived as more
centrist. This is because, as explained in previous chapters, presidential candidates
are forced to take relatively centrist positions. The elections that will be examined
in this chapter are the 1997 legislative election (the last election before the changes),
and the 2002 legislative election (the first election after the changes).
First, background on the factors leading to the institutional reforms will be dis-
cussed. This will be followed with accounts of the 1997 and 2002 legislative elections.
These accounts will include numerous examples of how politicians from the main par-
ties campaigned di↵erently in each of these elections. The accounts will show that
debate in the 1997 legislative election was more substantive in policy, while debate in
the 2002 legislative election centered on whether or not the President should be given
a legislative majority. In essence, the 2002 legislative campaign was placed in the
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context of the preceding Presidential election a few weeks earlier. Next, the impact
of the institutional changes on French voters will be assessed, through using French
election survey data. The results from the survey data will show that in the 2002
election, voters who voted for either the Gaullist or Socialist Presidential candidate
were more likely to feel the closest ideologically to that candidate’s party than simi-
lar voters were in 1997. In addition, centrist voters in 2002 were more likely to feel
ideologically closest to either the Gaullist or Socialist parties than similar voters in
1997. These results will then be followed up with concluding remarks for the chapter.
Background
Within the framework of semi-presidential regimes, political scientists classify France
as a premier-presidential regime, as opposed to a president-parliamentary regime
(Shugart and Carey, 1992; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). This means that the French
President possesses fewer constitutional powers than presidents under a president-
parliamentary regime. Despite these constitutional limitations of the French Presi-
dent, they have been able to wield considerable de facto political powers. Primarily,
this has been through two of their most important formal powers: the power to
appoint the Prime Minister, and the power to dissolve the National Assembly.1
This has meant that during the first years of the Fifth Republic, the President
has had their way with policy through these informal powers. However, this has
been conditional on the President and Prime Minister coming from the same party.
This was not the case when President Franc¸ois Mitterrand’s Socialist Party (five
years into his seven-year term) lost their majority in the National Assembly in the
1986 legislative election. As a result, Mitterrand was forced to appoint Rally For
the Republic (RPR) leader Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister. This is because the
1While the President can dissolve the National Assembly, they can only do it past 12 months
after the last dissolution.
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Prime Minister must have the confidence of the majority of the National Assembly.
Consequently, France entered its first period of “cohabitation,” in which the President
and Prime Minister come from opposing parties. During this period of cohabitation,
the Prime Minister became a more powerful political figure, with the ability to shape
domestic policy through their legislative majority. The President’s powers, on the
other hand, were relegated to foreign policy and defense, through their capacities as
head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the military (Lewis-Beck, 1997).
The first cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac ended when the Social-
ists regained a majority in the National Assembly after the 1988 legislative election.
However, a second cohabitation occurred when President Mitterrand was forced to
appoint former RPR Finance Minister E´douard Balladur2 in the wake of the RPR-
UDF landslide3 in the 1993 legislative election. This second cohabitation ended when
Chirac was elected President in 1995. The third cohabitation occurred after the RPR
and UDF lost their majority to the Socialist-led Plural Left alliance4 in the 1997
legislative election. This was also the first time a cohabitation involved a President
from the political right (Chirac) and a Prime Minister from the Socialists (Socialist
leader Lionel Jospin) (Leu↵en, 2009).
This third cohabitation would also be the last to date. This is because in 2000, a
constitutional referendum passed which reduced the President’s term from seven years
to five years. This is in tandem with the Socialist government passing legislation in
2001 that changed the order of the Presidential election and the legislative election,
so that the legislative election would occur within the matter of weeks after the
Presidential election. Framers of the Fifth Republic originally intended the legislative
2This was at the suggestion of Chirac, who, while still RPR leader in 1993, did not want to be
Prime Minister again.
3After the 1993 legislative election, the RPR and market-liberal Union for French Democracy
(UDF) came together to form a coalition government.
4The Plural Left was an electoral alliance between the Socialists, the French Communist Party,
the Greens, the social-liberal Radical-Socialist Party, and the left-wing Citizens’ Movement.
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election to precede the Presidential election in years where the Presidential election
fell during the same year as the legislative election.
The combination of these two institutional reforms meant that the legislative
election would immediately follow after the Presidential election every five years,
since the term of the National Assembly is five years (Laver et al., 2006).5 The
Socialists hoped that by making the Presidential election immediately precede the
legislative election, Jospin, who was very popular with French voters, would win the
next Presidential election, and then translate his popularity into a Socialist majority
in the legislative election immediately thereafter (Lewis-Beck et al., 2012).
1997 Legislative Election
Background
The 1997 legislative election was the first national election held since the election of
Chirac as President in 1995. After Chirac’s victory, France was plagued by numerous
industrial strikes. During this time, Chirac and his Prime Minister, Alain Juppe´,
su↵ered a decline in their poll numbers. However, by 1997, there was a calm in the
strikes, and the poll numbers of both Chirac and Juppe´ began to rebound. Still, the
next legislative election was originally scheduled for 1998, and by then, the French
government would have to put in place austerity measures required for joining the
European single currency (later created as the Euro). These austerity measures were
expected to be unpopular, and combined with his and Juppe´’s rising poll numbers,
Chirac decided to dissolve the National Assembly, and call for legislative elections in
May and June of 1997.6 Chirac’s strategy was also in part to catch the Socialists
5The first Presidential election that was technically subject to the two changes was the 2007
Presidential election, since Chirac’s seven-year term ended in 2002.
6France’s elections for the National Assembly take place over two rounds.
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o↵-guard, making them unprepared for a snap legislative election.
The main issues in the 1997 legislative campaign were the soon-to-be-enacted
European single currency (known as the Euro) and unemployment. The main cam-
paign focus of the RPR-led majority was the European Union, and the dangers of a
Socialist-led majority in the Assembly. Leaders in the RPR and the UDF accused the
Socialists on wanting to renege on commitments to the European Union, such as the
Maastricht Treaty and the Euro. Much of their campaign involved talking about the
consequences of a Socialist-led majority in the Assembly, and the Socialists’ electoral
pact with the Communists.
At the same time, the RPR-led majority presented a series of policy proposals.
These included tax reductions, budgetary controls, and decentralization (along with
their unconditional support for the Euro. On the Socialist side, their proposals in-
cluded creating 700,000 new jobs for young French people: half of which in the private
sector and the other half in the public sector. The Socialists also proposed to reduce
the maximum work hours per week from 39 to 35.
In the first round of the legislative election, the Socialists and their leftist allies
earned 45 percent of the popular vote (with the Socialists earning 26 percent of the
vote).7 Meanwhile, the RPR-led majority ended up with 36 percent of the vote (with
the RPR attaining 15 percent of the vote).8 After the disappointing results for the
right, Juppe´ resigned as Prime Minister at the personal request of President Chirac.
This was followed with Chirac making one of his few incursions into the legislative
campaign, by addressing the French public the day after the first round of election.
In his address, he promised a “renewed social model,” and warned voters against
abstaining or putting the Socialists’ ideas “back in the saddle” (Le Figaro, 1997a).
7Vote totals for the left also include dissident Socialist politicians who were not attached to any
major party.
8Vote totals for the right also include the joint ticket of the soft Eurosceptic Movement for France
(MPF) and liberal-conservative National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNI), along with
dissident rightist politicians who were not attached to any major party.
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The RPR-led majority also tried to shake up the campaign before the second round
by making former Social A↵airs and Employment Minister Philippe Se´guin of the
RPR and former Finance Minister Alain Madelin of the UDF more prominent in the
campaign. The media and public thought of Se´guin and Madelin each as a potential
candidate for the position of Prime Minister if the right retained their majority in
the second round (France Te´le´visions, 1997a).
The second round mirrored that of the results of the first round, in that the
Socialist-led left finished first with 47 percent of the vote (the Socialists won 38 percent
of the vote), while the RPR-led majority earned 46 percent of the vote (The RPR
won 22 percent of the vote). This translated into 320 seats for the Socialists and their
allies,9 and 253 seats for the RPR-led majority10 under the two-round majoritarian
system used for French legislative elections. After the election, Chirac asked Jospin
to form the next government, which Jospin subsequently did, by putting together
a cabinet that included members of the Socialists, Communists, Radical-Socialists,
Greens, and Citizens’ Movement.
Treatment of Issues and Institutions During Campaigning
During the 1997 campaign, the Socialists spoke of cohabitation as being a complete
shift in policy control from one party to another, complete with a policy platform they
would enact in a cohabitation situation. In addition, the RPR-led majority’s attacks
on the prospect of cohabitation were framed as a complete shift in policy control as
well. This debate over cohabitation included a substantive policy discussion over each
party’s policies as well. Also, attempts by the President to intervene in the legislative
9The seat breakdown on the left was 255 seats for the Socialists, 35 seats for the Communists,
12 seats for the Radical-Socialist Party, 7 seats each for the Greens and Citizens’ Movement, and 4
seats for unattached, dissident Socialist candidates.
10The seat breakdown on the right was 139 seats for the RPR, 112 seats for the UDF, and 2 seats
for the MPF-CNI ticket.
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campaign were relatively limited.
During the campaign, Jospin criticized divisions within the RPR over supporting
the Euro (Noblecourt and Saux, 1997) and criticized the right’s proposed policies,
such as cutting government spending and abolishing the minimum wage (Noblecourt,
1997a). On the issue of the Euro, Jospin shifted his position away from the center,
closer to the Communists’ (which opposed the adoption of the Euro), promising
to renegotiate the terms of the single currency, and not letting them stand as-is
(Lichfield, 1997b). On European policy in general, Jospin framed a similarity in
position with Chirac as a shift of Chirac to the Socialist position. While this may
seem like a standard statement of agreement, it actually shows that Jospin was not
shying from the Socialist position (Jarreau and Noblecourt, 1997).
Meanwhile, the right’s criticism of cohabitation was based on the prospects of a
policy shift to the left, and not that of a weakening of the President’s power. Speak-
ing for the right on French television, former President Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing of
the UDF gave four reasons why the Socialists should not be in power. The first
three reasons dealt with policy and ideology, while cohabitation was the last reason
Giscard gave (France Te´le´visions, 1997a). In one of his few incursions into the cam-
paign, Chriac talked about the dangers of cohabitation. Chirac spoke of the dangers
of having a Socialist and Communist government taking a role in shaping policy to-
ward Europe (Monnot and De Montvalon, 1997). Juppe´ also asked voters if they
could imagine the next European A↵airs Minister coming from the Communist Party
(Noblecourt and Saux, 1997). In addition, Chirac did not speak of cohabitation as
a weakening of his power, but instead as a shift away from economic liberalization
(Henning, 1997). This is combined with him saying on television that electing the
Socialists would be returning to the past (Le Figaro, 1997a). In an interview with
Le Figaro before the first round of the election, Juppe´ said a Socialist victory would
mean a shift to a new agenda, in the form of more taxes and more people collecting
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unemployment benefits (Le Figaro, 1997f). Furthermore, shortly after the first round,
then-former Budget Minister (and future President) Nicolas Sarkozy said that France
could not make the choice to go backwards policy-wise (Le Figaro, 1997c). Finally,
then-UDF leader Franc¸ois Le´otard argued that cohabitation should be avoided be-
cause the Socialists’ policies do not work (France Te´le´visions, 1997b). Le´otard did
not say, however, that cohabitation should be avoided because the president needs a
majority in the legislature.
In addition, Jospin spoke of cohabitation not as a sharing of power, but as a pol-
icy shift toward a new direction (Fitchett, 1997). Furthermore, he said in a speech
that when cohabitation occurs, power shifts from the President to the Prime Minister
and his government (Noblecourt, 1997b). Moreover, former Socialist Prime Minister
Laurent Fabius spoke of a Socialist victory also as a change in policy (Le Figaro,
1997b) and a change in governing (France Te´le´visions, 1997a). Additionally, Com-
munist leader Robert Hue said the left’s victory showed that French voters chose a
new policy agenda (Le Figaro, 1997d).
These statements by Jospin, Fabius, and Hue implied that a Socialist-led victory
in the legislative election would not be a check on power, but a new direction policy-
wise. Jospin also said that in the event of a Socialist victory, France will have spoken
with one voice, as in the case of every other legislative election that resulted in
cohabitation (Le Figaro, 1997e). This was Jospin’s way of claiming a mandate to
govern. In addition, given that the 1997 election was a non-concurrent election,
Jospin advocated a few policies that were non-centrist in nature. Two of the most
notable were the proposal to reduce the workweek to 35 hours, and the creation of
350,000 new government jobs for young people (Lichfield, 1997a).
Jospin reinforced this belief in cohabitation being a change in policy direction
by stressing the constitutional independence between the President and legislature.
In an interview on the television network France 2, he mentioned that the French
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Constitution bans the President from attending the National Assembly. He also said
that his opponent was the RPR-led majority and not Chirac, and that Chirac could
only help his opponents from the sidelines. This was evidenced by Jospin’s subsequent
attacking of Juppe´ and former Prime Minister Balladur, instead of directing attacks
toward Chirac (France Te´le´visions, 1997c). Jospin also reminded voters during the
campaign that the election was a legislative election, and not a Presidential election
(Aphatie, 1997).
Presidential Involvement in the Legislative Campaign
Direct Presidential involvement in the campaign was limited to a televised statement
during the moment of the National Assembly’s dissolution and a televised statement
before the second round of the election. This relative lack of presidential involvement
helped to highlight that there was independence between the President and his party
in the legislature. Before the first round, there was ambiguity over whether or not a
victory by the right would mean there would be a continuation of Chirac’s policies.
After Chirac said that there would be a continuation of the same policies after the
election, then-leader of the UDF group in the National Assembly, Gilles de Robien,
publicly hinted that there would be a change in policy directions if the RPR-led
majority was re-elected, causing confusion over what the agenda would be after a RPR
victory (Ottenheimer, 1997). After the first round result, then-Education Minister
Franc¸ois Bayrou of the UDF said the “governing majority would announce how it
intends to govern di↵erently” (Le Figaro, 1997c). Also, on the eve of the second
round, Giscard said the RPR-led majority would “govern di↵erently with the same
majority” if re-elected. Then-Speaker of the National Assembly, Philippe Se´guin, also
said at a pre-election rally that if the RPR-led majority were re-elected, it would be
“liberated” (France Te´le´visions, 1997b).
These previous comments from leaders on the right hinted that the legislative
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party would still have some autonomy from its President of the same party. This
does not mean that a legislative party is going to be fully independent from the
President during a non-concurrent election. This was evident occasional times in the
campaign when Chirac asked for voters to re-elect the RPR-led majority. It was also
evident in Juppe´’s resignation as Prime Minister after the first round at Chirac’s
request, despite the President’s lack of formal power in removing a Prime Minister.
This is due to informal powers presidents posses as the de facto head of their party
in presidential regimes (Samuels and Shugart, 2010).
In the next section, it will be shown that these “presidential incursions” into
the legislative election were more frequent in the 2002 election than during the 1997
election. It is important to keep in mind that presidential incursions are not in
themselves coattail e↵ects. Instead, presidents make incursions in a legislative election
in the hopes of producing coattail e↵ects. The closer a legislative election is to a
presidential election, there exists more opportunities for the president to exert coattail
e↵ects onto the legislative election.
2002 Legislative Election
Background
The 2002 legislative election was di↵erent from the 1997 election, since the 2002
election occurred weeks after the Presidential election. This was due to a referendum
in 2000, which reduced the duration of the President’s term from seven years to five
years. This had the e↵ect of making the Presidential election relatively concurrent
with the legislative election.11 Proponents of the change hoped that the occurrences of
cohabitation would diminish (Bu↵otot and Hanley, 2003). As a result, the legislative
11The National Assembly already had five-year terms before the 2000 Constitutional referendum.
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election in 2002 was held on the heels of the Presidential election.
In the Presidential campaign, Chirac was running again under the RPR banner
for a second term, while Jospin was the candidate for the Socialists. It was widely
expected that they would be the two candidates competing in the second round.
However, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the far-right National Front finished second in the
first round. 12
This occurred due to two key factors. First, the main issue in the campaign was
not the economy (which was rebounding since the Jospin government took power), but
instead was insecurity (crime and public safety). Le Pen was able to take advantage
of this unease among the electorate, since the anti-immigrant National Front linked
the issue of insecurity with immigration (Ga↵ney, 2004). Second, the left went into
the campaign fragmented, and as a result, significant amounts of the vote were spread
amongst di↵erent leftist candidates Clift (2004).13 These divisions were exacerbated
by Jospin’s centrist strategy in the Presidential campaign, by declaring that he was
not an ideological Socialist, which alienated many of the Socialists’ core voters.
Le Pen’s surprise place on the second round ballot led to a wave of protests around
the country against Le Pen and the National Front. In the second round, Chirac
easily defeated Le Pen 82 percent to 17 percent. This was the biggest landslide in
a Presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. Chirac owed his victory
mainly to left-wing voters who declared they would “vote for the criminal14 over the
fascist.”
Next would come the first round of the legislative election, which was scheduled to
12Chirac received 19.88 percent of the vote in the first round, Le Pen received 16.86 percent of
the vote, while Jospin earned 16.18 percent of the vote.
13Aside from Jospin, Three leftist candidates received over five percent of the vote: Arlette
Laguiller of the Trotskyist Workers’ Struggle, Jean-Pierre Cheve`nement of the Citizens’ Movement,
and Noe¨l Mame`re of the Greens. In addition, Olivier Besancenot of the Revolutionary Commu-
nist League received over four percent of the vote, and Communist Robert Hue received over three
percent of the vote.
14Chirac at the time was facing corruption allegations from his tenure as Mayor of Paris and a
financial scandal over misused government funds during the cohabitation period.
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take place five weeks after the second round of the presidential election. Spearheaded
by Chirac, a new political grouping was created to contest the legislative election,
named the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP). This electoral alliance con-
sisted of the RPR, Liberal Democracy, and part of the UDF.15 All candidates who
were elected to the National Assembly under the UMP brand would have to agree to
support the President and agree to take part in the creation of a new political party
in the fall of 2002.16 Consistent with the catchall nature of this new party, after
his re-election as President, Chirac named former Commerce and Industry Minister
Jean-Pierre Ra↵arin of Liberal Democracy the interim Prime Minister before the leg-
islative election.17 This was the second time during the Fifth Republic that a Prime
Minister did not come from the Gaullist or Socialist ranks (Cole, 2004).18
The Socialists, demoralized after Jospin’s defeat in the first round of the Presi-
dential election, were e↵ectively leaderless during the legislative campaign. This was
because Jospin announced his resignation as Prime Minister and retirement from pol-
itics right after his first found defeat in the Presidential election. The Socialists’ cam-
paign was run by then-Socialist Party First Secretary (and future President) Franc¸ois
Hollande, along with his then-domestic partner and former Environment Minister
Se´gole`ne Royal. However, there was no consensus among the Socialist leadership
over Hollande being the Prime Minister-in-waiting in the event of a Socialist victory.
Fabius and former Socialist Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn were skeptical
of Hollande’s claim to the Premiership if the Socialists won (Bell and Criddle, 2002).
This also highlighted the disunity on the left in the wake of the Presidential election.
In the first round of the legislative election, the UMP and their allies attained
15Centrist elements of the UDF, led by Bayrou, refused to join the new UMP, and continued on
under the UDF banner.
16The new party would be called the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP).
17Ra↵arin remained Prime Minister after the UMP won a majority in the legislative election.
18The first non-Gaullist or Socialist Prime Minister was liberal Raymond Barre, who was Prime
Minister under liberal President Giscard.
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43 percent of the popular vote (with the UMP earning 33 percent of the vote).19
Meanwhile, the Socialists and their allies ended up with 36 percent of the vote (while
the Socialists won 24 percent of the vote outright).20 The second round mirrored that
of the results of the first round, in that the right finished first with 52 percent of the
vote (the UMP won 47 percent of the vote), while the left earned 45 percent of the
vote (The Socialists won 35 percent of the vote). This translated into 320 seats for
the UMP21 and their allies and 253 seats for the United Left (Cole, 2002).22
Treatment of Issues and Institutions During Campaigning
The main di↵erence between the 1997 legislative election and the 2002 legislative
election was that in 2002, there was a relative lack of discussion on substantive issues,
combined with a di↵erent conception of cohabitation’s e↵ect on political power. While
the Socialists framed cohabitation as a shift in policy from one party to another in
1997, they said that cohabitation was instead a weakening of the President’s power
during the 2002 campaign. The right also changed their framing of cohabitation as
well. While in 1997, the RPR said that cohabitation would lead to shift toward the
Socialists setting the policy agenda, in 2002 the UMP said cohabitation would weaken
their own ability to set the policy agenda.
While debates during the 1997 legislative election centered primarily on unemploy-
ment and Europe, the 2002 legislative election campaign was devoid of substantial
discussions of issues in the media. Instead, arguments by the right focused on the
19The UMP’s allies were the UDF, the MPF, Liberal Democracy, the Rally for France (RPF), and
dissident rightist candidates not attached to any major party.
20The Socialists’ allies were the Communists, the Greens, The Radical Party of the Left (PRG;
the new name for the Radical-Socialist Party) and dissident Socialist candidates not attached to any
major party.
21The seat breakdown on the right was 357 seats for the UMP, 29 seats for the UDF, 2 seats for
the MPF, 2 seats for Liberal Democracy, 1 seat for the RPF, and 8 seats for unattached, dissident
rightist candidates.
22The seat breakdown on the left was 140 seats for the Socialists, 21 seats for the Communists, 7
seats for the PRG, 3 seats for the Greens, and 6 seats for unattached, dissident Socialist candidates.
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need for the President to have a legislative majority. This was coupled with them
stressing the importance of avoiding another five years of cohabitation. Even senior
figures in the UMP admitted that the main theme of the party’s campaign would be
arguing against another period of cohabitation (Collomb-Robert, 2004). Therefore,
attacks from the right were not targeted toward the left, but toward the situation
of cohabitation (Bacque, 2002b). Ra↵arin even said that his opponent was “not
the left, but cohabitation” (Mauroy, 2002). He would also say that voters wanted
“political e ciency,” and that the era of cohabitation in French politics was over
(The Scotsman, 2002). As a result, the left accused the right of using “snooze tac-
tics,” e↵ectively putting the legislative campaign to sleep in order to benefit from the
coattails of Chirac’s victory (Lichfield, 2002). In addition, former Socialist Defense
Minister Alain Richard said Chirac was using the anti-cohabitation campaign theme
as a “smokescreen” to avoid debate on the UMP’s policy platform (Le Figaro, 2002f).
When issues were brought up, discussion turned toward the direction of the Pres-
idency. After the first round of the legislative election, Ra↵arin said the UMP would
keep all of the commitments made by the President during the Presidential campaign
(Le Figaro, 2002c). After the results of the second round were announced, Ra↵arin
subsequently said “Jacques Chirac’s platform won its majority in the legislature” (Le
Figaro, 2002d). These comments indicate how the legislative party (in this case, the
UMP) converged more toward its Presidential candidate (Chirac) during the con-
current election. Furthermore, in a meeting with other UMP candidates during the
campaign, Ra↵arin said that during periods of cohabitation, “political powerlessness”
prevails (Collomb-Robert, 2004). This is in contrast to how the right framed cohabi-
tation five years earlier, as being a shift toward a di↵erent ideological direction.
Conversely, the Socialists’ main argument was that they should be elected to
government for the purposes of being in a position to challenge the President’s policies.
Hollande said that “the threat of such a strong concentration of power in the hands
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of one party would cause our democracy to become completely unbalanced. It is
imperative that the voters return an e↵ective opposition in the National Assembly”
(Henley, 2002). Also, at a rally in Nantes, Hollande told the crowd “Ra↵arin long
ago had a dream, that the right would have all of the powers for five years. We
do not want that nightmare. We are not tired and we have energy to spare. It is
not our individual fate that is at stake, it is the future of the country that is at
stake” (Freyssenet, 2002). Furthermore, Fabius remarked that it is not healthy to
have both the Presidency and the legislature to be controlled by the same party (Le
Figaro, 2002a). Other Socialists, such as former Social A↵airs Minister and Labor
Minister Martine Aubry, spoke of the need to elect a Socialist legislative majority for
the purpose of “rebalancing” policy (Waintraub, 2002). Even the Socialists’ allies,
like then-leader of The Greens, Dominique Voynet, said voters needed to “rebalance
powers” in the legislative election (Le Figaro, 2002e).
These comments are in contrast to five years earlier, when the left spoke of cohab-
itation as a shift in a di↵erent policy direction, as opposed to a balancing of political
institutions and policy. Even arguments from minor parties on the right involved in-
stitutional issues. Then-leader of the Rally for France, Charles Pasqua, argued, “how
can we unconditionally support the government for five years? Even under [Charles]
de Gaulle, this did not happen” (Huet, 2002).
Presidential Involvement in the Legislative Campaign
The Presidential incursions into the legislative campaign were more pronounced in
this election as compared to the 1997 election. Ten days before the first round of the
legislative election, Chirac promised to be fully engaged in the campaign. Among his
statements during the campaign, Chirac argued that the President needed a majority
to govern (Bacque, 2002a). Socialists criticized the increased role the President played
in the legislative campaign by accusing Chirac of “putting pressure on voters.” For
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instance, former Socialist Minister of Justice and Minister of Social A↵airs Elisabeth
Guigou accused Chirac of “pushing” French voters into voting for the UMP in the
legislative election. She said it was appropriate for the President to tell people to
vote in the legislative election, but it was inappropriate for him to tell the voters to
vote for a specific party (Le Figaro, 2002b). Hollande even said on France Te´le´visions
that Chirac was acting as a party leader and not as a head of state for the purposes
of defeating the left (Collomb-Robert, 2004).
Again, the 2002 legislative election was di↵erent from the 1997 legislative election
in several ways. First, major policy issues were not discussed as much as they were
during the 1997 election. Second, the situation of cohabitation was treated not as a
shift in policy from one party to another, but instead as a weakening of the incumbent
President’s power to enact their policy program. Essentially, the lack of policy dis-
cussion and framing of cohabitation as a weakening of executive power showed that
the 2002 legislative election was more a function of Presidential-level politics than the
1997 legislative election was.
Evidence From the Voters
Data and Methods
The examination of the debate among political actors showed that debates in 1997
legislative election were more grounded in ideology. Conversely, debates in the 2002
legislative election were less based on ideology, and focused more on whether or not
to give the President a second mandate and the institutional resources to advance
his agenda. To empirically demonstrate that the 2002 legislative election was more
a function of the 2002 Presidential election than the 1997 legislative election was of
the 1995 Presidential election, I will use survey data from the Centre for Political
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Research at Sciences Po (CEVIPOF) (Perrineau, 1997, 2002). Comparing each of
these legislative elections to these respective Presidential elections will show how the
di↵erence in timing between Presidential elections and legislative elections in France
a↵ected voters’ ideological perceptions of the major parties. According to the theory
of presidentialism’s e↵ect on party competition, we should see stronger coattail e↵ects
from the Presidential election exhibited on the 2002 legislative election than on the
1997 legislative election.
Examining these two elections works well for two reasons. First, the 1997 leg-
islative election was the last legislative election held before the 2000 constitutional
referendum, while the 2002 legislative election was the first legislative election after
the referendum. This will allow us to see immediate e↵ects that the institutional
changes caused. Second, the two major parties had the same candidates for Presi-
dent in 1995 and 2002 (Chirac for the RPR/UMP in 1995 and 2002, and Jospin for
the Socialists in 1995 and 2002). This allows for a natural control on the personal
characteristics of the Presidential candidates in the elections.
Two empirical tests will be conducted. The first test looks at the congruence be-
tween voters of a Presidential candidate and the ideological closeness of those voters
to that Presidential candidate’s party. This will involve examining Jospin voters in
1995’s ideological proximity to the Socialist Party in 1997, and then Jospin voters
in 2002’s ideological proximity to the Socialist Party in 2002. It will also involve
examining Chirac voters in 1995’s ideological proximity to the RPR in 1997, and
then Chirac voters in 2002’s ideological proximity to the UMP in 2002.23 This test
will show that there was more ideological convergence between the two parties and
their Presidential candidates during the 2002 Presidential and legislative elections.
23For both the 1995 and 2002 Presidential elections, the vote that will be analyzed will be voters’
vote in the first round. This is in part because a voter’s first round vote is closer to their true
preference, and because Jospin failed to advance to the second round in 2002. As a result, most
voters who would have otherwise voted for Jospin in the second round voted instead for Chirac over
Le Pen.
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Conversely, the test will also show that there will be less ideological congruence be-
tween the two parties and their respective Presidential candidates from 1995 during
the 1997 legislative election.
Under the theory of presidentialism and party competition, parties move ideolog-
ically closer to their presidential candidate when there is more concurrence between
the presidential election and legislative election. If there is more congruence be-
tween voting for a French Presidential candidate and feeling ideologically close to the
candidate’s party, then that is evidence that the party have moved closer to their
Presidential candidate.
The second test will examine the extent to which voters at the center of the
ideological spectrum felt ideologically close to the main parties in 1997 and 2002.
According to the theory, more centrists will identify with either the UMP or the
Socialists in 2002 than in 1997. The more that centrists perceive the Socialists or
RPR/UMP to be ideologically close to them, the more the parties are moving toward
the center of the political spectrum. We can expect the parties to converge more
toward the center in 2002 because of the centrist nature of presidential elections.
If legislative elections are concurrent with presidential elections, then parties will
move ideologically closer to the position of their presidential candidate. And since
presidential elections lead to the centrist positioning of candidates, this means parties
will find themselves more toward the center of the political spectrum.
The first test will show that the parties are ideologically converging more with
their Presidential candidates in 2002 than in 1997, while the second test will show
that the parties are moving more toward the center of the ideological spectrum in
2002 than in 1997. For the first test, when looking at Jospin voters in 1995 and 2002,
the dependent variable in question is whether or not a voter feels ideologically closest
to the Socialist Party in 1997 and 2002 respectively. When looking at Chirac voters
in 1995 and 2002, the dependent variable is whether or not a voter feels ideologically
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closest to the RPR in 1997 and the UMP in 2002 respectively.
To create these variables, I took a question that asked voters which party they felt
the closest to ideologically, and created two dummy dependent variables. The first
dummy variable either classifies a Chirac voter as feeling closest to the RPR/UMP or
feeling closest to any other or no party. The second dummy variable either classifies
a Jospin voter as feeling closest to the Socialists or feeling closest to any other or no
party. The key independent variable of interest is the year of the legislative election.
This is a dummy variable in which the voter was surveyed in 1997 (for the 1997
legislative election) or surveyed in 2002 (for the 2002 Presidential and legislative
elections).
In the second test, the dependent variable of interest is whether or not a centrist
voter felt ideologically closest to the RPR/UMP or the Socialists. To create this
dummy variable, I took the same ideological proximity variable mentioned above,
and classified a voter as feeling closest to either the RPR/UMP or Socialists for the
first category, and feeling closest to another or no party in the second category. The
independent variable for this test is the same for the first test: the year in which the
voter was surveyed (either 1997 or 2002). In this test, I am only examining voters
that did not classify themselves as being either on the left or the right politically.24
For both tests, I use several control variables: gender, age, and education.25 Binary
logistic regression models are used for both of the tests.
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of Chirac Voters in 1995 Who Felt Closest to the RPR in 1997
52.2%
47.8%
Felt Closest to RPR Did Not Feel Closest to RPR
Figure 5.2: Percentage of Chirac Voters in 2002 Who Felt Closest to the UMP in
2002
32.77%
67.23%
Felt Closest to UMP Did Not Feel Closest to UMP
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of Jospin Voters in 1995 Who Felt Closest to the Socialists in
1997
27.97%
72.03%
Felt Closest to Socialists Did Not Feel Closest to Socialists
Results
First the results for the first test are presented.26 The first result within the first test
compares the di↵erence in closeness to the RPR/UMP among Chirac voters in 1997
and 2002. The results show that Chirac voters in 2002 were significantly more likely
to feel the closest to the RPR/UMP in 2002 than in 1997, in line with expectations.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show this result.
The second result within the first test compares the di↵erence in closeness to the
Socialists among Jospin voters in 1997 and 2002. The results show that Jospin voters
in 2002 were significantly more likely to feel the closest to the Socialists in 2002 than
in 1997, also in line with expectations. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show this result. In all,
the results for the first test demonstrate that the presence of concurrent Presidential
24In the CEVIPOF surveys, ideology is measured with three categories: left, right, or neither left
nor right. In my second test I define centrists as someone who answered in the category “neither
left nor right.”
25For education, the survey asked what the highest diploma the respondent had attained.
26All of the full models used for both tests are presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of Jospin Voters in 2002 Who Felt Closest to the Socialists in
2002
86.41%
13.59%
Felt Closest to Socialists Did Not Feel Closest to Socialists
and legislative elections caused more voters of the main Presidential candidates to
feel ideologically closer to the Presidential candidate’s respective party than when the
legislative election was non-concurrent with the Presidential election. This indicates
that the parties converged more toward the position of their Presidential candidate
during the concurrent elections of 2002.
Next, the results for the second test (centrists’ closeness to the main parties) are
shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. The results show that centrists are significantly more
likely to feel the closest to either the RPR/UMP or Socialists during the concurrent
elections of 2002 than during the 1997 legislative election. The second test thus shows
that the presence of concurrent Presidential and legislative elections in 2002 caused
more centrists to feel closest to the RPR/UMP or Socialists than during the non-
concurrent legislative election of 1997. Taken along with the results from the first
test, this indicates that not only did the parties move closer to the locations of their
Presidential candidates, but since the Presidential candidates took relatively centrist
positions, the parties were moving toward the center of the political spectrum as well.
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of Centrists Who Felt the Closest to the RPR or Socialists in
1997
78.64%
21.36%
Feels Closest to the Parties Does Not Feel Closest to the Parties
Figure 5.6: Percentage of Centrists Who Felt the Closest to the UMP or Socialists in
2002
71.91%
28.09%
Feels Closest to the Parties Does Not Feel Closest to the Parties
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Conclusions
With evidence from both political leaders at the time and data from the CEVIPOF,
I have shown that there were substantial di↵erences in the campaigning styles of the
parties in the 1997 and 2002 legislative elections. In the 1997 election campaign, elec-
tion debate centered on substantial policy issues. When the constitutional changes
from 2000 were in e↵ect for the 2002 legislative election, however, the debate dur-
ing the campaign was less policy-oriented, and centered around whether or not the
President deserved a second mandate in the form of a legislative majority.
These di↵erences in campaigning techniques had e↵ects on the voters in these elec-
tions as well. Voters in the 2002 election who voted for Chirac or Jospin were more
likely to have felt the closest ideologically to the UMP/RPR or Socialists respectively
than voters in 1997 election. This indicates that there was more ideological congru-
ence between the parties and their Presidential candidates in 2002 than in 1997. In
addition, self-identifying centrist voters were more likely to feel ideologically closest
to either the UMP/RPR or Socialists in 2002 than they were in 1997. This indicates
too that since there was more congruence between the parties and their Presiden-
tial candidates in 2002 than in 1997, we could expect the parties to be perceived
as more centrist in 2002. This is a result of the centrist nature of presidential elec-
tions. Ultimately, these results corroborate with the theoretical expectation put forth
earlier that concurrent elections lead to legislative elections becoming a function of
presidential elections.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
What explains how parties decide to ideologically position themselves? This has been
a question that many scholars have tried to answer, mainly through the use of spatial
models. However, these scholars have not considered the impact that presidential
elections can have on legislative party competition. This is because existing spatial
models have modeled party competition as if it were occurring under a presidential
regime. However, in presidential regimes, the presidential election occurs separately
from the legislative election. In presidential regimes, the presidential election will
garner more attention than the legislative election. As a result, parties at the legisla-
tive level will have incentives to mimic the positions of their presidential candidates,
in order to take advantage of coattail e↵ects from the presidential election.
This dissertation argued that party competition is a function of presidential-level
competition in presidential regimes. Through the usage of formal modeling, data on
parties’ positions, survey data, as well as qualitative evidence, I presented two general
findings. First, presidentialism gives incentives for parties at the legislative level to
take more centrist positions, and second, presidential elections help to shape voters’
views about the parties competing in legislative elections. I can now present a more
detailed overview of the findings from this project. Also, limitations in the findings
will be discussed, along with further avenues for research that can build o↵ of this
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dissertation.
Chapter 2 detailed the new set of spatial models that explain how parties ideo-
logically position themselves in a world of presidentialism. Most significantly, parties
in multi-party legislative elections are in equilibria when they take positions that are
closer to the median voter than comparable parties competing under a parliamentary
regime. However, the coattail e↵ects are weakened when the legislative election is
occurring non-concurrently with the presidential election. Furthermore, the coattail
e↵ects weaken also when the legislative election is occurring under a semi-presidential
regime.
In Chapter 3, we saw that parties in presidential regimes were more centrist than
parties in parliamentary regimes. More specifically, the main parties of the left and
the right in legislative elections are ideologically closer to each other in presidential
regimes than in parliamentary regimes. These same parties were also closer to the
location of the median voter in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes.
In addition, within presidential regimes, the main parties of the left and the right
are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter during legislative elections
that are concurrent with the presidential election than similar parties during non-
concurrent legislative elections. However, the empirical results showed that within
presidential regimes, only parties competing in non-concurrent elections were ideo-
logically closer to each other and the median voter in regimes where the presidential
election is held under a plurality ballot instead of a runo↵ ballot.
Chapter 4 focused on the temporary change to direct elections for Prime Minister
in Israel, and the impact it had on the parties and voters during and after the reform.
The evidence from the 1996 and 1999 elections (which were the two elections that
also featured a separate Prime Ministerial election) show that the Labor and Likud
parties downplayed their parties’ brands and images during these elections. This then
led to a shrinking of the feeling gap between Labor and their party leader and Likud
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and their party leader among voters. The leaders in e↵ect replaced the parties. This,
combined with the centripetal nature of the Prime Ministerial election, caused voters
to perceive both Labor and Likud to be more centrist during the period of direct
elections for Prime Minister than during the period of pure parliamentary elections.
Chapter 5 explained how the constitutional reforms in France, which led to per-
manent concurrent elections starting in 2002, impacted the parties and voters. The
evidence from the 1997 legislative election shows that leaders in the RPR and So-
cialist parties focused on substantial policy issues and di↵erences. Conversely, in the
2002 legislative election, the UMP and Socialists did not discuss policy issues, and
the campaign revolved around whether or not President Chirac deserved a majority
in the National Assembly. Also, the centripetal nature of the Presidential election
caused more centrists to feel ideologically closest to either of the main two parties in
2002 than in 1997. In addition, the concurrence of the 2002 elections caused more
voters who voted for one of of the main candidates in the Presidential election to
feel ideologically closest to the party of that Presidential candidate than comparable
voters in 1997 election.
Limitations
Even though this dissertation uncovered many significant findings, there were still
several limitations. First, in Chapter 3, limitations in data did not allow for a full
replication of the formal theories put forth in Chapter 2. This was because of several
reasons. First, the lack of information on the positions of presidential candidates in
each election. Second, the datasets’ lack of the full spectrum of democratic countries,
primarily those in Latin America (where most of the world’s pure presidential regimes
are located). Third, the inability to distinguish between pure and semi-presidential
regimes in the data, due to the limited range of cases. This limited range of cases
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is also why there were mixed findings on a presidential ballot type’s e↵ect on party
positioning. While the results from the chapter kept in line with the general expec-
tations of the theory, having a stronger dataset would have provided more detail on
the empirical realties of how presidentialism a↵ects party systems.
In Chapter 4, there were a few limitations as well. First, there was only limited
information from the CSES on Israeli voters’ perceptions of Labor and Likud’s ideo-
logical positions. Data on the parties’ perceived positions were available for the 1996
and 2003 elections, but not for the 1992 and 1999 elections. In addition, the INES
did not ask voters about their perception regarding where they thought the parties
were located. This is also the case for the locations of the party leaders/Prime Min-
isterial candidates. However, still, the information that was available on perceived
party location conformed to the theoretical expectations of presidentialism’s influ-
ences on party competition. Additionally, the data that was available and used for
the chapter showed that the direct elections for Prime Minister had an e↵ect on how
voters related to both of the parties and their respective leaders. This showed that
the Knesset elections in 1996 and 1999 were functions of the direct elections for Prime
Minister occurring concurrently.
Then there were also limitations in Chapter 5. The inconsistencies in questions
asked over the course of the CEVIPOF made it more di cult to find identical ques-
tions for the 1997 and 2002 surveys. In addition, these two editions of the survey
did not ask voters where they believed the parties (nor their leaders) were located
ideologically. However, the data that I did use for the chapter still provided evidence
that the timing of the Presidential election a↵ected where voters felt in relation to
either the Gaullists or Socialists.
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Future Research
There are also implications for future research. Previous research has investigated
how di↵erent electoral systems lead to di↵erent policy outcomes, notably, on income
redistribution and social welfare policies (Persson and Tabellini, 2004; Iversen and
Soskice, 2006; Persson, 2007). Remember that PR electoral systems lead to parties
that are more non-centrist than parties competing under majoritarian electoral rules.
The presence of centrist parties would encourage lower levels of income redistribution
and social welfare spending. With that said, scholars have made the assumption that
income redistribution and social welfare spending levels will be similar (all things
being equal) in all majoritarian systems or PR systems, regardless of whether or not
the country in question has a presidential or parliamentary regime. If the factor
of presidentialism is added into the studies, we could potentially find that within
majoritarian and PR countries both, presidential regimes have lower levels of income
redistribution and welfare spending than parliamentary regimes.
The implications can also be seen if we look at the level of the individual legislator.
Results from Chapter 3 only showed the positions of legislators at the aggregate level.
However, the positions of legislators can be disaggregated further to look at the voting
ideologies of individual members of each party. We would expect to find in such an
analysis that individual legislators would be sensitive to presidential election outcomes
in their region or district.
For example, an analysis of the roll-call voting ideology of Members of the U.S.
House of Representatives would show that the Presidential election results in a given
member’s district will be a strong predictor of that member’s voting ideology. This
is because members of Congress know that voters are generally most interested in
the Presidential election when they make their voting decision. As a result, members
of Congress will see the Presidential vote share as a good proxy for measuring his
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district’s ideology. In that light, individual legislators are following the Presidential
election, making legislative behavior partly a function of politics at the Presidential
level.
A more complete picture of presidentialism’s e↵ects on voters’ views of parties’
locations could also be presented by examining evidence from American politics. This
is because the American National Election Study (ANES) has asked voters about the
ideological positions of parties and their respective Presidential candidates every two
years, over the course of several decades. Such a study would compare di↵erences in
perceived distances of parties from their presidential candidates during Presidential
election years and midterm election years.
Also, this project has indicated that it is important for researchers to consider
the positions of not just the parties in question, but the positions of parties’ pres-
idential candidates. This would mean that more election surveys should ask voters
about not only the positions of each party, but each party’s leader as well. Being
able to asses the gap between parties and their leaders will allow future scholars to
make stronger assessments of the extent presidentialism a↵ects party competition in
di↵erent institutional arrangements.
These improved surveys would not only help scholars in assessing whether or not
coattail e↵ects are present in presidential regimes, they will also be able to specifically
determine the extent to which the coattail e↵ects are working. This project did
show in Chapter 2 that there are stronger coattail e↵ects during concurrent elections.
However, having the positions of presidential candidates as well would give greater
precision in scholars’ assessments to how much presidentialism is exerting a force on
the party system.
More broadly, the findings in this dissertation will have consequences for institu-
tional designers. These would be political consequences of introducing (or removing)
presidentialism from the institutional framework of a democratic regime. The find-
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ings show that the presence or absence of presidentialism will have e↵ects on where
parties decide to stake out a position. Also, the presence or absence of presidentialism
in a country will have e↵ects on how the voters perceive the parties as well.
These findings mean two things. First, institutional designers might be indirectly
creating certain policy outcomes due to the inclusion or exclusion of presidentialism
that were not been foreseen by these designers. Second, voters’ relationships to their
political leaders will vary, according to the presence or absence of presidentialism
(or the nature of how presidentialism operates in the country). Voters will have
di↵erent opinions on the range of ideologies that are represented by the leading parties
in their country. If constitutional designers are intending to create a democratic
regime in which there are parties that represent a broader segment of ideologies in
the population, then including presidentialism would narrow the range of ideologies
that the leading political parties and o cials represent. Again, as mentioned in the
first chapter, these consequences are even more important in newly democratized
countries. It must be ensured that the institutional arrangements in these countries
are facilitating the legitimization of the democratic process.
While there were several limitations to the findings in this dissertation, there
was still a significant, common theme across them. That is, presidentialism has
a unique e↵ect on party competition. This highlights the importance of the need
for future studies on this topic. Given the consistency of the findings through the
chapters, future studies investigating the e↵ects of presidentialism should uncover
more consequences related to the findings in this dissertation. These implications
for party competition and voter attitudes will further highlight the necessity of a
thorough process of institutional design when designing new or reforming existing
institutional structures in democracies.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: List of Parties Used in Chapter 3
Country Election
Year
Left-Wing Party Right-Wing Party
Australia 1946 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1949 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1951 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1954 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1955 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1958 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1961 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1963 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1966 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1969 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1972 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1974 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1975 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1977 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1980 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1983 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1984 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1987 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
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Australia 1990 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1993 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1996 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 1998 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Australia 2001 Australian Labor Party Liberal Party of Australia
Austria 1949 Socialist Party of Austria Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1953 Socialist Party of Austria Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1956
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1959
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1962
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1966
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1970
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1971
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1975
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1979
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1983
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1986
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1990
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1994
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
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Austria 1995
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Austria 1999
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Freedom Party of Austria
Austria 2002
Social Democratic Party of
Austria
Austrian People’s Party
Belgium 1946 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1949 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1950 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1954 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1958 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1961 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1965 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1968 Belgian Socialist Party Christian Social Party
Belgium 1971 Belgian Socialist Party Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1974 Belgian Socialist Party Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1977 Belgian Socialist Party Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1978 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1981 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1985 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1987 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1991 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1995 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Belgium 1999 Socialist Party (Wallonia) Christian People’s Party
Bulgaria 1990 Bulgarian Socialist Party Union of Democratic Forces
Bulgaria 1991 Bulgarian Socialist Party Union of Democratic Forces
Bulgaria 1994 Bulgarian Socialist Party Union of Democratic Forces
Bulgaria 1997 Bulgarian Socialist Party Union of Democratic Forces
Bulgaria 2001 Bulgarian Socialist Party National Movement Simeon II
Canada 1945 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
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Canada 1949 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1953 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1957 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1958 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1962 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1963 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1965 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1968 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1972 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1974 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1979 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1980 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1984 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1988 Liberal Party of Canada
Progressive Conservative Party
of Canada
Canada 1993 Liberal Party of Canada Reform Party of Canada
Canada 1997 Liberal Party of Canada Reform Party of Canada
Canada 2000 Liberal Party of Canada Canadian Alliance
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Cyprus 1996
Progressive Party of Working
People
Democratic Rally
Cyprus 2001
Progressive Party of Working
People
Democratic Rally
Czech Republic 1990
Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia
Civic Forum
Czech Republic 1992
Communist Party of Bohemia
and Moravia
Civic Democratic Party
Czech Republic 1996 Czech Social Democratic Party Civic Democratic Party
Czech Republic 1998 Czech Social Democratic Party Civic Democratic Party
Czech Republic 2002 Czech Social Democratic Party Civic Democratic Party
Denmark 1945 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1947 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1950 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1953 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1953 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1957 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1960 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1964 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1966 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1968 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1971 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1973 Social Democrats Progress Party
Denmark 1975 Social Democrats Venstre
Denmark 1977 Social Democrats Progress Party
Denmark 1979 Social Democrats Venstre
Denmark 1981 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1984 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1987 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1988 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
Denmark 1990 Social Democrats Conservative People’s Party
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Denmark 1994 Social Democrats Venstre
Denmark 1998 Social Democrats Venstre
Denmark 2001 Social Democrats Venstre
Estonia 1992 Popular Front Bloc Fatherland Bloc
Estonia 1995 Estonian Centre Party Estonian Coalition Party
Estonia 1999 Estonian Centre Party Fatherland Union
Estonia 2003 Estonian Centre Party Res Publica Party
Finland 1945
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1948
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1951
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1954
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1958
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1962
Finnish People’s Democratic
League
National Coalition Party
Finland 1966
Finnish People’s Democratic
League
National Coalition Party
Finland 1970
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1972
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1975
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1979
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1983
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
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Finland 1987
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1991
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1995
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 1999
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
Finland 2003
Social Democratic Party of
Finland
National Coalition Party
France 1946 French Communist Party Popular Republican Movement
France 1951 French Communist Party Rally of the French People
France 1956 French Communist Party
National Centre of
Independents and Peasants
France 1973 Socialist Party
Union of Democrats for the
Republic
France 1978 Socialist Party Rally for the Republic
France 1981 Socialist Party Rally for the Republic
France 1986 Socialist Party Rally for the Republic
France 1988 Socialist Party Rally for the Republic
France 1993 Socialist Party Rally for the Republic
France 1997 Socialist Party Rally for the Republic
France 2002 Socialist Party Union for a Popular Movement
Georgia 2004 United National Movement New Rights Party of Georgia
Germany 1949
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1953
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1957
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1961
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
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Germany 1965
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1969
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1972
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1976
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1980
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1983
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1987
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1990
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1994
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 1998
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Germany 2002
Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Christian Democratic Union of
Germany
Greece 1974 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1977 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1981 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1985 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1989 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1989 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1990 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1993 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 1996 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
Greece 2000 Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy
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Hungary 1990 Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Democratic Forum
Hungary 1994 Hungarian Socialist Party Alliance of Free Democrats
Hungary 1998 Hungarian Socialist Party Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union
Hungary 2002 Hungarian Socialist Party Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union
Ireland 1948 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1951 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1954 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1957 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1961 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1965 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1969 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1973 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1977 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1981 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1982 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1982 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1987 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1989 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1992 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 1997 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Ireland 2002 Fianna Fa´il Fine Gael
Israel 1951 Mapai General Zionists
Israel 1955 Mapai Herut
Israel 1959 Mapai Herut
Israel 1961 Mapai Herut
Israel 1965 Alignment Gahal
Israel 1969 Alignment Gahal
Israel 1973 Alignment Likud
Israel 1977 Alignment Likud
Israel 1981 Alignment Likud
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Israel 1984 Alignment Likud
Israel 1988 Alignment Likud
Israel 1992 Israeli Labor Party Likud
Israel 1996 Israeli Labor Party Likud
Israel 1999 One Israel Likud
Italy 1946 Italian Socialist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1948 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1953 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1958 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1963 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1968 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1972 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1976 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1979 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1983 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1987 Italian Communist Party Christian Democracy
Italy 1992 Democratic Party of the Left Christian Democracy
Italy 1994 Democratic Party of the Left Forza Italia
Italy 1996 Democratic Party of the Left Forza Italia
Italy 2001 Democrats of the Left Forza Italia
Japan 1960 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1963 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1967 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1969 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1972 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1976 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1979 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1980 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1983 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1986 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
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Japan 1990 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1993 Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 1996 New Frontier Party Liberal Democratic Party
Japan 2000 Democratic Party of Japan Liberal Democratic Party
Latvia 1993 National Harmony Party Latvian Way
Latvia 1995 Democratic Party - Saimnieks People’s Movement for Latvia
Latvia 1998 National Harmony Party People’s Party
Latvia 2002
For Human Rights in United
Latvia
New Era Party
Lithuania 1992
Democratic Labour Party of
Lithuania
Sajudis
Lithuania 1996
Democratic Labour Party of
Lithuania
Homeland Union - Lithuanian
Conservatives
Lithuania 2000
Democratic Labour Party of
Lithuania
Liberal Union of Lithuania
Macedonia 1994
Social Democratic Union of
Macedonia
Party for Democratic Prosperity
Macedonia 1998
Social Democratic Union of
Macedonia
VMRO–DPMNE
Mexico 1997
Institutional Revolutionary
Party
National Action Party
Mexico 2000
Institutional Revolutionary
Party
National Action Party
Moldova 1994
Socialist Party of Moldova -
Unity Movement
Democratic Agrarian Party of
Moldova
Netherlands 1946 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1948 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1952 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1956 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1959 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1963 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1967 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
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Netherlands 1971 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1972 Labour Party Catholic People’s Party
Netherlands 1977 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 1981 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 1982 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 1986 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 1989 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 1994 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 1998 Labour Party
People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy
Netherlands 2002 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands 2003 Labour Party Christian Democratic Appeal
New Zealand 1946 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1949 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1951 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1954 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1957 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1960 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1963 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1966 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1969 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1972 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1975 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1978 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1981 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1984 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1987 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1990 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1993 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1996 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
New Zealand 1999 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
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New Zealand 2002 New Zealand Labour Party New Zealand National Party
Northern Ireland 1921 Nationalist Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1925 Nationalist Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1929 Nationalist Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1933 Nationalist Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1938 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1945 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1949 Nationalist Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1953 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1958 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1963 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1965 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Northern Ireland 1969 Northern Ireland Labour Party Ulster Unionist Party
Norway 1945 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1949 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1953 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1957 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1961 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1965 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1969 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1973 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1977 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1981 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1985 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1989 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1993 Labour Party Conservative Party
Norway 1997 Labour Party Progress Party
Norway 2001 Labour Party Conservative Party
Poland 1991 Democratic Left Alliance Democratic Union
Poland 1993 Democratic Left Alliance Polish People’s Party
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Poland 1997 Democratic Left Alliance Solidarity Electoral Action
Poland 2001 Democratic Left Alliance Civic Platform
Portugal 1975 Socialist Party Democratic People’s Party
Portugal 1976 Socialist Party Democratic People’s Party
Portugal 1979 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1980 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1983 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1985 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1987 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1991 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1995 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Portugal 1999 Socialist Party Social Democratic Party
Romania 1996
Social Democracy Party of
Romania
Romanian Democratic
Convention
Romania 2000
Social Democracy Party of
Romania
Greater Romania Party
Russia 2003
Communist Party of the
Russian Federation
United Russia
Serbia 2000 Socialist Party of Serbia
Democratic Opposition of
Serbia
Slovakia 1990
Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia
Public Against Violence
Slovakia 1992 Party of the Democratic Left
Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia
Slovakia 1994 Party of the Democratic Left
Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia
Slovakia 1998 Party of the Democratic Left
Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia
Slovakia 2002 Direction - Social Democracy
Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia
Slovenia 1996 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia Slovenian People’s Party
Slovenia 2000 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia Slovenian People’s Party
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South Korea 1992 Democratic Party Democratic Liberal Party
South Korea 1996
National Congress for New
Politics
New Korea Party
South Korea 2000 Millennium Democratic Party Grand National Party
South Korea 2004 Uri Party Grand National Party
South Korea 2008 United Democratic Party Grand National Party
Spain 1977 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Union of the Democratic Centre
Spain 1979 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Union of the Democratic Centre
Spain 1982 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party People’s Alliance
Spain 1986 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party People’s Alliance
Spain 1989 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party People’s Party
Spain 1993 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party People’s Party
Spain 1996 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party People’s Party
Spain 2000 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party People’s Party
Sri Lanka 1952 Sri Lanka Freedom Party United National Party
Sri Lanka 1956 Sri Lanka Freedom Party United National Party
Sri Lanka 1960 Sri Lanka Freedom Party United National Party
Sri Lanka 1965 Sri Lanka Freedom Party United National Party
Sri Lanka 1970 Sri Lanka Freedom Party United National Party
Sri Lanka 1977 Sri Lanka Freedom Party United National Party
Sweden 1944
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
National Organization of the
Right
Sweden 1948
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
National Organization of the
Right
Sweden 1952
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Rightist Party
Sweden 1956
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Rightist Party
Sweden 1958
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Rightist Party
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Sweden 1960
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Rightist Party
Sweden 1964
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Rightist Party
Sweden 1968
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Rightist Party
Sweden 1970
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1973
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1976
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1979
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1982
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1985
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1988
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1991
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1994
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 1998
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Sweden 2002
Swedish Social Democratic
Workers’ Party
Moderate Party
Switzerland 1947
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1951
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
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Switzerland 1955
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1959
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1963
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1967
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1971
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1975
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1979
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1983
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1987
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1991
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1995
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Christian Democratic People’s
Party of Switzerland
Switzerland 1999
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Swiss People’s Party
Switzerland 2003
Social Democratic Party of
Switzerland
Swiss People’s Party
Turkey 1950 Republican People’s Party Democratic Party
Turkey 1954 Republican People’s Party Democratic Party
Turkey 1957 Republican People’s Party Democratic Party
Turkey 1961 Republican People’s Party Justice Party
Turkey 1965 Republican People’s Party Justice Party
Turkey 1969 Republican People’s Party Justice Party
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Turkey 1973 Republican People’s Party Justice Party
Turkey 1977 Republican People’s Party Justice Party
Turkey 1983 People’s Party Motherland Party
Turkey 1987
Social Democratic Populist
Party
Motherland Party
Turkey 1991
Social Democratic Populist
Party
True Path Party
Turkey 1995 Democratic Left Party Welfare Party
Turkey 1999 Democratic Left Party Nationalist Movement Party
Ukraine 1994 Communist Party of Ukraine People’s Movement of Ukraine
Ukraine 1998 Communist Party of Ukraine People’s Movement of Ukraine
Ukraine 2002 Communist Party of Ukraine
Viktor Yushchenko Bloc - Our
Ukraine
United Kingdom 1945 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1950 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1951 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1955 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1959 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1964 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1966 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1970 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1974 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1974 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1979 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1983 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1987 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1992 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 1997 Labour Party Conservative Party
United Kingdom 2001 Labour Party Conservative Party
United States 1920 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1924 Democratic Party Republican Party
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United States 1928 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1932 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1936 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1940 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1944 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1948 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1952 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1956 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1960 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1964 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1968 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1972 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1976 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1980 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1984 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1988 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1992 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 1996 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 2000 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 2004 Democratic Party Republican Party
United States 2008 Democratic Party Republican Party
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Table A.2: Regression Results Used to Make Figure 3.1
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Presidentialism -6.22
(1.95)***
Concurrent Elections -8.00
(2.69)***
Non-Concurrent
Elections
-5.63
(2.33)**
Concurrent Elections
with Plurality Ballot
-6.84
(3.04)**
Concurrent Elections
with Runo↵ Ballot
-13.36
(4.70)***
Non-Concurrent
Elections with Plurality
Ballot
-13.63
(4.03)***
Non-Concurrent
Elections with Runo↵
Ballot
-5.22
(2.43)**
Majoritarian 5.19 5.59 4.18
(2.78)* (2.92)* (3.15)
Proportional 7.13 7.10 5.88
(2.59)** (2.60)*** (2.88)**
Constant 22.89 22.79 23.97
(2.44)*** (2.47)*** (2.67)***
N 440 440 440
F -statistic of model fit 6.68*** 5.66*** 7.50***
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04
Cells report Prais-Winsten FGLS parameter estimates with semirobust
standard errors in parentheses.
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.3: Regression Results Used to Make Figure 3.4
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c
Presidentialism -2.09
(1.17)*
Concurrent Elections -2.64
(1.09)**
Non-Concurrent
Elections
-1.91
(1.45)
Concurrent Elections
with Plurality Ballot
-2.19
(1.10)**
Concurrent Elections
with Runo↵ Ballot
-4.74
(3.02)
Non-Concurrent
Elections with Plurality
Ballot
-4.82
(1.26)***
Non-Concurrent
Elections with Runo↵
Ballot
-1.76
(1.52)
Majoritarian 2.12 2.24 1.72
(1.20)* (1.30)* (1.39)
Proportional 5.11 5.10 4.65
(1.30)*** (1.30)*** (1.44)***
Constant 5.33 5.30 5.73
(1.10)*** (1.13)*** (1.20)***
N 440 440 440
F -statistic of model fit 6.38*** 5.35*** 21.29***
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
Cells report Prais-Winsten FGLS parameter estimates with semirobust
standard errors in parentheses.
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.4: Regression Used to Make Figure 4.1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1996 Election 1.35*** 1.29*** 1.40***
(-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.09)
Age 0.01*** 0.01***
(-0.002) (-0.003)
Female 0.03 -0.08
(-0.08) (-0.08)
Education -0.004 -0.01
(-0.02) (-0.01)
Education2 0.0001
(-0.0004)
Ideology -2.21*** 0.14***
(-0.10) (-0.02)
Ideology2 0.29***
(-0.01)
Constant 5.92*** 2.66*** 3.30***
(-0.29) (-0.22) (-0.05)
Observations 5001 5001 5219
R2 0.17 0.06 0.05
Ordinary least squares regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.5: Regression Used to Calculate the Feeling Thermometer Gap Between the
Labor Party and Its Leader in Figure 4.2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1992 Election 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.35***
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.08)
1996 Election -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07)
1999 Election -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.36***
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07)
Age -0.0001 -0.0003
(-0.002) (-0.002)
Female 0.03 0.02
(-0.05) (-0.05)
Education -0.06*** -0.03***
(-0.01) -0.01
Education2 0.001***
(-0.0001)
Ideology -0.32*** -0.04***
(-0.07) (-0.02)
Ideology2 0.03***
(-0.01)
Constant 2.53*** 1.91*** 1.33***
(-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.06)
Observations 4987 4987 5187
R2 0.04 0.03 0.02
Ordinary least squares regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.6: Regression Used to Calculate the Feeling Thermometer Gap Between
Likud and Its Leader in Figure 4.2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1992 Election 0.11 0.14* 0.12
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.08)
1996 Election -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.34***
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.06)
1999 Election -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.39***
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.06)
Age 0.003* 0.003**
(-0.002) (-0.001)
Female -0.03 -0.02
(-0.05) (-0.05)
Education 0.02 0.01
(-0.01) (-0.01)
Education2 -0.0003*
(-0.0001)
Ideology 0.29*** 0.02*
(-0.06) (-0.01)
Ideology2 -0.03***
(-0.01)
Constant 0.50*** 0.96*** 1.25***
(-0.19) (-0.13) (-0.05)
Observations 4978 4978 5179
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02
Ordinary least squares regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.7: Regression Results Used to Make Figures 5.1 and 5.2
Model 1 Model 2
1997 Election -0.64*** -0.81***
(-0.12) (-0.11)
Female -0.05
(-0.12)
Age 0.01**
(-0.004)
Left -0.55**
(-0.28)
Right 1.55***
(-0.15)
Education 0.07***
(-0.02)
Constant -1.18*** 0.72***
(-0.30) (-0.08)
N 1480 1488
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.03
Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.8: Regression Results Used to Make Figures 5.3 and 5.4
Model 1 Model 2
1997 Election -0.75*** -0.90***
(-0.15) (-0.14)
Female -0.24*
(-0.14)
Age 0.01***
(-0.005)
Left 1.71***
(-0.2)
Right 0.2
(-0.47)
Education 0.06**
(-0.03)
Constant -0.52 1.85***
(-0.37) (-0.12)
N 1431 1434
Pseudo R2 (-0.10) (-0.03)
Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table A.9: Regression Results Used to Make Figures 5.5 and 5.6
Model 1 Model 2
1997 Election -0.36*** -0.36***
(-0.12) (-0.12)
Female 0.14
(-0.12)
Age 0.01***
(-0.004)
Education 0.001
(-0.02)
Constant -1.65*** -0.94***
(-0.26) (-0.08)
N 1515 1515
Pseudo R2 (-0.02) (-0.01)
Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses
⇤p < 0.10; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
